Daily Papers

As large language models are integrated into society, robustness toward a suite of prompts is increasingly important to maintain reliability in a high-variance environment.Robustness evaluations must comprehensively encapsulate the various settings in which a user may invoke an intelligent system. This paper proposes ASSERT, Automated Safety Scenario Red Teaming, consisting of three methods -- semantically aligned augmentation, target bootstrapping, and adversarial knowledge injection. For robust safety evaluation, we apply these methods in the critical domain of AI safety to algorithmically generate a test suite of prompts covering diverse robustness settings -- semantic equivalence, related scenarios, and adversarial. We partition our prompts into four safety domains for a fine-grained analysis of how the domain affects model performance. Despite dedicated safeguards in existing state-of-the-art models, we find statistically significant performance differences of up to 11% in absolute classification accuracy among semantically related scenarios and error rates of up to 19% absolute error in zero-shot adversarial settings, raising concerns for users' physical safety.

Large language model (LLM) has proven to benefit a lot from retrieval augmentation in alleviating hallucinations confronted with knowledge-intensive questions. Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) adopts IR-based techniques utilizing semantic-relevant documents as the generator's input context and realizes external knowledge injection. However, on today's Internet which is flooded with content generated by LLMs, there are too many "related yet useless" documents or even fake knowledge fabricated by LLMs, which will introduce extra noise to the generator and distract it from giving correct results. To this end, we regard the training of the RAG generator model as a multi-agent adversarial-defensive system, guiding the generator to have a better taste of whether a specific document helps answer the question through the Adversarial Tuning in a Multi-agent (ATM) system to strengthen the generator's robustness in an RAG pipeline. After rounds of multi-agent iterative tuning, we find that the ATM Generator can eventually discriminate useful documents amongst LLM fabrications and achieve better performance than strong baselines.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being used in real-world applications, they remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks: malicious third party prompts that subvert the intent of the system designer. To help researchers study this problem, we present a dataset of over 126,000 prompt injection attacks and 46,000 prompt-based "defenses" against prompt injection, all created by players of an online game called Tensor Trust. To the best of our knowledge, this is currently the largest dataset of human-generated adversarial examples for instruction-following LLMs. The attacks in our dataset have a lot of easily interpretable stucture, and shed light on the weaknesses of LLMs. We also use the dataset to create a benchmark for resistance to two types of prompt injection, which we refer to as prompt extraction and prompt hijacking. Our benchmark results show that many models are vulnerable to the attack strategies in the Tensor Trust dataset. Furthermore, we show that some attack strategies from the dataset generalize to deployed LLM-based applications, even though they have a very different set of constraints to the game. We release all data and source code at https://tensortrust.ai/paper

Vision-Language Model (VLM) based Web Agents represent a significant step towards automating complex tasks by simulating human-like interaction with websites. However, their deployment in uncontrolled web environments introduces significant security vulnerabilities. Existing research on adversarial environmental injection attacks often relies on unrealistic assumptions, such as direct HTML manipulation, knowledge of user intent, or access to agent model parameters, limiting their practical applicability. In this paper, we propose AdInject, a novel and real-world black-box attack method that leverages the internet advertising delivery to inject malicious content into the Web Agent's environment. AdInject operates under a significantly more realistic threat model than prior work, assuming a black-box agent, static malicious content constraints, and no specific knowledge of user intent. AdInject includes strategies for designing malicious ad content aimed at misleading agents into clicking, and a VLM-based ad content optimization technique that infers potential user intents from the target website's context and integrates these intents into the ad content to make it appear more relevant or critical to the agent's task, thus enhancing attack effectiveness. Experimental evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness of AdInject, attack success rates exceeding 60% in most scenarios and approaching 100% in certain cases. This strongly demonstrates that prevalent advertising delivery constitutes a potent and real-world vector for environment injection attacks against Web Agents. This work highlights a critical vulnerability in Web Agent security arising from real-world environment manipulation channels, underscoring the urgent need for developing robust defense mechanisms against such threats. Our code is available at https://github.com/NicerWang/AdInject.

Current vision-language models (VLMs) still exhibit inferior performance on knowledge-intensive tasks, primarily due to the challenge of accurately encoding all the associations between visual objects and scenes to their corresponding entities and background knowledge. While retrieval augmentation methods offer an efficient way to integrate external knowledge, extending them to vision-language domain presents unique challenges in (1) precisely retrieving relevant information from external sources due to the inherent discrepancy within the multimodal queries, and (2) being resilient to the irrelevant, extraneous and noisy information contained in the retrieved multimodal knowledge snippets. In this work, we introduce RORA-VLM, a novel and robust retrieval augmentation framework specifically tailored for VLMs, with two key innovations: (1) a 2-stage retrieval process with image-anchored textual-query expansion to synergistically combine the visual and textual information in the query and retrieve the most relevant multimodal knowledge snippets; and (2) a robust retrieval augmentation method that strengthens the resilience of VLMs against irrelevant information in the retrieved multimodal knowledge by injecting adversarial noises into the retrieval-augmented training process, and filters out extraneous visual information, such as unrelated entities presented in images, via a query-oriented visual token refinement strategy. We conduct extensive experiments to validate the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed methods on three widely adopted benchmark datasets. Our results demonstrate that with a minimal amount of training instance, RORA-VLM enables the base model to achieve significant performance improvement and constantly outperform state-of-the-art retrieval-augmented VLMs on all benchmarks while also exhibiting a novel zero-shot domain transfer capability.

The practice of transferring knowledge from a sophisticated, closed-source large language model (LLM) to a compact, open-source LLM has garnered considerable attention. Previous works have focused on a unidirectional knowledge distillation way by aligning the responses of the student model with those of the teacher model to a set of instructions. Nevertheless, they overlooked the possibility of incorporating any reciprocal "feedback"--identifying challenging instructions where the student model's performance falls short--to boost the student model's proficiency iteratively. To this end, we propose a novel adversarial distillation framework for a more efficient knowledge transfer. Leveraging the versatile role adaptability of LLMs, we prompt the closed-source model to identify "hard" instructions and generate new "hard" instructions for the student model, creating a three-stage adversarial loop of imitation, discrimination, and generation. By applying this adversarial framework, we successfully transfer knowledge from ChatGPT to a 7B student model (named Lion), achieving nearly 95% capability approximation using a mere 70k training data. We aspire that this proposed model may serve as the baseline to reflect the performance of ChatGPT, especially the open-source instruction-following language model baseline for our community.

The increasing depth of parametric domain knowledge in large language models (LLMs) is fueling their rapid deployment in real-world applications. Understanding model vulnerabilities in high-stakes and knowledge-intensive tasks is essential for quantifying the trustworthiness of model predictions and regulating their use. The recent discovery of named entities as adversarial examples (i.e. adversarial entities) in natural language processing tasks raises questions about their potential impact on the knowledge robustness of pre-trained and finetuned LLMs in high-stakes and specialized domains. We examined the use of type-consistent entity substitution as a template for collecting adversarial entities for billion-parameter LLMs with biomedical knowledge. To this end, we developed an embedding-space attack based on powerscaled distance-weighted sampling to assess the robustness of their biomedical knowledge with a low query budget and controllable coverage. Our method has favorable query efficiency and scaling over alternative approaches based on random sampling and blackbox gradient-guided search, which we demonstrated for adversarial distractor generation in biomedical question answering. Subsequent failure mode analysis uncovered two regimes of adversarial entities on the attack surface with distinct characteristics and we showed that entity substitution attacks can manipulate token-wise Shapley value explanations, which become deceptive in this setting. Our approach complements standard evaluations for high-capacity models and the results highlight the brittleness of domain knowledge in LLMs.

Injecting external knowledge can improve the performance of pre-trained language models (PLMs) on various downstream NLP tasks. However, massive retraining is required to deploy new knowledge injection methods or knowledge bases for downstream tasks. In this work, we are the first to study how to improve the flexibility and efficiency of knowledge injection by reusing existing downstream models. To this end, we explore a new paradigm plug-and-play knowledge injection, where knowledge bases are injected into frozen existing downstream models by a knowledge plugin. Correspondingly, we propose a plug-and-play injection method map-tuning, which trains a mapping of knowledge embeddings to enrich model inputs with mapped embeddings while keeping model parameters frozen. Experimental results on three knowledge-driven NLP tasks show that existing injection methods are not suitable for the new paradigm, while map-tuning effectively improves the performance of downstream models. Moreover, we show that a frozen downstream model can be well adapted to different domains with different mapping networks of domain knowledge. Our code and models are available at https://github.com/THUNLP/Knowledge-Plugin.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) acquire vast knowledge during pre-training, they often lack domain-specific, new, or niche information. Continual pre-training (CPT) attempts to address this gap but suffers from catastrophic forgetting and inefficiencies in low-data regimes. We introduce Knowledge-Instruct, a novel approach to efficiently inject knowledge from limited corpora through pure instruction-tuning. By generating information-dense synthetic instruction data, it effectively integrates new knowledge while preserving general reasoning and instruction-following abilities. Knowledge-Instruct demonstrates superior factual memorization, minimizes catastrophic forgetting, and remains scalable by leveraging synthetic data from relatively small language models. Additionally, it enhances contextual understanding, including complex multi-hop reasoning, facilitating integration with retrieval systems. We validate its effectiveness across diverse benchmarks, including Companies, a new dataset that we release to measure knowledge injection capabilities.

Large language/multimodal models (LLMs/LMMs) store extensive pre-trained knowledge but struggle to maintain consistency with real-world updates, making it difficult to avoid catastrophic forgetting while acquiring evolving knowledge. Previous work focused on constructing textual knowledge datasets and exploring knowledge injection in LLMs, lacking exploration of multimodal evolving knowledge injection in LMMs. To address this, we propose the EVOKE benchmark to evaluate LMMs' ability to inject multimodal evolving knowledge in real-world scenarios. Meanwhile, a comprehensive evaluation of multimodal evolving knowledge injection revealed two challenges: (1) Existing knowledge injection methods perform terribly on evolving knowledge. (2) Supervised fine-tuning causes catastrophic forgetting, particularly instruction following ability is severely compromised. Additionally, we provide pathways and find that: (1) Text knowledge augmentation during the training phase improves performance, while image augmentation cannot achieve it. (2) Continual learning methods, especially Replay and MoELoRA, effectively mitigate forgetting. Our findings indicate that current knowledge injection methods have many limitations on evolving knowledge, which motivates further research on more efficient and stable knowledge injection methods.

Existing frameworks for assessing robustness of large language models (LLMs) overly depend on specific benchmarks, increasing costs and failing to evaluate performance of LLMs in professional domains due to dataset limitations. This paper proposes a framework that systematically evaluates the robustness of LLMs under adversarial attack scenarios by leveraging knowledge graphs (KGs). Our framework generates original prompts from the triplets of knowledge graphs and creates adversarial prompts by poisoning, assessing the robustness of LLMs through the results of these adversarial attacks. We systematically evaluate the effectiveness of this framework and its modules. Experiments show that adversarial robustness of the ChatGPT family ranks as GPT-4-turbo > GPT-4o > GPT-3.5-turbo, and the robustness of large language models is influenced by the professional domains in which they operate.

We present a novel approach to integrating scientific knowledge into generative models, enhancing their realism and consistency in image synthesis. First, we introduce Science-T2I, an expert-annotated adversarial dataset comprising adversarial 20k image pairs with 9k prompts, covering wide distinct scientific knowledge categories. Leveraging Science-T2I, we present SciScore, an end-to-end reward model that refines the assessment of generated images based on scientific knowledge, which is achieved by augmenting both the scientific comprehension and visual capabilities of pre-trained CLIP model. Additionally, based on SciScore, we propose a two-stage training framework, comprising a supervised fine-tuning phase and a masked online fine-tuning phase, to incorporate scientific knowledge into existing generative models. Through comprehensive experiments, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework in establishing new standards for evaluating the scientific realism of generated content. Specifically, SciScore attains performance comparable to human-level, demonstrating a 5% improvement similar to evaluations conducted by experienced human evaluators. Furthermore, by applying our proposed fine-tuning method to FLUX, we achieve a performance enhancement exceeding 50% on SciScore.

Knowledge transferability, or transfer learning, has been widely adopted to allow a pre-trained model in the source domain to be effectively adapted to downstream tasks in the target domain. It is thus important to explore and understand the factors affecting knowledge transferability. In this paper, as the first work, we analyze and demonstrate the connections between knowledge transferability and another important phenomenon--adversarial transferability, i.e., adversarial examples generated against one model can be transferred to attack other models. Our theoretical studies show that adversarial transferability indicates knowledge transferability and vice versa. Moreover, based on the theoretical insights, we propose two practical adversarial transferability metrics to characterize this process, serving as bidirectional indicators between adversarial and knowledge transferability. We conduct extensive experiments for different scenarios on diverse datasets, showing a positive correlation between adversarial transferability and knowledge transferability. Our findings will shed light on future research about effective knowledge transfer learning and adversarial transferability analyses.

Despite recent progress, state-of-the-art question answering models remain vulnerable to a variety of adversarial attacks. While dynamic adversarial data collection, in which a human annotator tries to write examples that fool a model-in-the-loop, can improve model robustness, this process is expensive which limits the scale of the collected data. In this work, we are the first to use synthetic adversarial data generation to make question answering models more robust to human adversaries. We develop a data generation pipeline that selects source passages, identifies candidate answers, generates questions, then finally filters or re-labels them to improve quality. Using this approach, we amplify a smaller human-written adversarial dataset to a much larger set of synthetic question-answer pairs. By incorporating our synthetic data, we improve the state-of-the-art on the AdversarialQA dataset by 3.7F1 and improve model generalisation on nine of the twelve MRQA datasets. We further conduct a novel human-in-the-loop evaluation to show that our models are considerably more robust to new human-written adversarial examples: crowdworkers can fool our model only 8.8% of the time on average, compared to 17.6% for a model trained without synthetic data.

Large language models (LLMs) are proficient in capturing factual knowledge across various domains. However, refining their capabilities on previously seen knowledge or integrating new knowledge from external sources remains a significant challenge. In this work, we propose a novel synthetic knowledge ingestion method called Ski, which leverages fine-grained synthesis, interleaved generation, and assemble augmentation strategies to construct high-quality data representations from raw knowledge sources. We then integrate Ski and its variations with three knowledge injection techniques: Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG), Supervised Fine-tuning (SFT), and Continual Pre-training (CPT) to inject and refine knowledge in language models. Extensive empirical experiments are conducted on various question-answering tasks spanning finance, biomedicine, and open-generation domains to demonstrate that Ski significantly outperforms baseline methods by facilitating effective knowledge injection. We believe that our work is an important step towards enhancing the factual accuracy of LLM outputs by refining knowledge representation and injection capabilities.

Knowledge editing techniques have been increasingly adopted to efficiently correct the false or outdated knowledge in Large Language Models (LLMs), due to the high cost of retraining from scratch. Meanwhile, one critical but under-explored question is: can knowledge editing be used to inject harm into LLMs? In this paper, we propose to reformulate knowledge editing as a new type of safety threat for LLMs, namely Editing Attack, and conduct a systematic investigation with a newly constructed dataset EditAttack. Specifically, we focus on two typical safety risks of Editing Attack including Misinformation Injection and Bias Injection. For the risk of misinformation injection, we first categorize it into commonsense misinformation injection and long-tail misinformation injection. Then, we find that editing attacks can inject both types of misinformation into LLMs, and the effectiveness is particularly high for commonsense misinformation injection. For the risk of bias injection, we discover that not only can biased sentences be injected into LLMs with high effectiveness, but also one single biased sentence injection can cause a high bias increase in general outputs of LLMs, which are even highly irrelevant to the injected sentence, indicating a catastrophic impact on the overall fairness of LLMs. Then, we further illustrate the high stealthiness of editing attacks, measured by their impact on the general knowledge and reasoning capacities of LLMs, and show the hardness of defending editing attacks with empirical evidence. Our discoveries demonstrate the emerging misuse risks of knowledge editing techniques on compromising the safety alignment of LLMs.

