Daily Papers

Large Language Models (LLMs) are constrained by outdated information and a tendency to generate incorrect data, commonly referred to as "hallucinations." Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) addresses these limitations by combining the strengths of retrieval-based methods and generative models. This approach involves retrieving relevant information from a large, up-to-date dataset and using it to enhance the generation process, leading to more accurate and contextually appropriate responses. Despite its benefits, RAG introduces a new attack surface for LLMs, particularly because RAG databases are often sourced from public data, such as the web. In this paper, we propose to identify the vulnerabilities and attacks on retrieval parts (RAG database) and their indirect attacks on generative parts (LLMs). Specifically, we identify that poisoning several customized content passages could achieve a retrieval backdoor, where the retrieval works well for clean queries but always returns customized poisoned adversarial queries. Triggers and poisoned passages can be highly customized to implement various attacks. For example, a trigger could be a semantic group like "The Republican Party, Donald Trump, etc." Adversarial passages can be tailored to different contents, not only linked to the triggers but also used to indirectly attack generative LLMs without modifying them. These attacks can include denial-of-service attacks on RAG and semantic steering attacks on LLM generations conditioned by the triggers. Our experiments demonstrate that by just poisoning 10 adversarial passages can induce 98.2\% success rate to retrieve the adversarial passages. Then, these passages can increase the reject ratio of RAG-based GPT-4 from 0.01\% to 74.6\% or increase the rate of negative responses from 0.22\% to 72\% for targeted queries.

Computer-using agents (CUAs), which autonomously control computers to perform multi-step actions, might pose significant safety risks if misused. Existing benchmarks mostly evaluate language models' (LMs) safety risks in chatbots or simple tool-usage scenarios, without granting full computer access. To better evaluate CUAs' misuse risks, we introduce a new benchmark: CUAHarm. CUAHarm consists of 104 expert-written realistic misuse risks, such as disabling firewalls, leaking confidential information, launching denial-of-service attacks, or installing backdoors. We provide a sandbox environment and rule-based verifiable rewards to measure CUAs' success rates in executing these tasks (e.g., whether the firewall is indeed disabled), not just refusal. We evaluate multiple frontier open-source and proprietary LMs, such as Claude Sonnet, GPT-4o, Gemini Pro 1.5, Llama-3.3-70B, and Mistral Large 2. Surprisingly, even without carefully designed jailbreaking prompts, these frontier LMs comply with executing these malicious tasks at a high success rate (e.g., 59% for Claude 3.7 Sonnet). Newer models show higher misuse rates: Claude 3.7 Sonnet succeeds on 15% more tasks than Claude 3.5. While these models are robust to common malicious prompts (e.g., creating a bomb) in chatbot settings, they behave unsafely as CUAs. We further evaluate a leading agentic framework (UI-TARS-1.5) and find that while it improves performance, it also amplifies misuse risks. Benign variants reveal refusals stem from alignment, not capability limits. To mitigate risks, we explore using LMs to monitor CUAs' actions and chain-of-thoughts (CoTs). Monitoring CUAs is significantly harder than chatbot outputs. Monitoring CoTs yields modest gains, with average detection accuracy at only 72%. Even with hierarchical summarization, improvement is limited to 4%. CUAHarm will be released at https://github.com/db-ol/CUAHarm.

AI web agents use Internet resources at far greater speed, scale, and complexity -- changing how users and services interact. Deployed maliciously or erroneously, these agents could overload content providers. At the same time, web agents can bypass CAPTCHAs and other defenses by mimicking user behavior or flood authentication systems with fake accounts. Yet providers must protect their services and content from denial-of-service attacks and scraping by web agents. In this paper, we design a framework that imposes tunable costs on agents before providing access to resources; we call this Web Agent Throttling. We start by formalizing Throttling Gates as challenges issued to an agent that are asymmetric, scalable, robust, and compatible with any agent. Focusing on a common component -- the language model -- we require the agent to solve reasoning puzzles, thereby incurring excessive token-generation costs. However, we find that using existing puzzles, e.g., coding or math, as throttling gates fails to satisfy our properties. To address this, we introduce rebus-based Reasoning Gates, synthetic text puzzles that require multi-hop reasoning over world knowledge (thereby throttling an agent's model). We design a scalable generation and verification protocol for such reasoning gates. Our framework achieves computational asymmetry, i.e., the response-generation cost is 9.2x higher than the generation cost for SOTA models. We further deploy reasoning gates on a custom website and Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers and evaluate with real-world web agents. Finally, we discuss the limitations and environmental impact of real-world deployment of our framework.

As the amount of data that needs to be processed in real-time due to recent application developments increase, the need for a new computing paradigm is required. Edge computing resolves this issue by offloading computing resources required by intelligent transportation systems such as the Internet of Vehicles from the cloud closer to the end devices to improve performance however, it is susceptible to security issues that make the transportation systems vulnerable to attackers. In addition to this, there are security issues in transportation technologies that impact the edge computing paradigm as well. This paper presents some of the main security issues and challenges that are present in edge computing, which are Distributed Denial of Service attacks, side channel attacks, malware injection attacks and authentication and authorization attacks, how these impact intelligent transportation systems and research being done to help realize and mitigate these issues.

