Daily Papers

Decentralized reputation schemes present a promising area of experimentation in blockchain applications. These solutions aim to overcome the shortcomings of simple monetary incentive mechanisms of naive tokenomics. However, there is a significant research gap regarding the limitations and benefits of such solutions. We formulate these trade-offs as a conjecture on the irreconcilability of three desirable properties of the reputation system in this context. Such a system can not be simultaneously generalizable, trustless, and Sybil resistant. To handle the limitations of this trilemma, we propose MeritRank: Sybil tolerant feedback aggregation mechanism for reputation. Instead of preventing Sybil attacks, our approach successfully bounds the benefits of these attacks. Using a dataset of participants' interactions in MakerDAO, we run experiments to demonstrate Sybil tolerance of MeritRank. Decay parameters of reputation in MeritRank: transitivity decay and connectivity decay, allow for a fine-tuning of desirable levels of reputation utility and Sybil tolerance in different use contexts.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

To enhance the efficiency and practicality of federated bandit learning, recent advances have introduced incentives to motivate communication among clients, where a client participates only when the incentive offered by the server outweighs its participation cost. However, existing incentive mechanisms naively assume the clients are truthful: they all report their true cost and thus the higher cost one participating client claims, the more the server has to pay. Therefore, such mechanisms are vulnerable to strategic clients aiming to optimize their own utility by misreporting. To address this issue, we propose an incentive compatible (i.e., truthful) communication protocol, named Truth-FedBan, where the incentive for each participant is independent of its self-reported cost, and reporting the true cost is the only way to achieve the best utility. More importantly, Truth-FedBan still guarantees the sub-linear regret and communication cost without any overheads. In other words, the core conceptual contribution of this paper is, for the first time, demonstrating the possibility of simultaneously achieving incentive compatibility and nearly optimal regret in federated bandit learning. Extensive numerical studies further validate the effectiveness of our proposed solution.

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a mathcal{O} (KT) regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

In collaborative learning with streaming data, nodes (e.g., organizations) jointly and continuously learn a machine learning (ML) model by sharing the latest model updates computed from their latest streaming data. For the more resourceful nodes to be willing to share their model updates, they need to be fairly incentivized. This paper explores an incentive design that guarantees fairness so that nodes receive rewards commensurate to their contributions. Our approach leverages an explore-then-exploit formulation to estimate the nodes' contributions (i.e., exploration) for realizing our theoretically guaranteed fair incentives (i.e., exploitation). However, we observe a "rich get richer" phenomenon arising from the existing approaches to guarantee fairness and it discourages the participation of the less resourceful nodes. To remedy this, we additionally preserve asymptotic equality, i.e., less resourceful nodes achieve equal performance eventually to the more resourceful/"rich" nodes. We empirically demonstrate in two settings with real-world streaming data: federated online incremental learning and federated reinforcement learning, that our proposed approach outperforms existing baselines in fairness and learning performance while remaining competitive in preserving equality.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

We develop a Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) method to learn scalable control policies for target tracking. Our method can handle an arbitrary number of pursuers and targets; we show results for tasks consisting up to 1000 pursuers tracking 1000 targets. We use a decentralized, partially-observable Markov Decision Process framework to model pursuers as agents receiving partial observations (range and bearing) about targets which move using fixed, unknown policies. An attention mechanism is used to parameterize the value function of the agents; this mechanism allows us to handle an arbitrary number of targets. Entropy-regularized off-policy RL methods are used to train a stochastic policy, and we discuss how it enables a hedging behavior between pursuers that leads to a weak form of cooperation in spite of completely decentralized control execution. We further develop a masking heuristic that allows training on smaller problems with few pursuers-targets and execution on much larger problems. Thorough simulation experiments, ablation studies, and comparisons to state of the art algorithms are performed to study the scalability of the approach and robustness of performance to varying numbers of agents and targets.