Responses generated by neural conversational models tend to lack informativeness and diversity. We present Adversarial Information Maximization (AIM), an adversarial learning strategy that addresses these two related but distinct problems. To foster response diversity, we leverage adversarial training that allows distributional matching of synthetic and real responses. To improve informativeness, our framework explicitly optimizes a variational lower bound on pairwise mutual information between query and response. Empirical results from automatic and human evaluations demonstrate that our methods significantly boost informativeness and diversity.

Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have achieved widespread success yet remain prone to adversarial attacks. Typically, such attacks either involve frequent queries to the target model or rely on surrogate models closely mirroring the target model -- often trained with subsets of the target model's training data -- to achieve high attack success rates through transferability. However, in realistic scenarios where training data is inaccessible and excessive queries can raise alarms, crafting adversarial examples becomes more challenging. In this paper, we present UnivIntruder, a novel attack framework that relies solely on a single, publicly available CLIP model and publicly available datasets. By using textual concepts, UnivIntruder generates universal, transferable, and targeted adversarial perturbations that mislead DNNs into misclassifying inputs into adversary-specified classes defined by textual concepts. Our extensive experiments show that our approach achieves an Attack Success Rate (ASR) of up to 85% on ImageNet and over 99% on CIFAR-10, significantly outperforming existing transfer-based methods. Additionally, we reveal real-world vulnerabilities, showing that even without querying target models, UnivIntruder compromises image search engines like Google and Baidu with ASR rates up to 84%, and vision language models like GPT-4 and Claude-3.5 with ASR rates up to 80%. These findings underscore the practicality of our attack in scenarios where traditional avenues are blocked, highlighting the need to reevaluate security paradigms in AI applications.

We propose a conceptually simple and lightweight framework for improving the robustness of vision models through the combination of knowledge distillation and data augmentation. We address the conjecture that larger models do not make for better teachers by showing strong gains in out-of-distribution robustness when distilling from pretrained foundation models. Following this finding, we propose Discrete Adversarial Distillation (DAD), which leverages a robust teacher to generate adversarial examples and a VQGAN to discretize them, creating more informative samples than standard data augmentation techniques. We provide a theoretical framework for the use of a robust teacher in the knowledge distillation with data augmentation setting and demonstrate strong gains in out-of-distribution robustness and clean accuracy across different student architectures. Notably, our method adds minor computational overhead compared to similar techniques and can be easily combined with other data augmentations for further improvements.

Large-scale pre-trained language models have achieved tremendous success across a wide range of natural language understanding (NLU) tasks, even surpassing human performance. However, recent studies reveal that the robustness of these models can be challenged by carefully crafted textual adversarial examples. While several individual datasets have been proposed to evaluate model robustness, a principled and comprehensive benchmark is still missing. In this paper, we present Adversarial GLUE (AdvGLUE), a new multi-task benchmark to quantitatively and thoroughly explore and evaluate the vulnerabilities of modern large-scale language models under various types of adversarial attacks. In particular, we systematically apply 14 textual adversarial attack methods to GLUE tasks to construct AdvGLUE, which is further validated by humans for reliable annotations. Our findings are summarized as follows. (i) Most existing adversarial attack algorithms are prone to generating invalid or ambiguous adversarial examples, with around 90% of them either changing the original semantic meanings or misleading human annotators as well. Therefore, we perform a careful filtering process to curate a high-quality benchmark. (ii) All the language models and robust training methods we tested perform poorly on AdvGLUE, with scores lagging far behind the benign accuracy. We hope our work will motivate the development of new adversarial attacks that are more stealthy and semantic-preserving, as well as new robust language models against sophisticated adversarial attacks. AdvGLUE is available at https://adversarialglue.github.io.

Knowledge editing techniques for large language models (LLMs) can inject knowledge that is later reproducible verbatim, but they fall short on propagating that knowledge: models cannot answer questions that require reasoning with the injected knowledge. We present a hypernetwork-based approach for knowledge propagation, named PropMEND, where we meta-learn how to modify gradients of a language modeling loss to encourage injected information to propagate. Our approach extends the meta-objective of MEND [29] so that gradient updates on knowledge are transformed to enable answering multi-hop questions involving that knowledge. We show improved performance on the RippleEdit dataset, showing almost 2x accuracy on challenging multi-hop questions whose answers are not explicitly stated in the injected fact. We further introduce a new dataset, Controlled RippleEdit, to evaluate the generalization of our hypernetwork, testing knowledge propagation along relations and entities unseen during hypernetwork training. PropMEND still outperforms existing approaches in unseen entity-relation pairs, yet the performance gap decreases substantially, suggesting future work in propagating knowledge to a wide range of relations.

We design, implement, and evaluate adversarial decoding, a new, generic text generation technique that produces readable documents for different adversarial objectives. Prior methods either produce easily detectable gibberish, or cannot handle objectives that include embedding similarity. In particular, they only work for direct attacks (such as jailbreaking) and cannot produce adversarial text for realistic indirect injection, e.g., documents that (1) are retrieved in RAG systems in response to broad classes of queries, and also (2) adversarially influence subsequent generation. We also show that fluency (low perplexity) is not sufficient to evade filtering. We measure the effectiveness of adversarial decoding for different objectives, including RAG poisoning, jailbreaking, and evasion of defensive filters, and demonstrate that it outperforms existing methods while producing readable adversarial documents.

Knowledge-Enhanced Pre-trained Language Models (KEPLMs) are pre-trained models with relation triples injecting from knowledge graphs to improve language understanding abilities. To guarantee effective knowledge injection, previous studies integrate models with knowledge encoders for representing knowledge retrieved from knowledge graphs. The operations for knowledge retrieval and encoding bring significant computational burdens, restricting the usage of such models in real-world applications that require high inference speed. In this paper, we propose a novel KEPLM named DKPLM that Decomposes Knowledge injection process of the Pre-trained Language Models in pre-training, fine-tuning and inference stages, which facilitates the applications of KEPLMs in real-world scenarios. Specifically, we first detect knowledge-aware long-tail entities as the target for knowledge injection, enhancing the KEPLMs' semantic understanding abilities and avoiding injecting redundant information. The embeddings of long-tail entities are replaced by "pseudo token representations" formed by relevant knowledge triples. We further design the relational knowledge decoding task for pre-training to force the models to truly understand the injected knowledge by relation triple reconstruction. Experiments show that our model outperforms other KEPLMs significantly over zero-shot knowledge probing tasks and multiple knowledge-aware language understanding tasks. We further show that DKPLM has a higher inference speed than other competing models due to the decomposing mechanism.

Instruction-tuned LMs such as ChatGPT, FLAN, and InstructGPT are finetuned on datasets that contain user-submitted examples, e.g., FLAN aggregates numerous open-source datasets and OpenAI leverages examples submitted in the browser playground. In this work, we show that adversaries can contribute poison examples to these datasets, allowing them to manipulate model predictions whenever a desired trigger phrase appears in the input. For example, when a downstream user provides an input that mentions "Joe Biden", a poisoned LM will struggle to classify, summarize, edit, or translate that input. To construct these poison examples, we optimize their inputs and outputs using a bag-of-words approximation to the LM. We evaluate our method on open-source instruction-tuned LMs. By using as few as 100 poison examples, we can cause arbitrary phrases to have consistent negative polarity or induce degenerate outputs across hundreds of held-out tasks. Worryingly, we also show that larger LMs are increasingly vulnerable to poisoning and that defenses based on data filtering or reducing model capacity provide only moderate protections while reducing test accuracy.

Knowledge transfer between heterogeneous source and target networks and tasks has received a lot of attention in recent times as large amounts of quality labeled data can be difficult to obtain in many applications. Existing approaches typically constrain the target deep neural network (DNN) feature representations to be close to the source DNNs feature representations, which can be limiting. We, in this paper, propose a novel adversarial multi-armed bandit approach that automatically learns to route source representations to appropriate target representations following which they are combined in meaningful ways to produce accurate target models. We see upwards of 5\% accuracy improvements compared with the state-of-the-art knowledge transfer methods on four benchmark (target) image datasets CUB200, Stanford Dogs, MIT67, and Stanford40 where the source dataset is ImageNet. We qualitatively analyze the goodness of our transfer scheme by showing individual examples of the important features focused on by our target network at different layers compared with the (closest) competitors. We also observe that our improvement over other methods is higher for smaller target datasets making it an effective tool for small data applications that may benefit from transfer learning.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems enhance large language models by incorporating external knowledge, addressing issues like outdated internal knowledge and hallucination. However, their reliance on external knowledge bases makes them vulnerable to corpus poisoning attacks, where adversarial passages can be injected to manipulate retrieval results. Existing methods for crafting such passages, such as random token replacement or training inversion models, are often slow and computationally expensive, requiring either access to retriever's gradients or large computational resources. To address these limitations, we propose Dynamic Importance-Guided Genetic Algorithm (DIGA), an efficient black-box method that leverages two key properties of retrievers: insensitivity to token order and bias towards influential tokens. By focusing on these characteristics, DIGA dynamically adjusts its genetic operations to generate effective adversarial passages with significantly reduced time and memory usage. Our experimental evaluation shows that DIGA achieves superior efficiency and scalability compared to existing methods, while maintaining comparable or better attack success rates across multiple datasets.

Model distillation has become essential for creating smaller, deployable language models that retain larger system capabilities. However, widespread deployment raises concerns about resilience to adversarial manipulation. This paper investigates vulnerability of distilled models to adversarial injection of biased content during training. We demonstrate that adversaries can inject subtle biases into teacher models through minimal data poisoning, which propagates to student models and becomes significantly amplified. We propose two propagation modes: Untargeted Propagation, where bias affects multiple tasks, and Targeted Propagation, focusing on specific tasks while maintaining normal behavior elsewhere. With only 25 poisoned samples (0.25% poisoning rate), student models generate biased responses 76.9% of the time in targeted scenarios - higher than 69.4% in teacher models. For untargeted propagation, adversarial bias appears 6x-29x more frequently in student models on unseen tasks. We validate findings across six bias types (targeted advertisements, phishing links, narrative manipulations, insecure coding practices), various distillation methods, and different modalities spanning text and code generation. Our evaluation reveals shortcomings in current defenses - perplexity filtering, bias detection systems, and LLM-based autorater frameworks - against these attacks. Results expose significant security vulnerabilities in distilled models, highlighting need for specialized safeguards. We propose practical design principles for building effective adversarial bias mitigation strategies.

Despite extensive diagnostics and debugging by developers, AI systems sometimes exhibit harmful unintended behaviors. Finding and fixing these is challenging because the attack surface is so large -- it is not tractable to exhaustively search for inputs that may elicit harmful behaviors. Red-teaming and adversarial training (AT) are commonly used to improve robustness, however, they empirically struggle to fix failure modes that differ from the attacks used during training. In this work, we utilize latent adversarial training (LAT) to defend against vulnerabilities without leveraging knowledge of what they are or using inputs that elicit them. LAT makes use of the compressed, abstract, and structured latent representations of concepts that the network actually uses for prediction. Here, we use it to defend against failure modes without examples that elicit them. Specifically, we use LAT to remove trojans and defend against held-out classes of adversarial attacks. We show in image classification, text classification, and text generation tasks that LAT usually improves both robustness to novel attacks and performance on clean data relative to AT. This suggests that LAT can be a promising tool for defending against failure modes that are not explicitly identified by developers.

Communication via natural language is a crucial aspect of intelligence, and it requires computational models to learn and reason about world concepts, with varying levels of supervision. While there has been significant progress made on fully-supervised non-interactive tasks, such as question-answering and procedural text understanding, much of the community has turned to various sequential interactive tasks, as in semi-Markov text-based games, which have revealed limitations of existing approaches in terms of coherence, contextual awareness, and their ability to learn effectively from the environment. In this paper, we propose a framework for enabling improved functional grounding of agents in text-based games. Specifically, we consider two forms of domain knowledge that we inject into learning-based agents: memory of previous correct actions and affordances of relevant objects in the environment. Our framework supports three representative model classes: `pure' reinforcement learning (RL) agents, RL agents enhanced with knowledge graphs, and agents equipped with language models. Furthermore, we devise multiple injection strategies for the above domain knowledge types and agent architectures, including injection via knowledge graphs and augmentation of the existing input encoding strategies. We perform all experiments on the ScienceWorld text-based game environment, to illustrate the performance of various model configurations in challenging science-related instruction-following tasks. Our findings provide crucial insights on the development of effective natural language processing systems for interactive contexts.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being deployed in interactive contexts that involve direct user engagement, such as chatbots and writing assistants. These deployments are increasingly plagued by prompt injection and jailbreaking (collectively, prompt hacking), in which models are manipulated to ignore their original instructions and instead follow potentially malicious ones. Although widely acknowledged as a significant security threat, there is a dearth of large-scale resources and quantitative studies on prompt hacking. To address this lacuna, we launch a global prompt hacking competition, which allows for free-form human input attacks. We elicit 600K+ adversarial prompts against three state-of-the-art LLMs. We describe the dataset, which empirically verifies that current LLMs can indeed be manipulated via prompt hacking. We also present a comprehensive taxonomical ontology of the types of adversarial prompts.

Large Language Models (LLMs) excel at various tasks, including solving math word problems (MWPs), but struggle with real-world problems containing irrelevant information. To address this, we propose a prompting framework that generates adversarial variants of MWPs by adding irrelevant variables. We introduce a dataset, ProbleMATHIC, containing both adversarial and non-adversarial MWPs. Our experiments reveal that LLMs are susceptible to distraction by numerical noise, resulting in an average relative performance drop of ~26% on adversarial MWPs. To mitigate this, we fine-tune LLMs (Llama-2, Mistral) on the adversarial samples from our dataset. Fine-tuning on adversarial training instances improves performance on adversarial MWPs by ~8%, indicating increased robustness to noise and better ability to identify relevant data for reasoning. Finally, to assess the generalizability of our prompting framework, we introduce GSM-8K-Adv, an adversarial variant of the GSM-8K benchmark. LLMs continue to struggle when faced with adversarial information, reducing performance by up to ~6%.

