Daily Papers

Multi-agent systems commonly distribute tasks among specialized, autonomous agents, yet they often lack mechanisms to replace or reassign underperforming agents in real time. Inspired by the free-agency model of Major League Baseball, the Reinforcement Learning Free Agent (RLFA) algorithm introduces a reward-based mechanism to detect and remove agents exhibiting persistent underperformance and seamlessly insert more capable ones. Each agent internally uses a mixture-of-experts (MoE) approach, delegating incoming tasks to specialized sub-models under the guidance of a gating function. A primary use case is fraud detection, where RLFA promptly swaps out an agent whose detection accuracy dips below a preset threshold. A new agent is tested in a probationary mode, and upon demonstrating superior performance, fully replaces the underperformer. This dynamic, free-agency cycle ensures sustained accuracy, quicker adaptation to emerging threats, and minimal disruption to ongoing operations. By continually refreshing its roster of agents, the system fosters ongoing improvements and more resilient collaboration in multi-agent Generative AI environments.

Organizations typically train large models individually. This is costly and time-consuming, particularly for large-scale foundation models. Such vertical production is known to be suboptimal. Inspired by this economic insight, we ask whether it is possible to leverage others' expertise by trading the constituent parts in models, i.e., sets of weights, as if they were market commodities. While recent advances in aligning and interpolating models suggest that doing so may be possible, a number of fundamental questions must be answered to create viable parameter markets. In this work, we address these basic questions, propose a framework containing the infrastructure necessary for market operations to take place, study strategies for exchanging parameters, and offer means for agents to monetize parameters. Excitingly, compared to agents who train siloed models from scratch, we show that it is possible to mutually gain by using the market, even in competitive settings. This suggests that the notion of parameter markets may be a useful paradigm for improving large-scale model training in the future.

Rapid Large Language Model (LLM) advancements are fueling autonomous Multi-Agent System (MAS) development. However, current frameworks often lack flexibility, resource awareness, model diversity, and autonomous tool creation. This paper introduces HASHIRU (Hierarchical Agent System for Hybrid Intelligent Resource Utilization), a novel MAS framework enhancing flexibility, resource efficiency, and adaptability. HASHIRU features a "CEO" agent dynamically managing specialized "employee" agents, instantiated based on task needs and resource constraints (cost, memory). Its hybrid intelligence prioritizes smaller, local LLMs (via Ollama) while flexibly using external APIs and larger models when necessary. An economic model with hiring/firing costs promotes team stability and efficient resource allocation. The system also includes autonomous API tool creation and a memory function. Evaluations on tasks like academic paper review (58% success), safety assessments (100% on a JailbreakBench subset), and complex reasoning (outperforming Gemini 2.0 Flash on GSM8K: 96% vs. 61%; JEEBench: 80% vs. 68.3%; SVAMP: 92% vs. 84%) demonstrate HASHIRU's capabilities. Case studies illustrate its self-improvement via autonomous cost model generation, tool integration, and budget management. HASHIRU offers a promising approach for more robust, efficient, and adaptable MAS through dynamic hierarchical control, resource-aware hybrid intelligence, and autonomous functional extension. Source code and benchmarks are available at https://github.com/HASHIRU-AI/HASHIRU and https://github.com/HASHIRU-AI/HASHIRUBench respectively, and a live demo is available at https://hashiruagentx-hashiruai.hf.space upon request.

Agent-based modeling (ABM) seeks to understand the behavior of complex systems by simulating a collection of agents that act and interact within an environment. Their practical utility requires capturing realistic environment dynamics and adaptive agent behavior while efficiently simulating million-size populations. Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) present an opportunity to enhance ABMs by using LLMs as agents with further potential to capture adaptive behavior. However, the computational infeasibility of using LLMs for large populations has hindered their widespread adoption. In this paper, we introduce AgentTorch -- a framework that scales ABMs to millions of agents while capturing high-resolution agent behavior using LLMs. We benchmark the utility of LLMs as ABM agents, exploring the trade-off between simulation scale and individual agency. Using the COVID-19 pandemic as a case study, we demonstrate how AgentTorch can simulate 8.4 million agents representing New York City, capturing the impact of isolation and employment behavior on health and economic outcomes. We compare the performance of different agent architectures based on heuristic and LLM agents in predicting disease waves and unemployment rates. Furthermore, we showcase AgentTorch's capabilities for retrospective, counterfactual, and prospective analyses, highlighting how adaptive agent behavior can help overcome the limitations of historical data in policy design. AgentTorch is an open-source project actively being used for policy-making and scientific discovery around the world. The framework is available here: github.com/AgentTorch/AgentTorch.