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

We utilize an offline reinforcement learning (RL) model for sequential targeted promotion in the presence of budget constraints in a real-world business environment. In our application, the mobile app aims to boost customer retention by sending cash bonuses to customers and control the costs of such cash bonuses during each time period. To achieve the multi-task goal, we propose the Budget Constrained Reinforcement Learning for Sequential Promotion (BCRLSP) framework to determine the value of cash bonuses to be sent to users. We first find out the target policy and the associated Q-values that maximizes the user retention rate using an RL model. A linear programming (LP) model is then added to satisfy the constraints of promotion costs. We solve the LP problem by maximizing the Q-values of actions learned from the RL model given the budget constraints. During deployment, we combine the offline RL model with the LP model to generate a robust policy under the budget constraints. Using both online and offline experiments, we demonstrate the efficacy of our approach by showing that BCRLSP achieves a higher long-term customer retention rate and a lower cost than various baselines. Taking advantage of the near real-time cost control method, the proposed framework can easily adapt to data with a noisy behavioral policy and/or meet flexible budget constraints.

Effective conversational agents must be able to personalize their behavior to suit a user's preferences, personality, and attributes, whether they are assisting with writing tasks or operating in domains like education or healthcare. Current training methods like Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) prioritize helpfulness and safety but fall short in fostering truly empathetic, adaptive, and personalized interactions. Traditional approaches to personalization often rely on extensive user history, limiting their effectiveness for new or context-limited users. To overcome these limitations, we propose to incorporate an intrinsic motivation to improve the conversational agents's model of the user as an additional reward alongside multi-turn RLHF. This reward mechanism encourages the agent to actively elicit user traits by optimizing conversations to increase the accuracy of its user model. Consequently, the policy agent can deliver more personalized interactions through obtaining more information about the user. We applied our method both education and fitness settings, where LLMs teach concepts or recommend personalized strategies based on users' hidden learning style or lifestyle attributes. Using LLM-simulated users, our approach outperformed a multi-turn RLHF baseline in revealing information about the users' preferences, and adapting to them.

Information is often stored in a distributed and proprietary form, and agents who own information are often self-interested and require incentives to reveal their information. Suitable mechanisms are required to elicit and aggregate such distributed information for decision making. In this paper, we use simulations to investigate the use of decision markets as mechanisms in a multi-agent learning system to aggregate distributed information for decision-making in a contextual bandit problem. The system utilises strictly proper decision scoring rules to assess the accuracy of probabilistic reports from agents, which allows agents to learn to solve the contextual bandit problem jointly. Our simulations show that our multi-agent system with distributed information can be trained as efficiently as a centralised counterpart with a single agent that receives all information. Moreover, we use our system to investigate scenarios with deterministic decision scoring rules which are not incentive compatible. We observe the emergence of more complex dynamics with manipulative behaviour, which agrees with existing theoretical analyses.

Designing reward functions for efficiently guiding reinforcement learning (RL) agents toward specific behaviors is a complex task. This is challenging since it requires the identification of reward structures that are not sparse and that avoid inadvertently inducing undesirable behaviors. Naively modifying the reward structure to offer denser and more frequent feedback can lead to unintended outcomes and promote behaviors that are not aligned with the designer's intended goal. Although potential-based reward shaping is often suggested as a remedy, we systematically investigate settings where deploying it often significantly impairs performance. To address these issues, we introduce a new framework that uses a bi-level objective to learn behavior alignment reward functions. These functions integrate auxiliary rewards reflecting a designer's heuristics and domain knowledge with the environment's primary rewards. Our approach automatically determines the most effective way to blend these types of feedback, thereby enhancing robustness against heuristic reward misspecification. Remarkably, it can also adapt an agent's policy optimization process to mitigate suboptimalities resulting from limitations and biases inherent in the underlying RL algorithms. We evaluate our method's efficacy on a diverse set of tasks, from small-scale experiments to high-dimensional control challenges. We investigate heuristic auxiliary rewards of varying quality -- some of which are beneficial and others detrimental to the learning process. Our results show that our framework offers a robust and principled way to integrate designer-specified heuristics. It not only addresses key shortcomings of existing approaches but also consistently leads to high-performing solutions, even when given misaligned or poorly-specified auxiliary reward functions.

In peer mechanisms, the competitors for a prize also determine who wins. Each competitor may be asked to rank, grade, or nominate peers for the prize. Since the prize can be valuable, such as financial aid, course grades, or an award at a conference, competitors may be tempted to manipulate the mechanism. We survey approaches to prevent or discourage the manipulation of peer mechanisms. We conclude our survey by identifying several important research challenges.