In a model inversion (MI) attack, an adversary abuses access to a machine learning (ML) model to infer and reconstruct private training data. Remarkable progress has been made in the white-box and black-box setups, where the adversary has access to the complete model or the model's soft output respectively. However, there is very limited study in the most challenging but practically important setup: Label-only MI attacks, where the adversary only has access to the model's predicted label (hard label) without confidence scores nor any other model information. In this work, we propose LOKT, a novel approach for label-only MI attacks. Our idea is based on transfer of knowledge from the opaque target model to surrogate models. Subsequently, using these surrogate models, our approach can harness advanced white-box attacks. We propose knowledge transfer based on generative modelling, and introduce a new model, Target model-assisted ACGAN (T-ACGAN), for effective knowledge transfer. Our method casts the challenging label-only MI into the more tractable white-box setup. We provide analysis to support that surrogate models based on our approach serve as effective proxies for the target model for MI. Our experiments show that our method significantly outperforms existing SOTA Label-only MI attack by more than 15% across all MI benchmarks. Furthermore, our method compares favorably in terms of query budget. Our study highlights rising privacy threats for ML models even when minimal information (i.e., hard labels) is exposed. Our study highlights rising privacy threats for ML models even when minimal information (i.e., hard labels) is exposed. Our code, demo, models and reconstructed data are available at our project page: https://ngoc-nguyen-0.github.io/lokt/

Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved tremendous success in various applications, they are also susceptible to certain prompts that can induce them to bypass built-in safety measures and provide dangerous or illegal content, a phenomenon known as jailbreak. To protect LLMs from producing harmful information, various defense strategies are proposed, with most focusing on content filtering or adversarial training of models. In this paper, we propose an approach named Prompt Adversarial Tuning (PAT) to train a defense control mechanism, which is then embedded as a prefix to user prompts to implement our defense strategy. We design a training process similar to adversarial training to achieve our optimized goal, alternating between updating attack and defense controls. To our knowledge, we are the first to implement defense from the perspective of prompt tuning. Once employed, our method will hardly impact the operational efficiency of LLMs. Experiments show that our method is effective in both black-box and white-box settings, reducing the success rate of advanced attacks to nearly 0 while maintaining the benign answer rate of 80% to simple benign questions. Our work might potentially chart a new perspective for future explorations in LLM security.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems based on Large Language Models (LLMs) have become essential for tasks such as question answering and content generation. However, their increasing impact on public opinion and information dissemination has made them a critical focus for security research due to inherent vulnerabilities. Previous studies have predominantly addressed attacks targeting factual or single-query manipulations. In this paper, we address a more practical scenario: topic-oriented adversarial opinion manipulation attacks on RAG models, where LLMs are required to reason and synthesize multiple perspectives, rendering them particularly susceptible to systematic knowledge poisoning. Specifically, we propose Topic-FlipRAG, a two-stage manipulation attack pipeline that strategically crafts adversarial perturbations to influence opinions across related queries. This approach combines traditional adversarial ranking attack techniques and leverages the extensive internal relevant knowledge and reasoning capabilities of LLMs to execute semantic-level perturbations. Experiments show that the proposed attacks effectively shift the opinion of the model's outputs on specific topics, significantly impacting user information perception. Current mitigation methods cannot effectively defend against such attacks, highlighting the necessity for enhanced safeguards for RAG systems, and offering crucial insights for LLM security research.

Training large language models (LLMs) requires a substantial investment of time and money. To get a good return on investment, the developers spend considerable effort ensuring that the model never produces harmful and offensive outputs. However, bad-faith actors may still try to slander the reputation of an LLM by publicly reporting a forged output. In this paper, we show that defending against such slander attacks requires reconstructing the input of the forged output or proving that it does not exist. To do so, we propose and evaluate a search based approach for targeted adversarial attacks for LLMs. Our experiments show that we are rarely able to reconstruct the exact input of an arbitrary output, thus demonstrating that LLMs are still vulnerable to slander attacks.

Neural text ranking models have witnessed significant advancement and are increasingly being deployed in practice. Unfortunately, they also inherit adversarial vulnerabilities of general neural models, which have been detected but remain underexplored by prior studies. Moreover, the inherit adversarial vulnerabilities might be leveraged by blackhat SEO to defeat better-protected search engines. In this study, we propose an imitation adversarial attack on black-box neural passage ranking models. We first show that the target passage ranking model can be transparentized and imitated by enumerating critical queries/candidates and then train a ranking imitation model. Leveraging the ranking imitation model, we can elaborately manipulate the ranking results and transfer the manipulation attack to the target ranking model. For this purpose, we propose an innovative gradient-based attack method, empowered by the pairwise objective function, to generate adversarial triggers, which causes premeditated disorderliness with very few tokens. To equip the trigger camouflages, we add the next sentence prediction loss and the language model fluency constraint to the objective function. Experimental results on passage ranking demonstrate the effectiveness of the ranking imitation attack model and adversarial triggers against various SOTA neural ranking models. Furthermore, various mitigation analyses and human evaluation show the effectiveness of camouflages when facing potential mitigation approaches. To motivate other scholars to further investigate this novel and important problem, we make the experiment data and code publicly available.

The task of "unlearning" certain concepts in large language models (LLMs) has attracted immense attention recently, due to its importance for mitigating undesirable model behaviours, such as the generation of harmful, private, or incorrect information. Current protocols to evaluate unlearning methods largely rely on behavioral tests, without monitoring the presence of unlearned knowledge within the model's parameters. This residual knowledge can be adversarially exploited to recover the erased information post-unlearning. We argue that unlearning should also be evaluated internally, by considering changes in the parametric knowledge traces of the unlearned concepts. To this end, we propose a general methodology for eliciting directions in the parameter space (termed "concept vectors") that encode concrete concepts, and construct ConceptVectors, a benchmark dataset containing hundreds of common concepts and their parametric knowledge traces within two open-source LLMs. Evaluation on ConceptVectors shows that existing unlearning methods minimally impact concept vectors, while directly ablating these vectors demonstrably removes the associated knowledge from the LLMs and significantly reduces their susceptibility to adversarial manipulation. Our results highlight limitations in behavioral-based unlearning evaluations and call for future work to include parametric-based evaluations. To support this, we release our code and benchmark at https://github.com/yihuaihong/ConceptVectors.

Training deep networks requires various design decisions regarding for instance their architecture, data augmentation, or optimization. In this work, we find these training variations to result in networks learning unique feature sets from the data. Using public model libraries comprising thousands of models trained on canonical datasets like ImageNet, we observe that for arbitrary pairings of pretrained models, one model extracts significant data context unavailable in the other -- independent of overall performance. Given any arbitrary pairing of pretrained models and no external rankings (such as separate test sets, e.g. due to data privacy), we investigate if it is possible to transfer such "complementary" knowledge from one model to another without performance degradation -- a task made particularly difficult as additional knowledge can be contained in stronger, equiperformant or weaker models. Yet facilitating robust transfer in scenarios agnostic to pretrained model pairings would unlock auxiliary gains and knowledge fusion from any model repository without restrictions on model and problem specifics - including from weaker, lower-performance models. This work therefore provides an initial, in-depth exploration on the viability of such general-purpose knowledge transfer. Across large-scale experiments, we first reveal the shortcomings of standard knowledge distillation techniques, and then propose a much more general extension through data partitioning for successful transfer between nearly all pretrained models, which we show can also be done unsupervised. Finally, we assess both the scalability and impact of fundamental model properties on successful model-agnostic knowledge transfer.

Pre-trained language models (PLM) have advanced the state-of-the-art across NLP applications, but lack domain-specific knowledge that does not naturally occur in pre-training data. Previous studies augmented PLMs with symbolic knowledge for different downstream NLP tasks. However, knowledge bases (KBs) utilized in these studies are usually large-scale and static, in contrast to small, domain-specific, and modifiable knowledge bases that are prominent in real-world task-oriented dialogue (TOD) systems. In this paper, we showcase the advantages of injecting domain-specific knowledge prior to fine-tuning on TOD tasks. To this end, we utilize light-weight adapters that can be easily integrated with PLMs and serve as a repository for facts learned from different KBs. To measure the efficacy of proposed knowledge injection methods, we introduce Knowledge Probing using Response Selection (KPRS) -- a probe designed specifically for TOD models. Experiments on KPRS and the response generation task show improvements of knowledge injection with adapters over strong baselines.

Despite promising performance on open-source large vision-language models (LVLMs), transfer-based targeted attacks often fail against black-box commercial LVLMs. Analyzing failed adversarial perturbations reveals that the learned perturbations typically originate from a uniform distribution and lack clear semantic details, resulting in unintended responses. This critical absence of semantic information leads commercial LVLMs to either ignore the perturbation entirely or misinterpret its embedded semantics, thereby causing the attack to fail. To overcome these issues, we notice that identifying core semantic objects is a key objective for models trained with various datasets and methodologies. This insight motivates our approach that refines semantic clarity by encoding explicit semantic details within local regions, thus ensuring interoperability and capturing finer-grained features, and by concentrating modifications on semantically rich areas rather than applying them uniformly. To achieve this, we propose a simple yet highly effective solution: at each optimization step, the adversarial image is cropped randomly by a controlled aspect ratio and scale, resized, and then aligned with the target image in the embedding space. Experimental results confirm our hypothesis. Our adversarial examples crafted with local-aggregated perturbations focused on crucial regions exhibit surprisingly good transferability to commercial LVLMs, including GPT-4.5, GPT-4o, Gemini-2.0-flash, Claude-3.5-sonnet, Claude-3.7-sonnet, and even reasoning models like o1, Claude-3.7-thinking and Gemini-2.0-flash-thinking. Our approach achieves success rates exceeding 90% on GPT-4.5, 4o, and o1, significantly outperforming all prior state-of-the-art attack methods. Our optimized adversarial examples under different configurations and training code are available at https://github.com/VILA-Lab/M-Attack.

Recent work in open-domain question answering (ODQA) has shown that adversarial poisoning of the input contexts can cause large drops in accuracy for production systems. However, little to no work has proposed methods to defend against these attacks. To do so, we introduce a new method that uses query augmentation to search for a diverse set of retrieved passages that could answer the original question. We integrate these new passages into the model through the design of a novel confidence method, comparing the predicted answer to its appearance in the retrieved contexts (what we call Confidence from Answer Redundancy, e.g. CAR). Together these methods allow for a simple but effective way to defend against poisoning attacks and provide gains of 5-20% exact match across varying levels of data poisoning.

Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) expands the capabilities of modern large language models (LLMs) in chatbot applications, enabling developers to adapt and personalize the LLM output without expensive training or fine-tuning. RAG systems use an external knowledge database to retrieve the most relevant documents for a given query, providing this context to the LLM generator. While RAG achieves impressive utility in many applications, its adoption to enable personalized generative models introduces new security risks. In this work, we propose new attack surfaces for an adversary to compromise a victim's RAG system, by injecting a single malicious document in its knowledge database. We design Phantom, general two-step attack framework against RAG augmented LLMs. The first step involves crafting a poisoned document designed to be retrieved by the RAG system within the top-k results only when an adversarial trigger, a specific sequence of words acting as backdoor, is present in the victim's queries. In the second step, a specially crafted adversarial string within the poisoned document triggers various adversarial attacks in the LLM generator, including denial of service, reputation damage, privacy violations, and harmful behaviors. We demonstrate our attacks on multiple LLM architectures, including Gemma, Vicuna, and Llama.

The wide-ranging applications of large language models (LLMs), especially in safety-critical domains, necessitate the proper evaluation of the LLM's adversarial robustness. This paper proposes an efficient tool to audit the LLM's adversarial robustness via a prompt-based adversarial attack (PromptAttack). PromptAttack converts adversarial textual attacks into an attack prompt that can cause the victim LLM to output the adversarial sample to fool itself. The attack prompt is composed of three important components: (1) original input (OI) including the original sample and its ground-truth label, (2) attack objective (AO) illustrating a task description of generating a new sample that can fool itself without changing the semantic meaning, and (3) attack guidance (AG) containing the perturbation instructions to guide the LLM on how to complete the task by perturbing the original sample at character, word, and sentence levels, respectively. Besides, we use a fidelity filter to ensure that PromptAttack maintains the original semantic meanings of the adversarial examples. Further, we enhance the attack power of PromptAttack by ensembling adversarial examples at different perturbation levels. Comprehensive empirical results using Llama2 and GPT-3.5 validate that PromptAttack consistently yields a much higher attack success rate compared to AdvGLUE and AdvGLUE++. Interesting findings include that a simple emoji can easily mislead GPT-3.5 to make wrong predictions.

Warning: this paper contains content that may be inappropriate or offensive. As generative models become available for public use in various applications, testing and analyzing vulnerabilities of these models has become a priority. Here we propose an automatic red teaming framework that evaluates a given model and exposes its vulnerabilities against unsafe and inappropriate content generation. Our framework uses in-context learning in a feedback loop to red team models and trigger them into unsafe content generation. We propose different in-context attack strategies to automatically learn effective and diverse adversarial prompts for text-to-image models. Our experiments demonstrate that compared to baseline approaches, our proposed strategy is significantly more effective in exposing vulnerabilities in Stable Diffusion (SD) model, even when the latter is enhanced with safety features. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the proposed framework is effective for red teaming text-to-text models, resulting in significantly higher toxic response generation rate compared to previously reported numbers.

Major search engine providers are rapidly incorporating Large Language Model (LLM)-generated content in response to user queries. These conversational search engines operate by loading retrieved website text into the LLM context for summarization and interpretation. Recent research demonstrates that LLMs are highly vulnerable to jailbreaking and prompt injection attacks, which disrupt the safety and quality goals of LLMs using adversarial strings. This work investigates the impact of prompt injections on the ranking order of sources referenced by conversational search engines. To this end, we introduce a focused dataset of real-world consumer product websites and formalize conversational search ranking as an adversarial problem. Experimentally, we analyze conversational search rankings in the absence of adversarial injections and show that different LLMs vary significantly in prioritizing product name, document content, and context position. We then present a tree-of-attacks-based jailbreaking technique which reliably promotes low-ranked products. Importantly, these attacks transfer effectively to state-of-the-art conversational search engines such as perplexity.ai. Given the strong financial incentive for website owners to boost their search ranking, we argue that our problem formulation is of critical importance for future robustness work.

Machine learning models are susceptible to adversarial perturbations: small changes to input that can cause large changes in output. It is also demonstrated that there exist input-agnostic perturbations, called universal adversarial perturbations, which can change the inference of target model on most of the data samples. However, existing methods to craft universal perturbations are (i) task specific, (ii) require samples from the training data distribution, and (iii) perform complex optimizations. Additionally, because of the data dependence, fooling ability of the crafted perturbations is proportional to the available training data. In this paper, we present a novel, generalizable and data-free approaches for crafting universal adversarial perturbations. Independent of the underlying task, our objective achieves fooling via corrupting the extracted features at multiple layers. Therefore, the proposed objective is generalizable to craft image-agnostic perturbations across multiple vision tasks such as object recognition, semantic segmentation, and depth estimation. In the practical setting of black-box attack scenario (when the attacker does not have access to the target model and it's training data), we show that our objective outperforms the data dependent objectives to fool the learned models. Further, via exploiting simple priors related to the data distribution, our objective remarkably boosts the fooling ability of the crafted perturbations. Significant fooling rates achieved by our objective emphasize that the current deep learning models are now at an increased risk, since our objective generalizes across multiple tasks without the requirement of training data for crafting the perturbations. To encourage reproducible research, we have released the codes for our proposed algorithm.

Pre-trained language models (LMs) have been shown to memorize a substantial amount of knowledge from the pre-training corpora; however, they are still limited in recalling factually correct knowledge given a certain context. Hence, they tend to suffer from counterfactual or hallucinatory generation when used in knowledge-intensive natural language generation (NLG) tasks. Recent remedies to this problem focus on modifying either the pre-training or task fine-tuning objectives to incorporate knowledge, which normally require additional costly training or architecture modification of LMs for practical applications. We present Knowledge Infused Decoding (KID) -- a novel decoding algorithm for generative LMs, which dynamically infuses external knowledge into each step of the LM decoding. Specifically, we maintain a local knowledge memory based on the current context, interacting with a dynamically created external knowledge trie, and continuously update the local memory as a knowledge-aware constraint to guide decoding via reinforcement learning. On six diverse knowledge-intensive NLG tasks, task-agnostic LMs (e.g., GPT-2 and BART) armed with KID outperform many task-optimized state-of-the-art models, and show particularly strong performance in few-shot scenarios over seven related knowledge-infusion techniques. Human evaluation confirms KID's ability to generate more relevant and factual language for the input context when compared with multiple baselines. Finally, KID also alleviates exposure bias and provides stable generation quality when generating longer sequences. Code for KID is available at https://github.com/microsoft/KID.