Tool-calling has changed Large Language Model (LLM) applications by integrating external tools, significantly enhancing their functionality across diverse tasks. However, this integration also introduces new security vulnerabilities, particularly in the tool scheduling mechanisms of LLM, which have not been extensively studied. To fill this gap, we present ToolCommander, a novel framework designed to exploit vulnerabilities in LLM tool-calling systems through adversarial tool injection. Our framework employs a well-designed two-stage attack strategy. Firstly, it injects malicious tools to collect user queries, then dynamically updates the injected tools based on the stolen information to enhance subsequent attacks. These stages enable ToolCommander to execute privacy theft, launch denial-of-service attacks, and even manipulate business competition by triggering unscheduled tool-calling. Notably, the ASR reaches 91.67% for privacy theft and hits 100% for denial-of-service and unscheduled tool calling in certain cases. Our work demonstrates that these vulnerabilities can lead to severe consequences beyond simple misuse of tool-calling systems, underscoring the urgent need for robust defensive strategies to secure LLM Tool-calling systems.

3D Gaussian splatting (3DGS), known for its groundbreaking performance and efficiency, has become a dominant 3D representation and brought progress to many 3D vision tasks. However, in this work, we reveal a significant security vulnerability that has been largely overlooked in 3DGS: the computation cost of training 3DGS could be maliciously tampered by poisoning the input data. By developing an attack named Poison-splat, we reveal a novel attack surface where the adversary can poison the input images to drastically increase the computation memory and time needed for 3DGS training, pushing the algorithm towards its worst computation complexity. In extreme cases, the attack can even consume all allocable memory, leading to a Denial-of-Service (DoS) that disrupts servers, resulting in practical damages to real-world 3DGS service vendors. Such a computation cost attack is achieved by addressing a bi-level optimization problem through three tailored strategies: attack objective approximation, proxy model rendering, and optional constrained optimization. These strategies not only ensure the effectiveness of our attack but also make it difficult to defend with simple defensive measures. We hope the revelation of this novel attack surface can spark attention to this crucial yet overlooked vulnerability of 3DGS systems. Our code is available at https://github.com/jiahaolu97/poison-splat .

Large language models like ChatGPT have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in natural language understanding and generation, enabling various applications including translation, essay writing, and chit-chatting. However, there is a concern that they can be misused for malicious purposes, such as fraud or denial-of-service attacks. Therefore, it is crucial to develop methods for detecting whether the party involved in a conversation is a bot or a human. In this paper, we propose a framework named FLAIR, Finding Large language model Authenticity via a single Inquiry and Response, to detect conversational bots in an online manner. Specifically, we target a single question scenario that can effectively differentiate human users from bots. The questions are divided into two categories: those that are easy for humans but difficult for bots (e.g., counting, substitution, positioning, noise filtering, and ASCII art), and those that are easy for bots but difficult for humans (e.g., memorization and computation). Our approach shows different strengths of these questions in their effectiveness, providing a new way for online service providers to protect themselves against nefarious activities and ensure that they are serving real users. We open-sourced our dataset on https://github.com/hongwang600/FLAIR and welcome contributions from the community to enrich such detection datasets.

Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) is a high-performance telecommunications technology that directs data from one network node to another based on short path labels rather than long network addresses. Its efficiency and scalability have made it a popular choice for large-scale and enterprise networks. However, as MPLS networks grow and evolve, they encounter various security challenges. This paper explores the security implications associated with MPLS networks, including risks such as label spoofing, traffic interception, and denial of service attacks. Additionally, it evaluates advanced mitigation strategies to address these vulnerabilities, leveraging mathematical models and security protocols to enhance MPLS network resilience. By integrating theoretical analysis with practical solutions, this paper aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of MPLS security and propose effective methods for safeguarding network infrastructure.

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks pose an increasingly substantial cybersecurity threat to organizations across the globe. In this paper, we introduce a new deep learning-based technique for detecting DDoS attacks, a paramount cybersecurity challenge with evolving complexity and scale. Specifically, we propose a new dual-space prototypical network that leverages a unique dual-space loss function to enhance detection accuracy for various attack patterns through geometric and angular similarity measures. This approach capitalizes on the strengths of representation learning within the latent space (a lower-dimensional representation of data that captures complex patterns for machine learning analysis), improving the model's adaptability and sensitivity towards varying DDoS attack vectors. Our comprehensive evaluation spans multiple training environments, including offline training, simulated online training, and prototypical network scenarios, to validate the model's robustness under diverse data abundance and scarcity conditions. The Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) with Attention, trained with our dual-space prototypical design over a reduced training set, achieves an average accuracy of 94.85% and an F1-Score of 94.71% across our tests, showcasing its effectiveness in dynamic and constrained real-world scenarios.