Current reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) pipelines for large language model (LLM) alignment typically assign scalar rewards to sequences, using the final token as a surrogate indicator for the quality of the entire sequence. However, this leads to sparse feedback and suboptimal token-level credit assignment. In this work, we frame reward shaping as an optimization problem focused on token-level credit assignment. We propose a reward-shaping function leveraging explainability methods such as SHAP and LIME to estimate per-token rewards from the reward model. To learn parameters of this shaping function, we employ a bilevel optimization framework that integrates Bayesian Optimization and policy training to handle noise from the token reward estimates. Our experiments show that achieving a better balance of token-level reward attribution leads to performance improvements over baselines on downstream tasks and finds an optimal policy faster during training. Furthermore, we show theoretically that explainability methods that are feature additive attribution functions maintain the optimal policy as the original reward.

In cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), agents aim to achieve a common goal, such as defeating enemies or scoring a goal. Existing MARL algorithms are effective but still require significant learning time and often get trapped in local optima by complex tasks, subsequently failing to discover a goal-reaching policy. To address this, we introduce Efficient episodic Memory Utilization (EMU) for MARL, with two primary objectives: (a) accelerating reinforcement learning by leveraging semantically coherent memory from an episodic buffer and (b) selectively promoting desirable transitions to prevent local convergence. To achieve (a), EMU incorporates a trainable encoder/decoder structure alongside MARL, creating coherent memory embeddings that facilitate exploratory memory recall. To achieve (b), EMU introduces a novel reward structure called episodic incentive based on the desirability of states. This reward improves the TD target in Q-learning and acts as an additional incentive for desirable transitions. We provide theoretical support for the proposed incentive and demonstrate the effectiveness of EMU compared to conventional episodic control. The proposed method is evaluated in StarCraft II and Google Research Football, and empirical results indicate further performance improvement over state-of-the-art methods.

We present the LLM Economist, a novel framework that uses agent-based modeling to design and assess economic policies in strategic environments with hierarchical decision-making. At the lower level, bounded rational worker agents -- instantiated as persona-conditioned prompts sampled from U.S. Census-calibrated income and demographic statistics -- choose labor supply to maximize text-based utility functions learned in-context. At the upper level, a planner agent employs in-context reinforcement learning to propose piecewise-linear marginal tax schedules anchored to the current U.S. federal brackets. This construction endows economic simulacra with three capabilities requisite for credible fiscal experimentation: (i) optimization of heterogeneous utilities, (ii) principled generation of large, demographically realistic agent populations, and (iii) mechanism design -- the ultimate nudging problem -- expressed entirely in natural language. Experiments with populations of up to one hundred interacting agents show that the planner converges near Stackelberg equilibria that improve aggregate social welfare relative to Saez solutions, while a periodic, persona-level voting procedure furthers these gains under decentralized governance. These results demonstrate that large language model-based agents can jointly model, simulate, and govern complex economic systems, providing a tractable test bed for policy evaluation at the societal scale to help build better civilizations.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance in reasoning tasks, where reinforcement learning (RL) serves as a key algorithm for enhancing their reasoning capabilities. Currently, there are two mainstream reward paradigms: model-based rewards and rule-based rewards. However, both approaches suffer from limitations: rule-based rewards lack robustness, while model-based rewards are vulnerable to reward hacking. To address these issues, we propose Cooper(Co-optimizing Policy Model and Reward Model), a RL framework that jointly optimizes both the policy model and the reward model. Cooper leverages the high precision of rule-based rewards when identifying correct responses, and dynamically constructs and selects positive-negative sample pairs for continued training the reward model. This design enhances robustness and mitigates the risk of reward hacking. To further support Cooper, we introduce a hybrid annotation strategy that efficiently and accurately generates training data for the reward model. We also propose a reference-based reward modeling paradigm, where the reward model takes a reference answer as input. Based on this design, we train a reward model named VerifyRM, which achieves higher accuracy on VerifyBench compared to other models of the same size. We conduct reinforcement learning using both VerifyRM and Cooper. Our experiments show that Cooper not only alleviates reward hacking but also improves end-to-end RL performance, for instance, achieving a 0.54% gain in average accuracy on Qwen2.5-1.5B-Instruct. Our findings demonstrate that dynamically updating reward model is an effective way to combat reward hacking, providing a reference for better integrating reward models into RL.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