As the AI systems become deeply embedded in social media platforms, we've uncovered a concerning security vulnerability that goes beyond traditional adversarial attacks. It becomes important to assess the risks of LLMs before the general public use them on social media platforms to avoid any adverse impacts. Unlike obvious nonsensical text strings that safety systems can easily catch, our work reveals that human-readable situation-driven adversarial full-prompts that leverage situational context are effective but much harder to detect. We found that skilled attackers can exploit the vulnerabilities in open-source and proprietary LLMs to make a malicious user query safe for LLMs, resulting in generating a harmful response. This raises an important question about the vulnerabilities of LLMs. To measure the robustness against human-readable attacks, which now present a potent threat, our research makes three major contributions. First, we developed attacks that use movie scripts as situational contextual frameworks, creating natural-looking full-prompts that trick LLMs into generating harmful content. Second, we developed a method to transform gibberish adversarial text into readable, innocuous content that still exploits vulnerabilities when used within the full-prompts. Finally, we enhanced the AdvPrompter framework with p-nucleus sampling to generate diverse human-readable adversarial texts that significantly improve attack effectiveness against models like GPT-3.5-Turbo-0125 and Gemma-7b. Our findings show that these systems can be manipulated to operate beyond their intended ethical boundaries when presented with seemingly normal prompts that contain hidden adversarial elements. By identifying these vulnerabilities, we aim to drive the development of more robust safety mechanisms that can withstand sophisticated attacks in real-world applications.

Adversarial attacks are a major challenge faced by current machine learning research. These purposely crafted inputs fool even the most advanced models, precluding their deployment in safety-critical applications. Extensive research in computer vision has been carried to develop reliable defense strategies. However, the same issue remains less explored in natural language processing. Our work presents a model-agnostic detector of adversarial text examples. The approach identifies patterns in the logits of the target classifier when perturbing the input text. The proposed detector improves the current state-of-the-art performance in recognizing adversarial inputs and exhibits strong generalization capabilities across different NLP models, datasets, and word-level attacks.

Reward modeling has emerged as a promising approach for the scalable alignment of language models. However, contemporary reward models (RMs) often lack robustness, awarding high rewards to low-quality, out-of-distribution (OOD) samples. This can lead to reward hacking, where policies exploit unintended shortcuts to maximize rewards, undermining alignment. To address this challenge, we introduce Adv-RM, a novel adversarial training framework that automatically identifies adversarial examples -- responses that receive high rewards from the target RM but are OOD and of low quality. By leveraging reinforcement learning, Adv-RM trains a policy to generate adversarial examples that reliably expose vulnerabilities in large state-of-the-art reward models such as Nemotron 340B RM. Incorporating these adversarial examples into the reward training process improves the robustness of RMs, mitigating reward hacking and enhancing downstream performance in RLHF. We demonstrate that Adv-RM significantly outperforms conventional RM training, increasing stability and enabling more effective RLHF training in both synthetic and real-data settings.

Despite significant advances in large language models (LLMs), their knowledge memorization capabilities remain underexplored, due to the lack of standardized and high-quality test ground. In this paper, we introduce a novel, real-world and large-scale knowledge injection benchmark that evolves continuously over time without requiring human intervention. Specifically, we propose WikiDYK, which leverages recently-added and human-written facts from Wikipedia's "Did You Know..." entries. These entries are carefully selected by expert Wikipedia editors based on criteria such as verifiability and clarity. Each entry is converted into multiple question-answer pairs spanning diverse task formats from easy cloze prompts to complex multi-hop questions. WikiDYK contains 12,290 facts and 77,180 questions, which is also seamlessly extensible with future updates from Wikipedia editors. Extensive experiments using continued pre-training reveal a surprising insight: despite their prevalence in modern LLMs, Causal Language Models (CLMs) demonstrate significantly weaker knowledge memorization capabilities compared to Bidirectional Language Models (BiLMs), exhibiting a 23% lower accuracy in terms of reliability. To compensate for the smaller scales of current BiLMs, we introduce a modular collaborative framework utilizing ensembles of BiLMs as external knowledge repositories to integrate with LLMs. Experiment shows that our framework further improves the reliability accuracy by up to 29.1%.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in specialized domains with continuously evolving knowledge, the need for timely and precise knowledge injection has become essential. Fine-tuning with paraphrased data is a common approach to enhance knowledge injection, yet it faces two significant challenges: high computational costs due to repetitive external model usage and limited sample diversity. To this end, we introduce LaPael, a latent-level paraphrasing method that applies input-dependent noise to early LLM layers. This approach enables diverse and semantically consistent augmentations directly within the model. Furthermore, it eliminates the recurring costs of paraphrase generation for each knowledge update. Our extensive experiments on question-answering benchmarks demonstrate that LaPael improves knowledge injection over standard fine-tuning and existing noise-based approaches. Additionally, combining LaPael with data-level paraphrasing further enhances performance.

Recent vision-language foundation models, such as CLIP, have demonstrated superior capabilities in learning representations that can be transferable across diverse range of downstream tasks and domains. With the emergence of such powerful models, it has become crucial to effectively leverage their capabilities in tackling challenging vision tasks. On the other hand, only a few works have focused on devising adversarial examples that transfer well to both unknown domains and model architectures. In this paper, we propose a novel transfer attack method called PDCL-Attack, which leverages the CLIP model to enhance the transferability of adversarial perturbations generated by a generative model-based attack framework. Specifically, we formulate an effective prompt-driven feature guidance by harnessing the semantic representation power of text, particularly from the ground-truth class labels of input images. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to introduce prompt learning to enhance the transferable generative attacks. Extensive experiments conducted across various cross-domain and cross-model settings empirically validate our approach, demonstrating its superiority over state-of-the-art methods.

In this paper, we study the problem of generating obstinate (over-stability) adversarial examples by word substitution in NLP, where input text is meaningfully changed but the model's prediction does not, even though it should. Previous word substitution approaches have predominantly focused on manually designed antonym-based strategies for generating obstinate adversarial examples, which hinders its application as these strategies can only find a subset of obstinate adversarial examples and require human efforts. To address this issue, in this paper, we introduce a novel word substitution method named GradObstinate, a gradient-based approach that automatically generates obstinate adversarial examples without any constraints on the search space or the need for manual design principles. To empirically evaluate the efficacy of GradObstinate, we conduct comprehensive experiments on five representative models (Electra, ALBERT, Roberta, DistillBERT, and CLIP) finetuned on four NLP benchmarks (SST-2, MRPC, SNLI, and SQuAD) and a language-grounding benchmark (MSCOCO). Extensive experiments show that our proposed GradObstinate generates more powerful obstinate adversarial examples, exhibiting a higher attack success rate compared to antonym-based methods. Furthermore, to show the transferability of obstinate word substitutions found by GradObstinate, we replace the words in four representative NLP benchmarks with their obstinate substitutions. Notably, obstinate substitutions exhibit a high success rate when transferred to other models in black-box settings, including even GPT-3 and ChatGPT. Examples of obstinate adversarial examples found by GradObstinate are available at https://huggingface.co/spaces/anonauthors/SecretLanguage.

Modern image-to-text systems typically adopt the encoder-decoder framework, which comprises two main components: an image encoder, responsible for extracting image features, and a transformer-based decoder, used for generating captions. Taking inspiration from the analysis of neural networks' robustness against adversarial perturbations, we propose a novel gray-box algorithm for creating adversarial examples in image-to-text models. Unlike image classification tasks that have a finite set of class labels, finding visually similar adversarial examples in an image-to-text task poses greater challenges because the captioning system allows for a virtually infinite space of possible captions. In this paper, we present a gray-box adversarial attack on image-to-text, both untargeted and targeted. We formulate the process of discovering adversarial perturbations as an optimization problem that uses only the image-encoder component, meaning the proposed attack is language-model agnostic. Through experiments conducted on the ViT-GPT2 model, which is the most-used image-to-text model in Hugging Face, and the Flickr30k dataset, we demonstrate that our proposed attack successfully generates visually similar adversarial examples, both with untargeted and targeted captions. Notably, our attack operates in a gray-box manner, requiring no knowledge about the decoder module. We also show that our attacks fool the popular open-source platform Hugging Face.

Prompt-based learning paradigm bridges the gap between pre-training and fine-tuning, and works effectively under the few-shot setting. However, we find that this learning paradigm inherits the vulnerability from the pre-training stage, where model predictions can be misled by inserting certain triggers into the text. In this paper, we explore this universal vulnerability by either injecting backdoor triggers or searching for adversarial triggers on pre-trained language models using only plain text. In both scenarios, we demonstrate that our triggers can totally control or severely decrease the performance of prompt-based models fine-tuned on arbitrary downstream tasks, reflecting the universal vulnerability of the prompt-based learning paradigm. Further experiments show that adversarial triggers have good transferability among language models. We also find conventional fine-tuning models are not vulnerable to adversarial triggers constructed from pre-trained language models. We conclude by proposing a potential solution to mitigate our attack methods. Code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/leix28/prompt-universal-vulnerability

In this paper, we show that knowledge distillation can be subverted to manipulate language model benchmark scores, revealing a critical vulnerability in current evaluation practices. We introduce "Data Laundering," a three-phase process analogous to financial money laundering, that enables the covert transfer of benchmark-specific knowledge through seemingly legitimate intermediate training steps. Through extensive experiments with a 2-layer BERT student model, we show how this approach can achieve substantial improvements in benchmark accuracy (up to 75\% on GPQA) without developing genuine reasoning capabilities. Notably, this method can be exploited intentionally or even unintentionally, as researchers may inadvertently adopt this method that inflates scores using knowledge distillation without realizing the implications. While our findings demonstrate the effectiveness of this technique, we present them as a cautionary tale highlighting the urgent need for more robust evaluation methods in AI. This work aims to contribute to the ongoing discussion about evaluation integrity in AI development and the need for benchmarks that more accurately reflect true model capabilities. The code is available at https://github.com/mbzuai-nlp/data_laundering.

Adversarial robustness is a research area that has recently received a lot of attention in the quest for trustworthy artificial intelligence. However, recent works on adversarial robustness have focused on supervised learning where it is assumed that labeled data is plentiful. In this paper, we investigate semi-supervised adversarial training where labeled data is scarce. We derive two upper bounds for the robust risk and propose a regularization term for unlabeled data motivated by these two upper bounds. Then, we develop a semi-supervised adversarial training algorithm that combines the proposed regularization term with knowledge distillation using a semi-supervised teacher (i.e., a teacher model trained using a semi-supervised learning algorithm). Our experiments show that our proposed algorithm achieves state-of-the-art performance with significant margins compared to existing algorithms. In particular, compared to supervised learning algorithms, performance of our proposed algorithm is not much worse even when the amount of labeled data is very small. For example, our algorithm with only 8\% labeled data is comparable to supervised adversarial training algorithms that use all labeled data, both in terms of standard and robust accuracies on CIFAR-10.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaksx2013methods to elicit harmful or generally impermissible outputs. Safety measures are developed and assessed on their effectiveness at defending against jailbreak attacks, indicating a belief that safety is equivalent to robustness. We assert that current defense mechanisms, such as output filters and alignment fine-tuning, are, and will remain, fundamentally insufficient for ensuring model safety. These defenses fail to address risks arising from dual-intent queries and the ability to composite innocuous outputs to achieve harmful goals. To address this critical gap, we introduce an information-theoretic threat model called inferential adversaries who exploit impermissible information leakage from model outputs to achieve malicious goals. We distinguish these from commonly studied security adversaries who only seek to force victim models to generate specific impermissible outputs. We demonstrate the feasibility of automating inferential adversaries through question decomposition and response aggregation. To provide safety guarantees, we define an information censorship criterion for censorship mechanisms, bounding the leakage of impermissible information. We propose a defense mechanism which ensures this bound and reveal an intrinsic safety-utility trade-off. Our work provides the first theoretically grounded understanding of the requirements for releasing safe LLMs and the utility costs involved.

Knowledge erasure in large language models (LLMs) is important for ensuring compliance with data and AI regulations, safeguarding user privacy, mitigating bias, and misinformation. Existing unlearning methods aim to make the process of knowledge erasure more efficient and effective by removing specific knowledge while preserving overall model performance, especially for retained information. However, it has been observed that the unlearning techniques tend to suppress and leave the knowledge beneath the surface, thus making it retrievable with the right prompts. In this work, we demonstrate that step-by-step reasoning can serve as a backdoor to recover this hidden information. We introduce a step-by-step reasoning-based black-box attack, Sleek, that systematically exposes unlearning failures. We employ a structured attack framework with three core components: (1) an adversarial prompt generation strategy leveraging step-by-step reasoning built from LLM-generated queries, (2) an attack mechanism that successfully recalls erased content, and exposes unfair suppression of knowledge intended for retention and (3) a categorization of prompts as direct, indirect, and implied, to identify which query types most effectively exploit unlearning weaknesses. Through extensive evaluations on four state-of-the-art unlearning techniques and two widely used LLMs, we show that existing approaches fail to ensure reliable knowledge removal. Of the generated adversarial prompts, 62.5% successfully retrieved forgotten Harry Potter facts from WHP-unlearned Llama, while 50% exposed unfair suppression of retained knowledge. Our work highlights the persistent risks of information leakage, emphasizing the need for more robust unlearning strategies for erasure.

Text-conditioned image generation models have recently achieved astonishing image quality and alignment results. Consequently, they are employed in a fast-growing number of applications. Since they are highly data-driven, relying on billion-sized datasets randomly scraped from the web, they also produce unsafe content. As a contribution to the Adversarial Nibbler challenge, we distill a large set of over 1,000 potential adversarial inputs from existing safety benchmarks. Our analysis of the gathered prompts and corresponding images demonstrates the fragility of input filters and provides further insights into systematic safety issues in current generative image models.

This paper introduces FRACTURED-SORRY-Bench, a framework for evaluating the safety of Large Language Models (LLMs) against multi-turn conversational attacks. Building upon the SORRY-Bench dataset, we propose a simple yet effective method for generating adversarial prompts by breaking down harmful queries into seemingly innocuous sub-questions. Our approach achieves a maximum increase of +46.22\% in Attack Success Rates (ASRs) across GPT-4, GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini, and GPT-3.5-Turbo models compared to baseline methods. We demonstrate that this technique poses a challenge to current LLM safety measures and highlights the need for more robust defenses against subtle, multi-turn attacks.

Recent studies have revealed the vulnerability of pre-trained language models to adversarial attacks. Existing adversarial defense techniques attempt to reconstruct adversarial examples within feature or text spaces. However, these methods struggle to effectively repair the semantics in adversarial examples, resulting in unsatisfactory performance and limiting their practical utility. To repair the semantics in adversarial examples, we introduce a novel approach named Reactive Perturbation Defocusing (Rapid). Rapid employs an adversarial detector to identify fake labels of adversarial examples and leverage adversarial attackers to repair the semantics in adversarial examples. Our extensive experimental results conducted on four public datasets, convincingly demonstrate the effectiveness of Rapid in various adversarial attack scenarios. To address the problem of defense performance validation in previous works, we provide a demonstration of adversarial detection and repair based on our work, which can be easily evaluated at https://tinyurl.com/22ercuf8.

The rapid adoption of large language models (LLMs) in multi-agent systems has highlighted their impressive capabilities in various applications, such as collaborative problem-solving and autonomous negotiation. However, the security implications of these LLM-based multi-agent systems have not been thoroughly investigated, particularly concerning the spread of manipulated knowledge. In this paper, we investigate this critical issue by constructing a detailed threat model and a comprehensive simulation environment that mirrors real-world multi-agent deployments in a trusted platform. Subsequently, we propose a novel two-stage attack method involving Persuasiveness Injection and Manipulated Knowledge Injection to systematically explore the potential for manipulated knowledge (i.e., counterfactual and toxic knowledge) spread without explicit prompt manipulation. Our method leverages the inherent vulnerabilities of LLMs in handling world knowledge, which can be exploited by attackers to unconsciously spread fabricated information. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our attack method can successfully induce LLM-based agents to spread both counterfactual and toxic knowledge without degrading their foundational capabilities during agent communication. Furthermore, we show that these manipulations can persist through popular retrieval-augmented generation frameworks, where several benign agents store and retrieve manipulated chat histories for future interactions. This persistence indicates that even after the interaction has ended, the benign agents may continue to be influenced by manipulated knowledge. Our findings reveal significant security risks in LLM-based multi-agent systems, emphasizing the imperative need for robust defenses against manipulated knowledge spread, such as introducing ``guardian'' agents and advanced fact-checking tools.