Large language models are pre-trained on uncurated text datasets consisting of trillions of tokens scraped from the Web. Prior work has shown that: (1) web-scraped pre-training datasets can be practically poisoned by malicious actors; and (2) adversaries can compromise language models after poisoning fine-tuning datasets. Our work evaluates for the first time whether language models can also be compromised during pre-training, with a focus on the persistence of pre-training attacks after models are fine-tuned as helpful and harmless chatbots (i.e., after SFT and DPO). We pre-train a series of LLMs from scratch to measure the impact of a potential poisoning adversary under four different attack objectives (denial-of-service, belief manipulation, jailbreaking, and prompt stealing), and across a wide range of model sizes (from 600M to 7B). Our main result is that poisoning only 0.1% of a model's pre-training dataset is sufficient for three out of four attacks to measurably persist through post-training. Moreover, simple attacks like denial-of-service persist through post-training with a poisoning rate of only 0.001%.

Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) expands the capabilities of modern large language models (LLMs) in chatbot applications, enabling developers to adapt and personalize the LLM output without expensive training or fine-tuning. RAG systems use an external knowledge database to retrieve the most relevant documents for a given query, providing this context to the LLM generator. While RAG achieves impressive utility in many applications, its adoption to enable personalized generative models introduces new security risks. In this work, we propose new attack surfaces for an adversary to compromise a victim's RAG system, by injecting a single malicious document in its knowledge database. We design Phantom, general two-step attack framework against RAG augmented LLMs. The first step involves crafting a poisoned document designed to be retrieved by the RAG system within the top-k results only when an adversarial trigger, a specific sequence of words acting as backdoor, is present in the victim's queries. In the second step, a specially crafted adversarial string within the poisoned document triggers various adversarial attacks in the LLM generator, including denial of service, reputation damage, privacy violations, and harmful behaviors. We demonstrate our attacks on multiple LLM architectures, including Gemma, Vicuna, and Llama.

It has recently been shown that adversarial attacks on large language models (LLMs) can "jailbreak" the model into making harmful statements. In this work, we argue that the spectrum of adversarial attacks on LLMs is much larger than merely jailbreaking. We provide a broad overview of possible attack surfaces and attack goals. Based on a series of concrete examples, we discuss, categorize and systematize attacks that coerce varied unintended behaviors, such as misdirection, model control, denial-of-service, or data extraction. We analyze these attacks in controlled experiments, and find that many of them stem from the practice of pre-training LLMs with coding capabilities, as well as the continued existence of strange "glitch" tokens in common LLM vocabularies that should be removed for security reasons.

In this paper, we explore low-power custom quantised Multi-Layer Perceptrons (MLPs) as an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for automotive controller area network (CAN). We utilise the FINN framework from AMD/Xilinx to quantise, train and generate hardware IP of our MLP to detect denial of service (DoS) and fuzzying attacks on CAN network, using ZCU104 (XCZU7EV) FPGA as our target ECU architecture with integrated IDS capabilities. Our approach achieves significant improvements in latency (0.12 ms per-message processing latency) and inference energy consumption (0.25 mJ per inference) while achieving similar classification performance as state-of-the-art approaches in the literature.

One of the most common causes of lack of continuity of online systems stems from a widely popular Cyber Attack known as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), in which a network of infected devices (botnet) gets exploited to flood the computational capacity of services through the commands of an attacker. This attack is made by leveraging the Domain Name System (DNS) technology through Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs), a stealthy connection strategy that yet leaves suspicious data patterns. To detect such threats, advances in their analysis have been made. For the majority, they found Machine Learning (ML) as a solution, which can be highly effective in analyzing and classifying massive amounts of data. Although strongly performing, ML models have a certain degree of obscurity in their decision-making process. To cope with this problem, a branch of ML known as Explainable ML tries to break down the black-box nature of classifiers and make them interpretable and human-readable. This work addresses the problem of Explainable ML in the context of botnet and DGA detection, which at the best of our knowledge, is the first to concretely break down the decisions of ML classifiers when devised for botnet/DGA detection, therefore providing global and local explanations.

The indexing-retrieval-generation paradigm of retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) has been highly successful in solving knowledge-intensive tasks by integrating external knowledge into large language models (LLMs). However, the incorporation of external and unverified knowledge increases the vulnerability of LLMs because attackers can perform attack tasks by manipulating knowledge. In this paper, we introduce a benchmark named SafeRAG designed to evaluate the RAG security. First, we classify attack tasks into silver noise, inter-context conflict, soft ad, and white Denial-of-Service. Next, we construct RAG security evaluation dataset (i.e., SafeRAG dataset) primarily manually for each task. We then utilize the SafeRAG dataset to simulate various attack scenarios that RAG may encounter. Experiments conducted on 14 representative RAG components demonstrate that RAG exhibits significant vulnerability to all attack tasks and even the most apparent attack task can easily bypass existing retrievers, filters, or advanced LLMs, resulting in the degradation of RAG service quality. Code is available at: https://github.com/IAAR-Shanghai/SafeRAG.