Solving the problem of cooperation is fundamentally important for the creation and maintenance of functional societies. Problems of cooperation are omnipresent within human society, with examples ranging from navigating busy road junctions to negotiating treaties. As the use of AI becomes more pervasive throughout society, the need for socially intelligent agents capable of navigating these complex cooperative dilemmas is becoming increasingly evident. Direct punishment is a ubiquitous social mechanism that has been shown to foster the emergence of cooperation in both humans and non-humans. In the natural world, direct punishment is often strongly coupled with partner selection and reputation and used in conjunction with third-party punishment. The interactions between these mechanisms could potentially enhance the emergence of cooperation within populations. However, no previous work has evaluated the learning dynamics and outcomes emerging from Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) populations that combine these mechanisms. This paper addresses this gap. It presents a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of the behaviors and learning dynamics associated with direct punishment, third-party punishment, partner selection, and reputation. Finally, we discuss the implications of using these mechanisms on the design of cooperative AI systems.

Reward models have been increasingly critical for improving the reasoning capability of LLMs. Existing research has shown that a well-trained reward model can substantially improve model performances at inference time via search. However, the potential of reward models during RL training time still remains largely under-explored. It is currently unclear whether these reward models can provide additional training signals to enhance the reasoning capabilities of LLMs in RL training that uses sparse success rewards, which verify the correctness of solutions. In this work, we evaluate popular reward models for RL training, including the Outcome-supervised Reward Model (ORM) and the Process-supervised Reward Model (PRM), and train a collection of LLMs for math problems using RL by combining these learned rewards with success rewards. Surprisingly, even though these learned reward models have strong inference-time performances, they may NOT help or even hurt RL training, producing worse performances than LLMs trained with the success reward only. Our analysis reveals that an LLM can receive high rewards from some of these reward models by repeating correct but unnecessary reasoning steps, leading to a severe reward hacking issue. Therefore, we introduce two novel reward refinement techniques, including Clipping and Delta. The key idea is to ensure the accumulative reward of any reasoning trajectory is upper-bounded to keep a learned reward model effective without being exploited. We evaluate our techniques with multiple reward models over a set of 1.5B and 7B LLMs on MATH and GSM8K benchmarks and demonstrate that with a carefully designed reward function, RL training without any additional supervised tuning can improve all the evaluated LLMs, including the state-of-the-art 7B LLM Qwen2.5-Math-7B-Instruct on MATH and GSM8K benchmarks.

We propose Fuzzy Group Relative Policy Reward (FGRPR), a novel framework that integrates Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) with a fuzzy reward function to enhance learning efficiency. Unlike the conventional binary 0/1 accuracy reward, our fuzzy reward model provides nuanced incentives, encouraging more precise outputs. Experimental results demonstrate that GRPO with a standard 0/1 accuracy reward underperforms compared to supervised fine-tuning (SFT). In contrast, FGRPR, applied to Qwen2.5-VL(3B and 7B), surpasses all baseline models, including GPT4o, LLaMA2(90B), and SFT, across five in-domain datasets. On an out-of-domain dataset, FGRPR achieves performance comparable to SFT but excels when target values are larger, as its fuzzy reward function assigns higher rewards to closer approximations. This approach is broadly applicable to tasks where the precision of the answer is critical. Code and data: https://github.com/yeyimilk/CrowdVLM-R1

Dense process rewards have proven a more effective alternative to the sparse outcome-level rewards in the inference-time scaling of large language models (LLMs), particularly in tasks requiring complex multi-step reasoning. While dense rewards also offer an appealing choice for the reinforcement learning (RL) of LLMs since their fine-grained rewards have the potential to address some inherent issues of outcome rewards, such as training efficiency and credit assignment, this potential remains largely unrealized. This can be primarily attributed to the challenges of training process reward models (PRMs) online, where collecting high-quality process labels is prohibitively expensive, making them particularly vulnerable to reward hacking. To address these challenges, we propose PRIME (Process Reinforcement through IMplicit rEwards), which enables online PRM updates using only policy rollouts and outcome labels through implict process rewards. PRIME combines well with various advantage functions and forgoes the dedicated reward model training phrase that existing approaches require, substantially reducing the development overhead. We demonstrate PRIME's effectiveness on competitional math and coding. Starting from Qwen2.5-Math-7B-Base, PRIME achieves a 15.1% average improvement across several key reasoning benchmarks over the SFT model. Notably, our resulting model, Eurus-2-7B-PRIME, surpasses Qwen2.5-Math-7B-Instruct on seven reasoning benchmarks with 10% of its training data.