Adversarial examples, generated by carefully crafted perturbation, have attracted considerable attention in research fields. Recent works have argued that the existence of the robust and non-robust features is a primary cause of the adversarial examples, and investigated their internal interactions in the feature space. In this paper, we propose a way of explicitly distilling feature representation into the robust and non-robust features, using Information Bottleneck. Specifically, we inject noise variation to each feature unit and evaluate the information flow in the feature representation to dichotomize feature units either robust or non-robust, based on the noise variation magnitude. Through comprehensive experiments, we demonstrate that the distilled features are highly correlated with adversarial prediction, and they have human-perceptible semantic information by themselves. Furthermore, we present an attack mechanism intensifying the gradient of non-robust features that is directly related to the model prediction, and validate its effectiveness of breaking model robustness.

We present Twin Answer Sentences Attack (TASA), an adversarial attack method for question answering (QA) models that produces fluent and grammatical adversarial contexts while maintaining gold answers. Despite phenomenal progress on general adversarial attacks, few works have investigated the vulnerability and attack specifically for QA models. In this work, we first explore the biases in the existing models and discover that they mainly rely on keyword matching between the question and context, and ignore the relevant contextual relations for answer prediction. Based on two biases above, TASA attacks the target model in two folds: (1) lowering the model's confidence on the gold answer with a perturbed answer sentence; (2) misguiding the model towards a wrong answer with a distracting answer sentence. Equipped with designed beam search and filtering methods, TASA can generate more effective attacks than existing textual attack methods while sustaining the quality of contexts, in extensive experiments on five QA datasets and human evaluations.

AI systems can take harmful actions and are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks. We present an approach, inspired by recent advances in representation engineering, that "short-circuits" models as they respond with harmful outputs. Existing techniques aimed at improving alignment, such as refusal training, are often bypassed. Techniques such as adversarial training try to plug these holes by countering specific attacks. As an alternative to refusal training and adversarial training, short-circuiting directly controls the representations that are responsible for harmful outputs in the first place. Our technique can be applied to both text-only and multimodal language models to prevent the generation of harmful outputs without sacrificing utility -- even in the presence of powerful unseen attacks. Notably, while adversarial robustness in standalone image recognition remains an open challenge, short-circuiting allows the larger multimodal system to reliably withstand image "hijacks" that aim to produce harmful content. Finally, we extend our approach to AI agents, demonstrating considerable reductions in the rate of harmful actions when they are under attack. Our approach represents a significant step forward in the development of reliable safeguards to harmful behavior and adversarial attacks.

LLMs trained on massive datasets may inadvertently acquire sensitive information such as personal details and potentially harmful content. This risk is further heightened in multimodal LLMs as they integrate information from multiple modalities (image and text). Adversaries can exploit this knowledge through multimodal prompts to extract sensitive details. Evaluating how effectively MLLMs can forget such information (targeted unlearning) necessitates the creation of high-quality, well-annotated image-text pairs. While prior work on unlearning has focused on text, multimodal unlearning remains underexplored. To address this gap, we first introduce a multimodal unlearning benchmark, UnLOK-VQA (Unlearning Outside Knowledge VQA), as well as an attack-and-defense framework to evaluate methods for deleting specific multimodal knowledge from MLLMs. We extend a visual question-answering dataset using an automated pipeline that generates varying-proximity samples for testing generalization and specificity, followed by manual filtering for maintaining high quality. We then evaluate six defense objectives against seven attacks (four whitebox, three blackbox), including a novel whitebox method leveraging interpretability of hidden states. Our results show multimodal attacks outperform text- or image-only ones, and that the most effective defense removes answer information from internal model states. Additionally, larger models exhibit greater post-editing robustness, suggesting that scale enhances safety. UnLOK-VQA provides a rigorous benchmark for advancing unlearning in MLLMs.

We introduce and study the problem of adversarial arithmetic, which provides a simple yet challenging testbed for language model alignment. This problem is comprised of arithmetic questions posed in natural language, with an arbitrary adversarial string inserted before the question is complete. Even in the simple setting of 1-digit addition problems, it is easy to find adversarial prompts that make all tested models (including PaLM2, GPT4, Claude2) misbehave, and even to steer models to a particular wrong answer. We additionally provide a simple algorithm for finding successful attacks by querying those same models, which we name "prompt inversion rejection sampling" (PIRS). We finally show that models can be partially hardened against these attacks via reinforcement learning and via agentic constitutional loops. However, we were not able to make a language model fully robust against adversarial arithmetic attacks.

Discovering the existence of universal adversarial perturbations had large theoretical and practical impacts on the field of adversarial learning. In the text domain, most universal studies focused on adversarial prefixes which are added to all texts. However, unlike the vision domain, adding the same perturbation to different inputs results in noticeably unnatural inputs. Therefore, we introduce a new universal adversarial setup - a universal adversarial policy, which has many advantages of other universal attacks but also results in valid texts - thus making it relevant in practice. We achieve this by learning a single search policy over a predefined set of semantics preserving text alterations, on many texts. This formulation is universal in that the policy is successful in finding adversarial examples on new texts efficiently. Our approach uses text perturbations which were extensively shown to produce natural attacks in the non-universal setup (specific synonym replacements). We suggest a strong baseline approach for this formulation which uses reinforcement learning. It's ability to generalise (from as few as 500 training texts) shows that universal adversarial patterns exist in the text domain as well.

Data-free Knowledge Distillation (DFKD) has gained popularity recently, with the fundamental idea of carrying out knowledge transfer from a Teacher neural network to a Student neural network in the absence of training data. However, in the Adversarial DFKD framework, the student network's accuracy, suffers due to the non-stationary distribution of the pseudo-samples under multiple generator updates. To this end, at every generator update, we aim to maintain the student's performance on previously encountered examples while acquiring knowledge from samples of the current distribution. Thus, we propose a meta-learning inspired framework by treating the task of Knowledge-Acquisition (learning from newly generated samples) and Knowledge-Retention (retaining knowledge on previously met samples) as meta-train and meta-test, respectively. Hence, we dub our method as Learning to Retain while Acquiring. Moreover, we identify an implicit aligning factor between the Knowledge-Retention and Knowledge-Acquisition tasks indicating that the proposed student update strategy enforces a common gradient direction for both tasks, alleviating interference between the two objectives. Finally, we support our hypothesis by exhibiting extensive evaluation and comparison of our method with prior arts on multiple datasets.

Knowledge distillation (KD) has been shown to be highly effective in guiding a student model with a larger teacher model and achieving practical benefits in improving the computational and memory efficiency for large language models (LLMs). State-of-the-art KD methods for LLMs mostly rely on minimizing explicit distribution distance between teacher and student probability predictions. Instead of optimizing these mandatory behaviour cloning objectives, we explore an imitation learning strategy for KD of LLMs. In particular, we minimize the imitation gap by matching the action-value moments of the teacher's behavior from both on- and off-policy perspectives. To achieve this action-value moment-matching goal, we propose an adversarial training algorithm to jointly estimate the moment-matching distance and optimize the student policy to minimize it. Results from both task-agnostic instruction-following experiments and task-specific experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our method and achieve new state-of-the-art performance.

Knowledge distillation (KD) is a simple and successful method to transfer knowledge from a teacher to a student model solely based on functional activity. However, current KD has a few shortcomings: it has recently been shown that this method is unsuitable to transfer simple inductive biases like shift equivariance, struggles to transfer out of domain generalization, and optimization time is magnitudes longer compared to default non-KD model training. To improve these aspects of KD, we propose Hard Augmentations for Robust Distillation (HARD), a generally applicable data augmentation framework, that generates synthetic data points for which the teacher and the student disagree. We show in a simple toy example that our augmentation framework solves the problem of transferring simple equivariances with KD. We then apply our framework in real-world tasks for a variety of augmentation models, ranging from simple spatial transformations to unconstrained image manipulations with a pretrained variational autoencoder. We find that our learned augmentations significantly improve KD performance on in-domain and out-of-domain evaluation. Moreover, our method outperforms even state-of-the-art data augmentations and since the augmented training inputs can be visualized, they offer a qualitative insight into the properties that are transferred from the teacher to the student. Thus HARD represents a generally applicable, dynamically optimized data augmentation technique tailored to improve the generalization and convergence speed of models trained with KD.

We propose a universal adversarial attack on multimodal Large Language Models (LLMs) that leverages a single optimized image to override alignment safeguards across diverse queries and even multiple models. By backpropagating through the vision encoder and language head, we craft a synthetic image that forces the model to respond with a targeted phrase (e.g., ''Sure, here it is'') or otherwise unsafe content-even for harmful prompts. In experiments on the SafeBench benchmark, our method achieves significantly higher attack success rates than existing baselines, including text-only universal prompts (e.g., up to 93% on certain models). We further demonstrate cross-model transferability by training on several multimodal LLMs simultaneously and testing on unseen architectures. Additionally, a multi-answer variant of our approach produces more natural-sounding (yet still malicious) responses. These findings underscore critical vulnerabilities in current multimodal alignment and call for more robust adversarial defenses. We will release code and datasets under the Apache-2.0 license. Warning: some content generated by Multimodal LLMs in this paper may be offensive to some readers.

We investigate the robustness of reasoning models trained for step-by-step problem solving by introducing query-agnostic adversarial triggers - short, irrelevant text that, when appended to math problems, systematically mislead models to output incorrect answers without altering the problem's semantics. We propose CatAttack, an automated iterative attack pipeline for generating triggers on a weaker, less expensive proxy model (DeepSeek V3) and successfully transfer them to more advanced reasoning target models like DeepSeek R1 and DeepSeek R1-distilled-Qwen-32B, resulting in greater than 300% increase in the likelihood of the target model generating an incorrect answer. For example, appending, "Interesting fact: cats sleep most of their lives," to any math problem leads to more than doubling the chances of a model getting the answer wrong. Our findings highlight critical vulnerabilities in reasoning models, revealing that even state-of-the-art models remain susceptible to subtle adversarial inputs, raising security and reliability concerns. The CatAttack triggers dataset with model responses is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/collinear-ai/cat-attack-adversarial-triggers.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly prevalent across many real-world applications, understanding and enhancing their robustness to user inputs is of paramount importance. Existing methods for identifying adversarial prompts tend to focus on specific domains, lack diversity, or require extensive human annotations. To address these limitations, we present Rainbow Teaming, a novel approach for producing a diverse collection of adversarial prompts. Rainbow Teaming casts adversarial prompt generation as a quality-diversity problem, and uses open-ended search to generate prompts that are both effective and diverse. It can uncover a model's vulnerabilities across a broad range of domains including, in this paper, safety, question answering, and cybersecurity. We also demonstrate that fine-tuning on synthetic data generated by Rainbow Teaming improves the safety of state-of-the-art LLMs without hurting their general capabilities and helpfulness, paving the path to open-ended self-improvement.

We study the problem of injecting knowledge into large pre-trained models like BERT and RoBERTa. Existing methods typically update the original parameters of pre-trained models when injecting knowledge. However, when multiple kinds of knowledge are injected, the historically injected knowledge would be flushed away. To address this, we propose K-Adapter, a framework that retains the original parameters of the pre-trained model fixed and supports the development of versatile knowledge-infused model. Taking RoBERTa as the backbone model, K-Adapter has a neural adapter for each kind of infused knowledge, like a plug-in connected to RoBERTa. There is no information flow between different adapters, thus multiple adapters can be efficiently trained in a distributed way. As a case study, we inject two kinds of knowledge in this work, including (1) factual knowledge obtained from automatically aligned text-triplets on Wikipedia and Wikidata and (2) linguistic knowledge obtained via dependency parsing. Results on three knowledge-driven tasks, including relation classification, entity typing, and question answering, demonstrate that each adapter improves the performance and the combination of both adapters brings further improvements. Further analysis indicates that K-Adapter captures versatile knowledge than RoBERTa.

In this paper, we propose a novel adversarial defence mechanism for image classification -- CARSO -- inspired by cues from cognitive neuroscience. The method is synergistically complementary to adversarial training and relies on knowledge of the internal representation of the attacked classifier. Exploiting a generative model for adversarial purification, conditioned on such representation, it samples reconstructions of inputs to be finally classified. Experimental evaluation by a well-established benchmark of varied, strong adaptive attacks, across diverse image datasets and classifier architectures, shows that CARSO is able to defend the classifier significantly better than state-of-the-art adversarial training alone -- with a tolerable clean accuracy toll. Furthermore, the defensive architecture succeeds in effectively shielding itself from unforeseen threats, and end-to-end attacks adapted to fool stochastic defences. Code and pre-trained models are available at https://github.com/emaballarin/CARSO .

The recent advances in diffusion models (DMs) have revolutionized the generation of realistic and complex images. However, these models also introduce potential safety hazards, such as producing harmful content and infringing data copyrights. Despite the development of safety-driven unlearning techniques to counteract these challenges, doubts about their efficacy persist. To tackle this issue, we introduce an evaluation framework that leverages adversarial prompts to discern the trustworthiness of these safety-driven DMs after they have undergone the process of unlearning harmful concepts. Specifically, we investigated the adversarial robustness of DMs, assessed by adversarial prompts, when eliminating unwanted concepts, styles, and objects. We develop an effective and efficient adversarial prompt generation approach for DMs, termed UnlearnDiffAtk. This method capitalizes on the intrinsic classification abilities of DMs to simplify the creation of adversarial prompts, thereby eliminating the need for auxiliary classification or diffusion models.Through extensive benchmarking, we evaluate the robustness of five widely-used safety-driven unlearned DMs (i.e., DMs after unlearning undesirable concepts, styles, or objects) across a variety of tasks. Our results demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency merits of UnlearnDiffAtk over the state-of-the-art adversarial prompt generation method and reveal the lack of robustness of current safety-driven unlearning techniques when applied to DMs. Codes are available at https://github.com/OPTML-Group/Diffusion-MU-Attack. WARNING: This paper contains model outputs that may be offensive in nature.

As generative AI, particularly large language models (LLMs), become increasingly integrated into production applications, new attack surfaces and vulnerabilities emerge and put a focus on adversarial threats in natural language and multi-modal systems. Red-teaming has gained importance in proactively identifying weaknesses in these systems, while blue-teaming works to protect against such adversarial attacks. Despite growing academic interest in adversarial risks for generative AI, there is limited guidance tailored for practitioners to assess and mitigate these challenges in real-world environments. To address this, our contributions include: (1) a practical examination of red- and blue-teaming strategies for securing generative AI, (2) identification of key challenges and open questions in defense development and evaluation, and (3) the Attack Atlas, an intuitive framework that brings a practical approach to analyzing single-turn input attacks, placing it at the forefront for practitioners. This work aims to bridge the gap between academic insights and practical security measures for the protection of generative AI systems.