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) systems have transformed various industries by autonomously generating content that mimics human creativity. However, concerns about their social and economic consequences arise with widespread adoption. This paper employs agent-based modeling (ABM) to explore these implications, predicting the impact of generative AI on societal frameworks. The ABM integrates individual, business, and governmental agents to simulate dynamics such as education, skills acquisition, AI adoption, and regulatory responses. This study enhances understanding of AI's complex interactions and provides insights for policymaking. The literature review underscores ABM's effectiveness in forecasting AI impacts, revealing AI adoption, employment, and regulation trends with potential policy implications. Future research will refine the model, assess long-term implications and ethical considerations, and deepen understanding of generative AI's societal effects.

Standard federated learning (FL) approaches are vulnerable to the free-rider dilemma: participating agents can contribute little to nothing yet receive a well-trained aggregated model. While prior mechanisms attempt to solve the free-rider dilemma, none have addressed the issue of truthfulness. In practice, adversarial agents can provide false information to the server in order to cheat its way out of contributing to federated training. In an effort to make free-riding-averse federated mechanisms truthful, and consequently less prone to breaking down in practice, we propose FACT. FACT is the first federated mechanism that: (1) eliminates federated free riding by using a penalty system, (2) ensures agents provide truthful information by creating a competitive environment, and (3) encourages agent participation by offering better performance than training alone. Empirically, FACT avoids free-riding when agents are untruthful, and reduces agent loss by over 4x.

Agency is a system's capacity to steer outcomes toward a goal, and is a central topic of study across biology, philosophy, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence. Determining if a system exhibits agency is a notoriously difficult question: Dennett (1989), for instance, highlights the puzzle of determining which principles can decide whether a rock, a thermostat, or a robot each possess agency. We here address this puzzle from the viewpoint of reinforcement learning by arguing that agency is fundamentally frame-dependent: Any measurement of a system's agency must be made relative to a reference frame. We support this claim by presenting a philosophical argument that each of the essential properties of agency proposed by Barandiaran et al. (2009) and Moreno (2018) are themselves frame-dependent. We conclude that any basic science of agency requires frame-dependence, and discuss the implications of this claim for reinforcement learning.

Multi-agent systems often require agents to collaborate with or compete against other agents with diverse goals, behaviors, or strategies. Agent modeling is essential when designing adaptive policies for intelligent machine agents in multiagent systems, as this is the means by which the ego agent understands other agents' behavior and extracts their meaningful policy representations. These representations can be used to enhance the ego agent's adaptive policy which is trained by reinforcement learning. However, existing agent modeling approaches typically assume the availability of local observations from other agents (modeled agents) during training or a long observation trajectory for policy adaption. To remove these constrictive assumptions and improve agent modeling performance, we devised a Contrastive Learning-based Agent Modeling (CLAM) method that relies only on the local observations from the ego agent during training and execution. With these observations, CLAM is capable of generating consistent high-quality policy representations in real-time right from the beginning of each episode. We evaluated the efficacy of our approach in both cooperative and competitive multi-agent environments. Our experiments demonstrate that our approach achieves state-of-the-art on both cooperative and competitive tasks, highlighting the potential of contrastive learning-based agent modeling for enhancing reinforcement learning.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

The free energy principle, and its corollary active inference, constitute a bio-inspired theory that assumes biological agents act to remain in a restricted set of preferred states of the world, i.e., they minimize their free energy. Under this principle, biological agents learn a generative model of the world and plan actions in the future that will maintain the agent in an homeostatic state that satisfies its preferences. This framework lends itself to being realized in silico, as it comprehends important aspects that make it computationally affordable, such as variational inference and amortized planning. In this work, we investigate the tool of deep learning to design and realize artificial agents based on active inference, presenting a deep-learning oriented presentation of the free energy principle, surveying works that are relevant in both machine learning and active inference areas, and discussing the design choices that are involved in the implementation process. This manuscript probes newer perspectives for the active inference framework, grounding its theoretical aspects into more pragmatic affairs, offering a practical guide to active inference newcomers and a starting point for deep learning practitioners that would like to investigate implementations of the free energy principle.

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

When one agent interacts with a multi-agent environment, it is challenging to deal with various opponents unseen before. Modeling the behaviors, goals, or beliefs of opponents could help the agent adjust its policy to adapt to different opponents. In addition, it is also important to consider opponents who are learning simultaneously or capable of reasoning. However, existing work usually tackles only one of the aforementioned types of opponents. In this paper, we propose model-based opponent modeling (MBOM), which employs the environment model to adapt to all kinds of opponents. MBOM simulates the recursive reasoning process in the environment model and imagines a set of improving opponent policies. To effectively and accurately represent the opponent policy, MBOM further mixes the imagined opponent policies according to the similarity with the real behaviors of opponents. Empirically, we show that MBOM achieves more effective adaptation than existing methods in a variety of tasks, respectively with different types of opponents, i.e., fixed policy, na\"ive learner, and reasoning learner.