Foundation models, specifically Large Language Models (LLMs), have lately gained wide-spread attention and adoption. Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) involves training a reward model to capture desired behaviors, which is then used to align LLM's. These reward models are additionally used at inference-time to estimate LLM responses' adherence to those desired behaviors. However, there is little work measuring how robust these reward models are to distribution shifts. In this work, we evaluate how reward model performance - measured via accuracy and calibration (i.e. alignment between accuracy and confidence) - is affected by distribution shift. We show novel calibration patterns and accuracy drops due to OOD prompts and responses, and that the reward model is more sensitive to shifts in responses than prompts. Additionally, we adapt an OOD detection technique commonly used in classification to the reward model setting to detect these distribution shifts in prompts and responses.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such mechanisms by having agents play a game instead of tossing a coin. The game is designed so an agent's best action is to play randomly, and this play then injects ``randomness'' into the mechanism. This derandomization retains many of the good normative properties of the original randomized mechanism but gives a mechanism that is deterministic and easy, for instance, to audit. We consider three related methods to derandomize randomized mechanism in six different domains: voting, facility location, task allocation, school choice, peer selection, and resource allocation. We propose a number of novel derandomized mechanisms for these six domains with good normative properties. Each mechanism has a mixed Nash equilibrium in which agents play a modular arithmetic game with an uniform mixed strategy. In all but one mixed Nash equilibrium, agents report their preferences over the original problem sincerely. The derandomized methods are thus ``quasi-strategy proof''. In one domain, we additionally show that a new and desirable normative property emerges as a result of derandomization.

In natural human-to-human conversations, participants often receive feedback signals from one another based on their follow-up reactions. These reactions can include verbal responses, facial expressions, changes in emotional state, and other non-verbal cues. Similarly, in human-machine interactions, the machine can leverage the user's follow-up utterances as feedback signals to assess whether it has appropriately addressed the user's request. Therefore, we propose using the likelihood of follow-up utterances as rewards to differentiate preferred responses from less favored ones, without relying on human or commercial LLM-based preference annotations. Our proposed reward mechanism, ``Follow-up Likelihood as Reward" (FLR), matches the performance of strong reward models trained on large-scale human or GPT-4 annotated data on 8 pairwise-preference and 4 rating-based benchmarks. Building upon the FLR mechanism, we propose to automatically mine preference data from the online generations of a base policy model. The preference data are subsequently used to boost the helpfulness of the base model through direct alignment from preference (DAP) methods, such as direct preference optimization (DPO). Lastly, we demonstrate that fine-tuning the language model that provides follow-up likelihood with natural language feedback significantly enhances FLR's performance on reward modeling benchmarks and effectiveness in aligning the base policy model's helpfulness.

Reward design in reinforcement learning (RL) is challenging since specifying human notions of desired behavior may be difficult via reward functions or require many expert demonstrations. Can we instead cheaply design rewards using a natural language interface? This paper explores how to simplify reward design by prompting a large language model (LLM) such as GPT-3 as a proxy reward function, where the user provides a textual prompt containing a few examples (few-shot) or a description (zero-shot) of the desired behavior. Our approach leverages this proxy reward function in an RL framework. Specifically, users specify a prompt once at the beginning of training. During training, the LLM evaluates an RL agent's behavior against the desired behavior described by the prompt and outputs a corresponding reward signal. The RL agent then uses this reward to update its behavior. We evaluate whether our approach can train agents aligned with user objectives in the Ultimatum Game, matrix games, and the DealOrNoDeal negotiation task. In all three tasks, we show that RL agents trained with our framework are well-aligned with the user's objectives and outperform RL agents trained with reward functions learned via supervised learning

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has emerged as a powerful technique to make large language models (LLMs) easier to use and more effective. A core piece of the RLHF process is the training and utilization of a model of human preferences that acts as a reward function for optimization. This approach, which operates at the intersection of many stakeholders and academic disciplines, remains poorly understood. RLHF reward models are often cited as being central to achieving performance, yet very few descriptors of capabilities, evaluations, training methods, or open-source models exist. Given this lack of information, further study and transparency is needed for learned RLHF reward models. In this paper, we illustrate the complex history of optimizing preferences, and articulate lines of inquiry to understand the sociotechnical context of reward models. In particular, we highlight the ontological differences between costs, rewards, and preferences at stake in RLHF's foundations, related methodological tensions, and possible research directions to improve general understanding of how reward models function.