Recently, there has been a surge of interest in introducing vision into Large Language Models (LLMs). The proliferation of large Visual Language Models (VLMs), such as Flamingo, BLIP-2, and GPT-4, signifies an exciting convergence of advancements in both visual and language foundation models. Yet, the risks associated with this integrative approach are largely unexamined. In this paper, we shed light on the security and safety implications of this trend. First, we underscore that the continuous and high-dimensional nature of the additional visual input space intrinsically makes it a fertile ground for adversarial attacks. This unavoidably expands the attack surfaces of LLMs. Second, we highlight that the broad functionality of LLMs also presents visual attackers with a wider array of achievable adversarial objectives, extending the implications of security failures beyond mere misclassification. To elucidate these risks, we study adversarial examples in the visual input space of a VLM. Specifically, against MiniGPT-4, which incorporates safety mechanisms that can refuse harmful instructions, we present visual adversarial examples that can circumvent the safety mechanisms and provoke harmful behaviors of the model. Remarkably, we discover that adversarial examples, even if optimized on a narrow, manually curated derogatory corpus against specific social groups, can universally jailbreak the model's safety mechanisms. A single such adversarial example can generally undermine MiniGPT-4's safety, enabling it to heed a wide range of harmful instructions and produce harmful content far beyond simply imitating the derogatory corpus used in optimization. Unveiling these risks, we accentuate the urgent need for comprehensive risk assessments, robust defense strategies, and the implementation of responsible practices for the secure and safe utilization of VLMs.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) techniques have emerged as a promising solution to enhance the reliability of large language models (LLMs) by addressing issues like hallucinations, outdated knowledge, and domain adaptation. In particular, existing RAG methods append relevant documents retrieved from external corpus or databases to the input of LLMs to guide their generation process, which we refer to as the in-context knowledge injection method. While this approach is simple and often effective, it has inherent limitations. Firstly, increasing the context length and number of relevant documents can lead to higher computational overhead and degraded performance, especially in complex reasoning tasks. More importantly, in-context knowledge injection operates primarily at the input level, but LLMs store their internal knowledge in their parameters. This gap fundamentally limits the capacity of in-context methods. To this end, we introduce Parametric retrieval-augmented generation (Parametric RAG), a new RAG paradigm that integrates external knowledge directly into the parameters of feed-forward networks (FFN) of an LLM through document parameterization. This approach not only saves online computational costs by eliminating the need to inject multiple documents into the LLMs' input context, but also deepens the integration of external knowledge into the parametric knowledge space of the LLM. Experimental results demonstrate that Parametric RAG substantially enhances both the effectiveness and efficiency of knowledge augmentation in LLMs. Also, it can be combined with in-context RAG methods to achieve even better performance. We have open-sourced all the code, data, and models in the following anonymized GitHub link: https://github.com/oneal2000/PRAG

Adversarial training is a practical approach for improving the robustness of deep neural networks against adversarial attacks. Although bringing reliable robustness, the performance toward clean examples is negatively affected after adversarial training, which means a trade-off exists between accuracy and robustness. Recently, some studies have tried to use knowledge distillation methods in adversarial training, achieving competitive performance in improving the robustness but the accuracy for clean samples is still limited. In this paper, to mitigate the accuracy-robustness trade-off, we introduce the Multi-Teacher Adversarial Robustness Distillation (MTARD) to guide the model's adversarial training process by applying a strong clean teacher and a strong robust teacher to handle the clean examples and adversarial examples, respectively. During the optimization process, to ensure that different teachers show similar knowledge scales, we design the Entropy-Based Balance algorithm to adjust the teacher's temperature and keep the teachers' information entropy consistent. Besides, to ensure that the student has a relatively consistent learning speed from multiple teachers, we propose the Normalization Loss Balance algorithm to adjust the learning weights of different types of knowledge. A series of experiments conducted on public datasets demonstrate that MTARD outperforms the state-of-the-art adversarial training and distillation methods against various adversarial attacks.

The deployment of large language models (LLMs) faces considerable challenges concerning resource constraints and inference efficiency. Recent research has increasingly focused on smaller, task-specific models enhanced by distilling knowledge from LLMs. However, prior studies have often overlooked the diversity and quality of knowledge, especially the untapped potential of negative knowledge. Constructing effective negative knowledge remains severely understudied. In this paper, we introduce a novel framework called quality-guided contrastive rationale distillation aimed at enhancing reasoning capabilities through contrastive knowledge learning. For positive knowledge, we enrich its diversity through temperature sampling and employ self-consistency for further denoising and refinement. For negative knowledge, we propose an innovative self-adversarial approach that generates low-quality rationales by sampling previous iterations of smaller language models, embracing the idea that one can learn from one's own weaknesses. A contrastive loss is developed to distill both positive and negative knowledge into smaller language models, where an online-updating discriminator is integrated to assess qualities of rationales and assign them appropriate weights, optimizing the training process. Through extensive experiments across multiple reasoning tasks, we demonstrate that our method consistently outperforms existing distillation techniques, yielding higher-quality rationales.

Knowledge-grounded dialogue generation aims to mitigate the issue of text degeneration by incorporating external knowledge to supplement the context. However, the model often fails to internalize this information into responses in a human-like manner. Instead, it simply inserts segments of the provided knowledge into generic responses. As a result, the generated responses tend to be tedious, incoherent, and in lack of interactivity which means the degeneration problem is still unsolved. In this work, we first find that such copying-style degeneration is primarily due to the weak likelihood objective, which allows the model to "cheat" the objective by merely duplicating knowledge segments in a superficial pattern matching based on overlap. To overcome this challenge, we then propose a Multi-level Adaptive Contrastive Learning (MACL) framework that dynamically samples negative examples and subsequently penalizes degeneration behaviors at both the token-level and sequence-level. Extensive experiments on the WoW dataset demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach across various pre-trained models.

Recent advancements in Text-to-Image (T2I) models have raised significant safety concerns about their potential misuse for generating inappropriate or Not-Safe-For-Work (NSFW) contents, despite existing countermeasures such as NSFW classifiers or model fine-tuning for inappropriate concept removal. Addressing this challenge, our study unveils GuardT2I, a novel moderation framework that adopts a generative approach to enhance T2I models' robustness against adversarial prompts. Instead of making a binary classification, GuardT2I utilizes a Large Language Model (LLM) to conditionally transform text guidance embeddings within the T2I models into natural language for effective adversarial prompt detection, without compromising the models' inherent performance. Our extensive experiments reveal that GuardT2I outperforms leading commercial solutions like OpenAI-Moderation and Microsoft Azure Moderator by a significant margin across diverse adversarial scenarios. Our framework is available at https://github.com/cure-lab/GuardT2I.

Visual modifications to text are often used to obfuscate offensive comments in social media (e.g., "!d10t") or as a writing style ("1337" in "leet speak"), among other scenarios. We consider this as a new type of adversarial attack in NLP, a setting to which humans are very robust, as our experiments with both simple and more difficult visual input perturbations demonstrate. We then investigate the impact of visual adversarial attacks on current NLP systems on character-, word-, and sentence-level tasks, showing that both neural and non-neural models are, in contrast to humans, extremely sensitive to such attacks, suffering performance decreases of up to 82\%. We then explore three shielding methods---visual character embeddings, adversarial training, and rule-based recovery---which substantially improve the robustness of the models. However, the shielding methods still fall behind performances achieved in non-attack scenarios, which demonstrates the difficulty of dealing with visual attacks.

Procedural text describes dynamic state changes during a step-by-step natural process (e.g., photosynthesis). In this work, we focus on the task of procedural text understanding, which aims to comprehend such documents and track entities' states and locations during a process. Although recent approaches have achieved substantial progress, their results are far behind human performance. Two challenges, the difficulty of commonsense reasoning and data insufficiency, still remain unsolved, which require the incorporation of external knowledge bases. Previous works on external knowledge injection usually rely on noisy web mining tools and heuristic rules with limited applicable scenarios. In this paper, we propose a novel KnOwledge-Aware proceduraL text understAnding (KOALA) model, which effectively leverages multiple forms of external knowledge in this task. Specifically, we retrieve informative knowledge triples from ConceptNet and perform knowledge-aware reasoning while tracking the entities. Besides, we employ a multi-stage training schema which fine-tunes the BERT model over unlabeled data collected from Wikipedia before further fine-tuning it on the final model. Experimental results on two procedural text datasets, ProPara and Recipes, verify the effectiveness of the proposed methods, in which our model achieves state-of-the-art performance in comparison to various baselines.

In this paper, we present InferES - an original corpus for Natural Language Inference (NLI) in European Spanish. We propose, implement, and analyze a variety of corpus-creating strategies utilizing expert linguists and crowd workers. The objectives behind InferES are to provide high-quality data, and, at the same time to facilitate the systematic evaluation of automated systems. Specifically, we focus on measuring and improving the performance of machine learning systems on negation-based adversarial examples and their ability to generalize across out-of-distribution topics. We train two transformer models on InferES (8,055 gold examples) in a variety of scenarios. Our best model obtains 72.8% accuracy, leaving a lot of room for improvement. The "hypothesis-only" baseline performs only 2%-5% higher than majority, indicating much fewer annotation artifacts than prior work. We find that models trained on InferES generalize very well across topics (both in- and out-of-distribution) and perform moderately well on negation-based adversarial examples.

In many practical applications, large language models (LLMs) need to incorporate new knowledge not present in their pre-training data. The primary methods for this are fine-tuning and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG). Although RAG has emerged as the industry standard for knowledge injection, fine-tuning has not yet achieved comparable success. In this paper, we propose a new fine-tuning technique for learning new knowledge and show that it can reach the performance of RAG. The proposed method is based on the self-distillation approach, which we call prompt distillation. First, we generate question-answer pairs about the new knowledge. Then, we fine-tune a student model on the question-answer pairs to imitate the output distributions of a teacher model, which additionally receives the new knowledge in its prompt. The student model is identical to the teacher, except it is equipped with a LoRA adapter. This training procedure facilitates distilling the new knowledge from the teacher's prompt into the student's weights.

The study of adversarial vulnerabilities of deep neural networks (DNNs) has progressed rapidly. Existing attacks require either internal access (to the architecture, parameters, or training set of the victim model) or external access (to query the model). However, both the access may be infeasible or expensive in many scenarios. We investigate no-box adversarial examples, where the attacker can neither access the model information or the training set nor query the model. Instead, the attacker can only gather a small number of examples from the same problem domain as that of the victim model. Such a stronger threat model greatly expands the applicability of adversarial attacks. We propose three mechanisms for training with a very small dataset (on the order of tens of examples) and find that prototypical reconstruction is the most effective. Our experiments show that adversarial examples crafted on prototypical auto-encoding models transfer well to a variety of image classification and face verification models. On a commercial celebrity recognition system held by clarifai.com, our approach significantly diminishes the average prediction accuracy of the system to only 15.40%, which is on par with the attack that transfers adversarial examples from a pre-trained Arcface model.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have showcased remarkable capabilities in following human instructions. However, recent studies have raised concerns about the robustness of LLMs when prompted with instructions combining textual adversarial samples. In this paper, drawing inspiration from recent works that LLMs are sensitive to the design of the instructions, we utilize instructions in code style, which are more structural and less ambiguous, to replace typically natural language instructions. Through this conversion, we provide LLMs with more precise instructions and strengthen the robustness of LLMs. Moreover, under few-shot scenarios, we propose a novel method to compose in-context demonstrations using both clean and adversarial samples (adversarial context method) to further boost the robustness of the LLMs. Experiments on eight robustness datasets show that our method consistently outperforms prompting LLMs with natural language instructions. For example, with gpt-3.5-turbo, our method achieves an improvement of 5.68\% in test set accuracy and a reduction of 5.66 points in Attack Success Rate (ASR).

Despite their tremendous success in modelling high-dimensional data manifolds, deep neural networks suffer from the threat of adversarial attacks - Existence of perceptually valid input-like samples obtained through careful perturbation that lead to degradation in the performance of the underlying model. Major concerns with existing defense mechanisms include non-generalizability across different attacks, models and large inference time. In this paper, we propose a generalized defense mechanism capitalizing on the expressive power of regularized latent space based generative models. We design an adversarial filter, devoid of access to classifier and adversaries, which makes it usable in tandem with any classifier. The basic idea is to learn a Lipschitz constrained mapping from the data manifold, incorporating adversarial perturbations, to a quantized latent space and re-map it to the true data manifold. Specifically, we simultaneously auto-encode the data manifold and its perturbations implicitly through the perturbations of the regularized and quantized generative latent space, realized using variational inference. We demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed formulation in providing resilience against multiple attack types (black and white box) and methods, while being almost real-time. Our experiments show that the proposed method surpasses the state-of-the-art techniques in several cases.

Backdoor attacks pose a serious security threat for training neural networks as they surreptitiously introduce hidden functionalities into a model. Such backdoors remain silent during inference on clean inputs, evading detection due to inconspicuous behavior. However, once a specific trigger pattern appears in the input data, the backdoor activates, causing the model to execute its concealed function. Detecting such poisoned samples within vast datasets is virtually impossible through manual inspection. To address this challenge, we propose a novel approach that enables model training on potentially poisoned datasets by utilizing the power of recent diffusion models. Specifically, we create synthetic variations of all training samples, leveraging the inherent resilience of diffusion models to potential trigger patterns in the data. By combining this generative approach with knowledge distillation, we produce student models that maintain their general performance on the task while exhibiting robust resistance to backdoor triggers.

Neural ranking models (NRMs) have shown remarkable success in recent years, especially with pre-trained language models. However, deep neural models are notorious for their vulnerability to adversarial examples. Adversarial attacks may become a new type of web spamming technique given our increased reliance on neural information retrieval models. Therefore, it is important to study potential adversarial attacks to identify vulnerabilities of NRMs before they are deployed. In this paper, we introduce the Word Substitution Ranking Attack (WSRA) task against NRMs, which aims to promote a target document in rankings by adding adversarial perturbations to its text. We focus on the decision-based black-box attack setting, where the attackers cannot directly get access to the model information, but can only query the target model to obtain the rank positions of the partial retrieved list. This attack setting is realistic in real-world search engines. We propose a novel Pseudo Relevance-based ADversarial ranking Attack method (PRADA) that learns a surrogate model based on Pseudo Relevance Feedback (PRF) to generate gradients for finding the adversarial perturbations. Experiments on two web search benchmark datasets show that PRADA can outperform existing attack strategies and successfully fool the NRM with small indiscernible perturbations of text.

Knowledge distillation aims to train a compact student network using soft supervision from a larger teacher network and hard supervision from ground truths. However, determining an optimal knowledge fusion ratio that balances these supervisory signals remains challenging. Prior methods generally resort to a constant or heuristic-based fusion ratio, which often falls short of a proper balance. In this study, we introduce a novel adaptive method for learning a sample-wise knowledge fusion ratio, exploiting both the correctness of teacher and student, as well as how well the student mimics the teacher on each sample. Our method naturally leads to the intra-sample trilateral geometric relations among the student prediction (S), teacher prediction (T), and ground truth (G). To counterbalance the impact of outliers, we further extend to the inter-sample relations, incorporating the teacher's global average prediction T for samples within the same class. A simple neural network then learns the implicit mapping from the intra- and inter-sample relations to an adaptive, sample-wise knowledge fusion ratio in a bilevel-optimization manner. Our approach provides a simple, practical, and adaptable solution for knowledge distillation that can be employed across various architectures and model sizes. Extensive experiments demonstrate consistent improvements over other loss re-weighting methods on image classification, attack detection, and click-through rate prediction.

Adversarial training provides a means of regularizing supervised learning algorithms while virtual adversarial training is able to extend supervised learning algorithms to the semi-supervised setting. However, both methods require making small perturbations to numerous entries of the input vector, which is inappropriate for sparse high-dimensional inputs such as one-hot word representations. We extend adversarial and virtual adversarial training to the text domain by applying perturbations to the word embeddings in a recurrent neural network rather than to the original input itself. The proposed method achieves state of the art results on multiple benchmark semi-supervised and purely supervised tasks. We provide visualizations and analysis showing that the learned word embeddings have improved in quality and that while training, the model is less prone to overfitting. Code is available at https://github.com/tensorflow/models/tree/master/research/adversarial_text.

As large language models become more prevalent, their possible harmful or inappropriate responses are a cause for concern. This paper introduces a unique dataset containing adversarial examples in the form of questions, which we call AttaQ, designed to provoke such harmful or inappropriate responses. We assess the efficacy of our dataset by analyzing the vulnerabilities of various models when subjected to it. Additionally, we introduce a novel automatic approach for identifying and naming vulnerable semantic regions - input semantic areas for which the model is likely to produce harmful outputs. This is achieved through the application of specialized clustering techniques that consider both the semantic similarity of the input attacks and the harmfulness of the model's responses. Automatically identifying vulnerable semantic regions enhances the evaluation of model weaknesses, facilitating targeted improvements to its safety mechanisms and overall reliability.

Transfer learning from pretrained language models recently became the dominant approach for solving many NLP tasks. A common approach to transfer learning for multiple tasks that maximize parameter sharing trains one or more task-specific layers on top of the language model. In this paper, we present an alternative approach based on adversarial reprogramming, which extends earlier work on automatic prompt generation. Adversarial reprogramming attempts to learn task-specific word embeddings that, when concatenated to the input text, instruct the language model to solve the specified task. Using up to 25K trainable parameters per task, this approach outperforms all existing methods with up to 25M trainable parameters on the public leaderboard of the GLUE benchmark. Our method, initialized with task-specific human-readable prompts, also works in a few-shot setting, outperforming GPT-3 on two SuperGLUE tasks with just 32 training samples.

Accurately identifying adversarial techniques in security texts is critical for effective cyber defense. However, existing methods face a fundamental trade-off: they either rely on generic models with limited domain precision or require resource-intensive pipelines that depend on large labeled datasets and task-specific optimizations, such as custom hard-negative mining and denoising, resources rarely available in specialized domains. We propose TechniqueRAG, a domain-specific retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) framework that bridges this gap by integrating off-the-shelf retrievers, instruction-tuned LLMs, and minimal text-technique pairs. Our approach addresses data scarcity by fine-tuning only the generation component on limited in-domain examples, circumventing the need for resource-intensive retrieval training. While conventional RAG mitigates hallucination by coupling retrieval and generation, its reliance on generic retrievers often introduces noisy candidates, limiting domain-specific precision. To address this, we enhance retrieval quality and domain specificity through zero-shot LLM re-ranking, which explicitly aligns retrieved candidates with adversarial techniques. Experiments on multiple security benchmarks demonstrate that TechniqueRAG achieves state-of-the-art performance without extensive task-specific optimizations or labeled data, while comprehensive analysis provides further insights.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are swiftly advancing in architecture and capability, and as they integrate more deeply into complex systems, the urgency to scrutinize their security properties grows. This paper surveys research in the emerging interdisciplinary field of adversarial attacks on LLMs, a subfield of trustworthy ML, combining the perspectives of Natural Language Processing and Security. Prior work has shown that even safety-aligned LLMs (via instruction tuning and reinforcement learning through human feedback) can be susceptible to adversarial attacks, which exploit weaknesses and mislead AI systems, as evidenced by the prevalence of `jailbreak' attacks on models like ChatGPT and Bard. In this survey, we first provide an overview of large language models, describe their safety alignment, and categorize existing research based on various learning structures: textual-only attacks, multi-modal attacks, and additional attack methods specifically targeting complex systems, such as federated learning or multi-agent systems. We also offer comprehensive remarks on works that focus on the fundamental sources of vulnerabilities and potential defenses. To make this field more accessible to newcomers, we present a systematic review of existing works, a structured typology of adversarial attack concepts, and additional resources, including slides for presentations on related topics at the 62nd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (ACL'24).

Visual question answering (VQA) often requires an understanding of visual concepts and language semantics, which relies on external knowledge. Most existing methods exploit pre-trained language models or/and unstructured text, but the knowledge in these resources are often incomplete and noisy. Some other methods prefer to use knowledge graphs (KGs) which often have intensive structured knowledge, but the research is still quite preliminary. In this paper, we propose LaKo, a knowledge-driven VQA method via Late Knowledge-to-text Injection. To effectively incorporate an external KG, we transfer triples into textual format and propose a late injection mechanism for knowledge fusion. Finally we address VQA as a text generation task with an effective encoder-decoder paradigm, which achieves state-of-the-art results on OKVQA dataset.

The prevalence and strong capability of large language models (LLMs) present significant safety and ethical risks if exploited by malicious users. To prevent the potentially deceptive usage of LLMs, recent works have proposed algorithms to detect LLM-generated text and protect LLMs. In this paper, we investigate the robustness and reliability of these LLM detectors under adversarial attacks. We study two types of attack strategies: 1) replacing certain words in an LLM's output with their synonyms given the context; 2) automatically searching for an instructional prompt to alter the writing style of the generation. In both strategies, we leverage an auxiliary LLM to generate the word replacements or the instructional prompt. Different from previous works, we consider a challenging setting where the auxiliary LLM can also be protected by a detector. Experiments reveal that our attacks effectively compromise the performance of all detectors in the study with plausible generations, underscoring the urgent need to improve the robustness of LLM-generated text detection systems.

In the future, powerful AI systems may be deployed in high-stakes settings, where a single failure could be catastrophic. One technique for improving AI safety in high-stakes settings is adversarial training, which uses an adversary to generate examples to train on in order to achieve better worst-case performance. In this work, we used a safe language generation task (``avoid injuries'') as a testbed for achieving high reliability through adversarial training. We created a series of adversarial training techniques -- including a tool that assists human adversaries -- to find and eliminate failures in a classifier that filters text completions suggested by a generator. In our task, we determined that we can set very conservative classifier thresholds without significantly impacting the quality of the filtered outputs. We found that adversarial training increased robustness to the adversarial attacks that we trained on -- doubling the time for our contractors to find adversarial examples both with our tool (from 13 to 26 minutes) and without (from 20 to 44 minutes) -- without affecting in-distribution performance. We hope to see further work in the high-stakes reliability setting, including more powerful tools for enhancing human adversaries and better ways to measure high levels of reliability, until we can confidently rule out the possibility of catastrophic deployment-time failures of powerful models.

Recent studies have shown that robustness to adversarial attacks can be transferred across networks. In other words, we can make a weak model more robust with the help of a strong teacher model. We ask if instead of learning from a static teacher, can models "learn together" and "teach each other" to achieve better robustness? In this paper, we study how interactions among models affect robustness via knowledge distillation. We propose mutual adversarial training (MAT), in which multiple models are trained together and share the knowledge of adversarial examples to achieve improved robustness. MAT allows robust models to explore a larger space of adversarial samples, and find more robust feature spaces and decision boundaries. Through extensive experiments on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, we demonstrate that MAT can effectively improve model robustness and outperform state-of-the-art methods under white-box attacks, bringing sim8% accuracy gain to vanilla adversarial training (AT) under PGD-100 attacks. In addition, we show that MAT can also mitigate the robustness trade-off among different perturbation types, bringing as much as 13.1% accuracy gain to AT baselines against the union of l_infty, l_2 and l_1 attacks. These results show the superiority of the proposed method and demonstrate that collaborative learning is an effective strategy for designing robust models.

We introduce two challenging datasets that reliably cause machine learning model performance to substantially degrade. The datasets are collected with a simple adversarial filtration technique to create datasets with limited spurious cues. Our datasets' real-world, unmodified examples transfer to various unseen models reliably, demonstrating that computer vision models have shared weaknesses. The first dataset is called ImageNet-A and is like the ImageNet test set, but it is far more challenging for existing models. We also curate an adversarial out-of-distribution detection dataset called ImageNet-O, which is the first out-of-distribution detection dataset created for ImageNet models. On ImageNet-A a DenseNet-121 obtains around 2% accuracy, an accuracy drop of approximately 90%, and its out-of-distribution detection performance on ImageNet-O is near random chance levels. We find that existing data augmentation techniques hardly boost performance, and using other public training datasets provides improvements that are limited. However, we find that improvements to computer vision architectures provide a promising path towards robust models.

We present FireBERT, a set of three proof-of-concept NLP classifiers hardened against TextFooler-style word-perturbation by producing diverse alternatives to original samples. In one approach, we co-tune BERT against the training data and synthetic adversarial samples. In a second approach, we generate the synthetic samples at evaluation time through substitution of words and perturbation of embedding vectors. The diversified evaluation results are then combined by voting. A third approach replaces evaluation-time word substitution with perturbation of embedding vectors. We evaluate FireBERT for MNLI and IMDB Movie Review datasets, in the original and on adversarial examples generated by TextFooler. We also test whether TextFooler is less successful in creating new adversarial samples when manipulating FireBERT, compared to working on unhardened classifiers. We show that it is possible to improve the accuracy of BERT-based models in the face of adversarial attacks without significantly reducing the accuracy for regular benchmark samples. We present co-tuning with a synthetic data generator as a highly effective method to protect against 95% of pre-manufactured adversarial samples while maintaining 98% of original benchmark performance. We also demonstrate evaluation-time perturbation as a promising direction for further research, restoring accuracy up to 75% of benchmark performance for pre-made adversarials, and up to 65% (from a baseline of 75% orig. / 12% attack) under active attack by TextFooler.

Leading language model (LM) providers like OpenAI and Google offer fine-tuning APIs that allow customers to adapt LMs for specific use cases. To prevent misuse, these LM providers implement filtering mechanisms to block harmful fine-tuning data. Consequently, adversaries seeking to produce unsafe LMs via these APIs must craft adversarial training data that are not identifiably harmful. We make three contributions in this context: 1. We show that many existing attacks that use harmless data to create unsafe LMs rely on eliminating model refusals in the first few tokens of their responses. 2. We show that such prior attacks can be blocked by a simple defense that pre-fills the first few tokens from an aligned model before letting the fine-tuned model fill in the rest. 3. We describe a new data-poisoning attack, ``No, Of course I Can Execute'' (NOICE), which exploits an LM's formulaic refusal mechanism to elicit harmful responses. By training an LM to refuse benign requests on the basis of safety before fulfilling those requests regardless, we are able to jailbreak several open-source models and a closed-source model (GPT-4o). We show an attack success rate (ASR) of 57% against GPT-4o; our attack earned a Bug Bounty from OpenAI. Against open-source models protected by simple defenses, we improve ASRs by an average of 3.25 times compared to the best performing previous attacks that use only harmless data. NOICE demonstrates the exploitability of repetitive refusal mechanisms and broadens understanding of the threats closed-source models face from harmless data.

In the evolving landscape of text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models, the remarkable capability to generate high-quality images from textual descriptions faces challenges with the potential misuse of reproducing sensitive content. To address this critical issue, we introduce Robust Adversarial Concept Erase (RACE), a novel approach designed to mitigate these risks by enhancing the robustness of concept erasure method for T2I models. RACE utilizes a sophisticated adversarial training framework to identify and mitigate adversarial text embeddings, significantly reducing the Attack Success Rate (ASR). Impressively, RACE achieves a 30 percentage point reduction in ASR for the ``nudity'' concept against the leading white-box attack method. Our extensive evaluations demonstrate RACE's effectiveness in defending against both white-box and black-box attacks, marking a significant advancement in protecting T2I diffusion models from generating inappropriate or misleading imagery. This work underlines the essential need for proactive defense measures in adapting to the rapidly advancing field of adversarial challenges. Our code is publicly available: https://github.com/chkimmmmm/R.A.C.E.

This paper introduces Indiana Jones, an innovative approach to jailbreaking Large Language Models (LLMs) by leveraging inter-model dialogues and keyword-driven prompts. Through orchestrating interactions among three specialised LLMs, the method achieves near-perfect success rates in bypassing content safeguards in both white-box and black-box LLMs. The research exposes systemic vulnerabilities within contemporary models, particularly their susceptibility to producing harmful or unethical outputs when guided by ostensibly innocuous prompts framed in historical or contextual contexts. Experimental evaluations highlight the efficacy and adaptability of Indiana Jones, demonstrating its superiority over existing jailbreak methods. These findings emphasise the urgent need for enhanced ethical safeguards and robust security measures in the development of LLMs. Moreover, this work provides a critical foundation for future studies aimed at fortifying LLMs against adversarial exploitation while preserving their utility and flexibility.

Many deployed learned models are black boxes: given input, returns output. Internal information about the model, such as the architecture, optimisation procedure, or training data, is not disclosed explicitly as it might contain proprietary information or make the system more vulnerable. This work shows that such attributes of neural networks can be exposed from a sequence of queries. This has multiple implications. On the one hand, our work exposes the vulnerability of black-box neural networks to different types of attacks -- we show that the revealed internal information helps generate more effective adversarial examples against the black box model. On the other hand, this technique can be used for better protection of private content from automatic recognition models using adversarial examples. Our paper suggests that it is actually hard to draw a line between white box and black box models.

Training deep neural networks on images represented as grids of pixels has brought to light an interesting phenomenon known as adversarial examples. Inspired by how humans reconstruct abstract concepts, we attempt to codify the input bitmap image into a set of compact, interpretable elements to avoid being fooled by the adversarial structures. We take the first step in this direction by experimenting with image vectorization as an input transformation step to map the adversarial examples back into the natural manifold of MNIST handwritten digits. We compare our method vs. state-of-the-art input transformations and further discuss the trade-offs between a hand-designed and a learned transformation defense.

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that can bypass their safety guardrails. In many domains, adversarial training has proven to be one of the most promising methods to reliably improve robustness against such attacks. Yet, in the context of LLMs, current methods for adversarial training are hindered by the high computational costs required to perform discrete adversarial attacks at each training iteration. We address this problem by instead calculating adversarial attacks in the continuous embedding space of the LLM, which is orders of magnitudes more efficient. We propose a fast adversarial training algorithm (C-AdvUL) composed of two losses: the first makes the model robust on continuous embedding attacks computed on an adversarial behaviour dataset; the second ensures the usefulness of the final model by fine-tuning on utility data. Moreover, we introduce C-AdvIPO, an adversarial variant of IPO that does not require utility data for adversarially robust alignment. Our empirical evaluation on four models from different families (Gemma, Phi3, Mistral, Zephyr) and at different scales (2B, 3.8B, 7B) shows that both algorithms substantially enhance LLM robustness against discrete attacks (GCG, AutoDAN, PAIR), while maintaining utility. Our results demonstrate that robustness to continuous perturbations can extrapolate to discrete threat models. Thereby, we present a path toward scalable adversarial training algorithms for robustly aligning LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are seeing significant adoption in every type of organization due to their exceptional generative capabilities. However, LLMs are found to be vulnerable to various adversarial attacks, particularly prompt injection attacks, which trick them into producing harmful or inappropriate content. Adversaries execute such attacks by crafting malicious prompts to deceive the LLMs. In this paper, we propose a novel approach based on embedding-based Machine Learning (ML) classifiers to protect LLM-based applications against this severe threat. We leverage three commonly used embedding models to generate embeddings of malicious and benign prompts and utilize ML classifiers to predict whether an input prompt is malicious. Out of several traditional ML methods, we achieve the best performance with classifiers built using Random Forest and XGBoost. Our classifiers outperform state-of-the-art prompt injection classifiers available in open-source implementations, which use encoder-only neural networks.

In this paper, we present Jellyfish, an open-source LLM as a universal task solver for DP. Built on the Llama 2 13B model, Jellyfish is instruction-tuned with the datasets of several typical DP tasks including error detection, data imputation, schema matching, and entity matching, and delivers generalizability to other tasks. Remarkably, Jellyfish can operate on a local, single, and low-priced GPU with its 13 billion parameters, ensuring data security and enabling further tuning. Its proficiency in understanding natural language allows users to manually craft instructions for DP tasks. Unlike many existing methods that heavily rely on prior knowledge, Jellyfish acquires domain knowledge during its tuning process and integrates optional knowledge injection during inference. A distinctive feature of Jellyfish is its interpreter, which elucidates its output decisions. To construct Jellyfish, we develop a series of pre-tuning and DP-tuning techniques. Jellyfish is equipped with an instance serializer, which automatically translates raw data into model prompts, and a knowledge injector, which optionally introduces task- and dataset-specific knowledge to enhance DP performance. Our evaluation of Jellyfish, using a range of real datasets, shows its competitiveness compared to state-of-the-art methods and its strong generalizability to unseen tasks. Jellyfish's performance rivals that of GPT series models, and its interpreter offers enhanced reasoning capabilities compared to GPT-3.5. Furthermore, our evaluation highlights the effectiveness of the techniques employed in constructing Jellyfish. Our model is available at Hugging Face: https://huggingface.co/NECOUDBFM/Jellyfish .