Process reward models (PRMs) have proven effective for test-time scaling of Large Language Models (LLMs) on challenging reasoning tasks. However, reward hacking issues with PRMs limit their successful application in reinforcement fine-tuning. In this paper, we identify the main cause of PRM-induced reward hacking: the canonical summation-form credit assignment in reinforcement learning (RL), which defines the value as cumulative gamma-decayed future rewards, easily induces LLMs to hack steps with high rewards. To address this, we propose PURE: Process sUpervised Reinforcement lEarning. The key innovation of PURE is a min-form credit assignment that formulates the value function as the minimum of future rewards. This method significantly alleviates reward hacking by limiting the value function range and distributing advantages more reasonably. Through extensive experiments on 3 base models, we show that PRM-based approaches enabling min-form credit assignment achieve comparable reasoning performance to verifiable reward-based methods within only 30% steps. In contrast, the canonical sum-form credit assignment collapses training even at the beginning! Additionally, when we supplement PRM-based fine-tuning with just 10% verifiable rewards, we further alleviate reward hacking and produce the best fine-tuned model based on Qwen2.5-Math-7B in our experiments, achieving 82.5% accuracy on AMC23 and 53.3% average accuracy across 5 benchmarks. Moreover, we summarize the observed reward hacking cases and analyze the causes of training collapse. Code and models are available at https://github.com/CJReinforce/PURE.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) is essential for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values. However, RLHF is susceptible to reward hacking, where the agent exploits flaws in the reward function rather than learning the intended behavior, thus degrading alignment. While reward shaping helps stabilize RLHF and partially mitigate reward hacking, a systematic investigation into shaping techniques and their underlying principles remains lacking. To bridge this gap, we present a comprehensive study of the prevalent reward shaping methods. Our analysis suggests three key design principles: (1) RL reward is ideally bounded, (2) RL benefits from rapid initial growth followed by gradual convergence, and (3) RL reward is best formulated as a function of centered reward. Guided by these insights, we propose Preference As Reward (PAR), a novel approach that leverages the latent preferences embedded within the reward model itself as the signal for reinforcement learning. We evaluated PAR on two base models, Gemma2-2B and Llama3-8B, using two datasets, Ultrafeedback-Binarized and HH-RLHF. Experimental results demonstrate PAR's superior performance over other reward shaping methods. On the AlpacaEval 2.0 benchmark, PAR achieves a win rate at least 5 percentage points higher than competing approaches. Furthermore, PAR exhibits remarkable data efficiency, requiring only a single reference reward for optimal performance, and maintains robustness against reward hacking even after two full epochs of training. Code is available at https://github.com/PorUna-byte/PAR.

Recent advances such as DeepSeek R1-Zero highlight the effectiveness of incentive training, a reinforcement learning paradigm that computes rewards solely based on the final answer part of a language model's output, thereby encouraging the generation of intermediate reasoning steps. However, these methods fundamentally rely on external verifiers, which limits their applicability to domains like mathematics and coding where such verifiers are readily available. Although reward models can serve as verifiers, they require high-quality annotated data and are costly to train. In this work, we propose NOVER, NO-VERifier Reinforcement Learning, a general reinforcement learning framework that requires only standard supervised fine-tuning data with no need for an external verifier. NOVER enables incentive training across a wide range of text-to-text tasks and outperforms the model of the same size distilled from large reasoning models such as DeepSeek R1 671B by 7.7 percent. Moreover, the flexibility of NOVER enables new possibilities for optimizing large language models, such as inverse incentive training.

Decentralized learning offers a promising approach to crowdsource data consumptions and computational workloads across geographically distributed compute interconnected through peer-to-peer networks, accommodating the exponentially increasing demands. However, proper incentives are still in absence, considerably discouraging participation. Our vision is that a fair incentive mechanism relies on fair attribution of contributions to participating nodes, which faces non-trivial challenges arising from the localized connections making influence ``cascade'' in a decentralized network. To overcome this, we design the first method to estimate Data Influence CascadE (DICE) in a decentralized environment. Theoretically, the framework derives tractable approximations of influence cascade over arbitrary neighbor hops, suggesting the influence cascade is determined by an interplay of data, communication topology, and the curvature of loss landscape. DICE also lays the foundations for applications including selecting suitable collaborators and identifying malicious behaviors. Project page is available at https://raiden-zhu.github.io/blog/2025/DICE/.

Ensuring sufficient exploration is a central challenge when training meta-reinforcement learning (meta-RL) agents to solve novel environments. Conventional solutions to the exploration-exploitation dilemma inject explicit incentives such as randomization, uncertainty bonuses, or intrinsic rewards to encourage exploration. In this work, we hypothesize that an agent trained solely to maximize a greedy (exploitation-only) objective can nonetheless exhibit emergent exploratory behavior, provided three conditions are met: (1) Recurring Environmental Structure, where the environment features repeatable regularities that allow past experience to inform future choices; (2) Agent Memory, enabling the agent to retain and utilize historical interaction data; and (3) Long-Horizon Credit Assignment, where learning propagates returns over a time frame sufficient for the delayed benefits of exploration to inform current decisions. Through experiments in stochastic multi-armed bandits and temporally extended gridworlds, we observe that, when both structure and memory are present, a policy trained on a strictly greedy objective exhibits information-seeking exploratory behavior. We further demonstrate, through controlled ablations, that emergent exploration vanishes if either environmental structure or agent memory is absent (Conditions 1 & 2). Surprisingly, removing long-horizon credit assignment (Condition 3) does not always prevent emergent exploration-a result we attribute to the pseudo-Thompson Sampling effect. These findings suggest that, under the right prerequisites, exploration and exploitation need not be treated as orthogonal objectives but can emerge from a unified reward-maximization process.

Diffusion models have emerged as the de facto paradigm for video generation. However, their reliance on web-scale data of varied quality often yields results that are visually unappealing and misaligned with the textual prompts. To tackle this problem, we propose InstructVideo to instruct text-to-video diffusion models with human feedback by reward fine-tuning. InstructVideo has two key ingredients: 1) To ameliorate the cost of reward fine-tuning induced by generating through the full DDIM sampling chain, we recast reward fine-tuning as editing. By leveraging the diffusion process to corrupt a sampled video, InstructVideo requires only partial inference of the DDIM sampling chain, reducing fine-tuning cost while improving fine-tuning efficiency. 2) To mitigate the absence of a dedicated video reward model for human preferences, we repurpose established image reward models, e.g., HPSv2. To this end, we propose Segmental Video Reward, a mechanism to provide reward signals based on segmental sparse sampling, and Temporally Attenuated Reward, a method that mitigates temporal modeling degradation during fine-tuning. Extensive experiments, both qualitative and quantitative, validate the practicality and efficacy of using image reward models in InstructVideo, significantly enhancing the visual quality of generated videos without compromising generalization capabilities. Code and models will be made publicly available.

Reward modeling in large language models is susceptible to reward hacking, causing models to latch onto superficial features such as the tendency to generate lists or unnecessarily long responses. In reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) and more generally during post-training flawed reward signals often lead to outputs that optimize for these spurious correlates instead of genuine quality or correctness. We propose Context-Aware Reward Modeling (CARMO), a novel approach that first generates dynamic, context-relevant criteria to ground the reward model before producing reward scores. Unlike prior methods that rely on static rubrics, CARMO leverages large language models (LLMs) to adaptively create evaluation criteria such as logical consistency, clarity, and depth tailored to the user query. Our theoretical analysis shows that such criteria generation can mitigate reward hacking. We further demonstrate that CARMO can be distilled into smaller models, reducing the computational cost of alignment. We establish a new state-of-the-art performance in zero-shot settings for generative models, achieving a 2.1\% improvement on Reward Bench. Furthermore, alignment performed on the CARMO-curated preference dataset achieves 22.5\% and 21.1\% LC-WR and WR, respectively, on Mistral-Base (7B).