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated powerful capabilities that render them valuable in different applications, including conversational AI products. It is paramount to ensure the security and reliability of these products by mitigating their vulnerabilities towards malicious user interactions, which can lead to the exposure of great risks and reputational repercussions. In this work, we present a comprehensive study on the efficacy of fine-tuning and aligning Chain-of-Thought (CoT) responses of different LLMs that serve as input moderation guardrails. We systematically explore various tuning methods by leveraging a small set of training data to adapt these models as proxy defense mechanisms to detect malicious inputs and provide a reasoning for their verdicts, thereby preventing the exploitation of conversational agents. We rigorously evaluate the efficacy and robustness of different tuning strategies to generalize across diverse adversarial and malicious query types. Our experimental results outline the potential of alignment processes tailored to a varied range of harmful input queries, even with constrained data resources. These techniques significantly enhance the safety of conversational AI systems and provide a feasible framework for deploying more secure and trustworthy AI-driven interactions.

With the emergence of Mixture-of-Experts (MoE), the efficient scaling of model size has accelerated the development of large language models in recent years. However, their high memory requirements prevent their use in resource-constrained environments. While knowledge distillation (KD) has been a proven method for model compression, its application to MoE teacher models remains underexplored. Through our investigation, we discover that non-activated experts in MoE models possess valuable knowledge that benefits student models. We further demonstrate that existing KD methods are not optimal for compressing MoE models, as they fail to leverage this knowledge effectively. To address this, we propose two intuitive MoE-specific KD methods for the first time: Knowledge Augmentation (KA) and Student-Aware Router (SAR), both designed to effectively extract knowledge from all experts. Specifically, KA augments knowledge by sampling experts multiple times, while SAR uses all experts and adjusts the expert weights through router training to provide optimal knowledge. Extensive experiments show that our methods outperform conventional KD methods, demonstrating their effectiveness for MoE teacher models.

Large language models are now tuned to align with the goals of their creators, namely to be "helpful and harmless." These models should respond helpfully to user questions, but refuse to answer requests that could cause harm. However, adversarial users can construct inputs which circumvent attempts at alignment. In this work, we study to what extent these models remain aligned, even when interacting with an adversarial user who constructs worst-case inputs (adversarial examples). These inputs are designed to cause the model to emit harmful content that would otherwise be prohibited. We show that existing NLP-based optimization attacks are insufficiently powerful to reliably attack aligned text models: even when current NLP-based attacks fail, we can find adversarial inputs with brute force. As a result, the failure of current attacks should not be seen as proof that aligned text models remain aligned under adversarial inputs. However the recent trend in large-scale ML models is multimodal models that allow users to provide images that influence the text that is generated. We show these models can be easily attacked, i.e., induced to perform arbitrary un-aligned behavior through adversarial perturbation of the input image. We conjecture that improved NLP attacks may demonstrate this same level of adversarial control over text-only models.

Large language models (LLMs) have significantly transformed the educational landscape. As current plagiarism detection tools struggle to keep pace with LLMs' rapid advancements, the educational community faces the challenge of assessing students' true problem-solving abilities in the presence of LLMs. In this work, we explore a new paradigm for ensuring fair evaluation -- generating adversarial examples which preserve the structure and difficulty of the original questions aimed for assessment, but are unsolvable by LLMs. Focusing on the domain of math word problems, we leverage abstract syntax trees to structurally generate adversarial examples that cause LLMs to produce incorrect answers by simply editing the numeric values in the problems. We conduct experiments on various open- and closed-source LLMs, quantitatively and qualitatively demonstrating that our method significantly degrades their math problem-solving ability. We identify shared vulnerabilities among LLMs and propose a cost-effective approach to attack high-cost models. Additionally, we conduct automatic analysis to investigate the cause of failure, providing further insights into the limitations of LLMs.

Typical fact verification models use retrieved written evidence to verify claims. Evidence sources, however, often change over time as more information is gathered and revised. In order to adapt, models must be sensitive to subtle differences in supporting evidence. We present VitaminC, a benchmark infused with challenging cases that require fact verification models to discern and adjust to slight factual changes. We collect over 100,000 Wikipedia revisions that modify an underlying fact, and leverage these revisions, together with additional synthetically constructed ones, to create a total of over 400,000 claim-evidence pairs. Unlike previous resources, the examples in VitaminC are contrastive, i.e., they contain evidence pairs that are nearly identical in language and content, with the exception that one supports a given claim while the other does not. We show that training using this design increases robustness -- improving accuracy by 10% on adversarial fact verification and 6% on adversarial natural language inference (NLI). Moreover, the structure of VitaminC leads us to define additional tasks for fact-checking resources: tagging relevant words in the evidence for verifying the claim, identifying factual revisions, and providing automatic edits via factually consistent text generation.

Can we teach Large Language Models (LLMs) to refrain from hallucinating factual statements? In this paper we present a fine-tuning strategy that we call ConfQA, which can reduce hallucination rate from 20-40% to under 5% across multiple factuality benchmarks. The core idea is simple: when the LLM answers a question correctly, it is trained to continue with the answer; otherwise, it is trained to admit "I am unsure". But there are two key factors that make the training highly effective. First, we introduce a dampening prompt "answer only if you are confident" to explicitly guide the behavior, without which hallucination remains high as 15%-25%. Second, we leverage simple factual statements, specifically attribute values from knowledge graphs, to help LLMs calibrate the confidence, resulting in robust generalization across domains and question types. Building on this insight, we propose the Dual Neural Knowledge framework, which seamlessly select between internally parameterized neural knowledge and externally recorded symbolic knowledge based on ConfQA's confidence. The framework enables potential accuracy gains to beyond 95%, while reducing unnecessary external retrievals by over 30%.

Text classification systems have been proven vulnerable to adversarial text examples, modified versions of the original text examples that are often unnoticed by human eyes, yet can force text classification models to alter their classification. Often, research works quantifying the impact of adversarial text attacks have been applied only to models trained in English. In this paper, we introduce the first word-level study of adversarial attacks in Arabic. Specifically, we use a synonym (word-level) attack using a Masked Language Modeling (MLM) task with a BERT model in a black-box setting to assess the robustness of the state-of-the-art text classification models to adversarial attacks in Arabic. To evaluate the grammatical and semantic similarities of the newly produced adversarial examples using our synonym BERT-based attack, we invite four human evaluators to assess and compare the produced adversarial examples with their original examples. We also study the transferability of these newly produced Arabic adversarial examples to various models and investigate the effectiveness of defense mechanisms against these adversarial examples on the BERT models. We find that fine-tuned BERT models were more susceptible to our synonym attacks than the other Deep Neural Networks (DNN) models like WordCNN and WordLSTM we trained. We also find that fine-tuned BERT models were more susceptible to transferred attacks. We, lastly, find that fine-tuned BERT models successfully regain at least 2% in accuracy after applying adversarial training as an initial defense mechanism.

Discrete adversarial attacks are symbolic perturbations to a language input that preserve the output label but lead to a prediction error. While such attacks have been extensively explored for the purpose of evaluating model robustness, their utility for improving robustness has been limited to offline augmentation only. Concretely, given a trained model, attacks are used to generate perturbed (adversarial) examples, and the model is re-trained exactly once. In this work, we address this gap and leverage discrete attacks for online augmentation, where adversarial examples are generated at every training step, adapting to the changing nature of the model. We propose (i) a new discrete attack, based on best-first search, and (ii) random sampling attacks that unlike prior work are not based on expensive search-based procedures. Surprisingly, we find that random sampling leads to impressive gains in robustness, outperforming the commonly-used offline augmentation, while leading to a speedup at training time of ~10x. Furthermore, online augmentation with search-based attacks justifies the higher training cost, significantly improving robustness on three datasets. Last, we show that our new attack substantially improves robustness compared to prior methods.

Large language models (LLMs) can often be made to behave in undesirable ways that they are explicitly fine-tuned not to. For example, the LLM red-teaming literature has produced a wide variety of 'jailbreaking' techniques to elicit harmful text from models that were fine-tuned to be harmless. Recent work on red-teaming, model editing, and interpretability suggests that this challenge stems from how (adversarial) fine-tuning largely serves to suppress rather than remove undesirable capabilities from LLMs. Prior work has introduced latent adversarial training (LAT) as a way to improve robustness to broad classes of failures. These prior works have considered untargeted latent space attacks where the adversary perturbs latent activations to maximize loss on examples of desirable behavior. Untargeted LAT can provide a generic type of robustness but does not leverage information about specific failure modes. Here, we experiment with targeted LAT where the adversary seeks to minimize loss on a specific competing task. We find that it can augment a wide variety of state-of-the-art methods. First, we use targeted LAT to improve robustness to jailbreaks, outperforming a strong R2D2 baseline with orders of magnitude less compute. Second, we use it to more effectively remove backdoors with no knowledge of the trigger. Finally, we use it to more effectively unlearn knowledge for specific undesirable tasks in a way that is also more robust to re-learning. Overall, our results suggest that targeted LAT can be an effective tool for defending against harmful behaviors from LLMs.

Because "out-of-the-box" large language models are capable of generating a great deal of objectionable content, recent work has focused on aligning these models in an attempt to prevent undesirable generation. While there has been some success at circumventing these measures -- so-called "jailbreaks" against LLMs -- these attacks have required significant human ingenuity and are brittle in practice. In this paper, we propose a simple and effective attack method that causes aligned language models to generate objectionable behaviors. Specifically, our approach finds a suffix that, when attached to a wide range of queries for an LLM to produce objectionable content, aims to maximize the probability that the model produces an affirmative response (rather than refusing to answer). However, instead of relying on manual engineering, our approach automatically produces these adversarial suffixes by a combination of greedy and gradient-based search techniques, and also improves over past automatic prompt generation methods. Surprisingly, we find that the adversarial prompts generated by our approach are quite transferable, including to black-box, publicly released LLMs. Specifically, we train an adversarial attack suffix on multiple prompts (i.e., queries asking for many different types of objectionable content), as well as multiple models (in our case, Vicuna-7B and 13B). When doing so, the resulting attack suffix is able to induce objectionable content in the public interfaces to ChatGPT, Bard, and Claude, as well as open source LLMs such as LLaMA-2-Chat, Pythia, Falcon, and others. In total, this work significantly advances the state-of-the-art in adversarial attacks against aligned language models, raising important questions about how such systems can be prevented from producing objectionable information. Code is available at github.com/llm-attacks/llm-attacks.

Models leveraging both visual and textual data such as Contrastive Language-Image Pre-training (CLIP), are the backbone of many recent advances in artificial intelligence. In this work, we show that despite their versatility, such models are vulnerable to what we refer to as fooling master images. Fooling master images are capable of maximizing the confidence score of a CLIP model for a significant number of widely varying prompts, while being either unrecognizable or unrelated to the attacked prompts for humans. The existence of such images is problematic as it could be used by bad actors to maliciously interfere with CLIP-trained image retrieval models in production with comparably small effort as a single image can attack many different prompts. We demonstrate how fooling master images for CLIP (CLIPMasterPrints) can be mined using stochastic gradient descent, projected gradient descent, or blackbox optimization. Contrary to many common adversarial attacks, the blackbox optimization approach allows us to mine CLIPMasterPrints even when the weights of the model are not accessible. We investigate the properties of the mined images, and find that images trained on a small number of image captions generalize to a much larger number of semantically related captions. We evaluate possible mitigation strategies, where we increase the robustness of the model and introduce an approach to automatically detect CLIPMasterPrints to sanitize the input of vulnerable models. Finally, we find that vulnerability to CLIPMasterPrints is related to a modality gap in contrastive pre-trained multi-modal networks. Code available at https://github.com/matfrei/CLIPMasterPrints.

Large language models (LLMs) augmented with retrieval systems have demonstrated significant potential in handling knowledge-intensive tasks. However, these models often struggle with unfaithfulness issues, generating outputs that either ignore the retrieved context or inconsistently blend it with the LLM`s parametric knowledge. This issue is particularly severe in cases of knowledge conflict, where the retrieved context conflicts with the model`s parametric knowledge. While existing faithful RAG approaches enforce strict context adherence through well-designed prompts or modified decoding strategies, our analysis reveals a critical limitation: they achieve faithfulness by forcibly suppressing the model`s parametric knowledge, which undermines the model`s internal knowledge structure and increases the risk of misinterpreting the context. To this end, this paper proposes FaithfulRAG, a novel framework that resolves knowledge conflicts by explicitly modeling discrepancies between the model`s parametric knowledge and retrieved context. Specifically, FaithfulRAG identifies conflicting knowledge at the fact level and designs a self-thinking process, allowing LLMs to reason about and integrate conflicting facts before generating responses. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method outperforms state-of-the-art methods. The code is available at https:// github.com/DeepLearnXMU/Faithful-RAG

Red-teaming is a common practice for mitigating unsafe behaviors in Large Language Models (LLMs), which involves thoroughly assessing LLMs to identify potential flaws and addressing them with responsible and accurate responses. While effective, manual red-teaming is costly, and existing automatic red-teaming typically discovers safety risks without addressing them. In this paper, we propose a Multi-round Automatic Red-Teaming (MART) method, which incorporates both automatic adversarial prompt writing and safe response generation, significantly increasing red-teaming scalability and the safety of the target LLM. Specifically, an adversarial LLM and a target LLM interplay with each other in an iterative manner, where the adversarial LLM aims to generate challenging prompts that elicit unsafe responses from the target LLM, while the target LLM is fine-tuned with safety aligned data on these adversarial prompts. In each round, the adversarial LLM crafts better attacks on the updated target LLM, while the target LLM also improves itself through safety fine-tuning. On adversarial prompt benchmarks, the violation rate of an LLM with limited safety alignment reduces up to 84.7% after 4 rounds of MART, achieving comparable performance to LLMs with extensive adversarial prompt writing. Notably, model helpfulness on non-adversarial prompts remains stable throughout iterations, indicating the target LLM maintains strong performance on instruction following.

This paper presents a pioneering methodology, termed StructTuning, to efficiently transform foundation Large Language Models (LLMs) into domain specialists. It significantly minimizes the training corpus requirement to a mere 0.3% while achieving an impressive 50% of traditional knowledge injection performance. Our method is inspired by the educational processes for human students, particularly how structured domain knowledge from textbooks is absorbed and then applied to tackle real-world challenges through specific exercises. Based on this, we propose a novel two-stage knowledge injection strategy: Structure-aware Continual Pre-Training (SCPT) and Structure-aware Supervised Fine-Tuning (SSFT). In the SCPT phase, we organize the training data into an auto-generated taxonomy of domain knowledge, enabling LLMs to effectively memorize textual segments linked to specific expertise within the taxonomy's architecture. Subsequently, in the SSFT phase, we explicitly prompt models to reveal the underlying knowledge structure in their outputs, leveraging this structured domain insight to address practical problems adeptly. Our ultimate method has undergone extensive evaluations across model architectures and scales, using closed-book question-answering tasks on LongBench and MMedBench datasets. Remarkably, our method matches 50% of the improvement displayed by the state-of-the-art MMedLM2 on MMedBench, but with only 0.3% quantity of the training corpus. This breakthrough showcases the potential to scale up our StructTuning for stronger domain-specific LLMs. Code will be made public soon.

In recent years, NLP practitioners have converged on the following practice: (i) import an off-the-shelf pretrained (masked) language model; (ii) append a multilayer perceptron atop the CLS token's hidden representation (with randomly initialized weights); and (iii) fine-tune the entire model on a downstream task (MLP-FT). This procedure has produced massive gains on standard NLP benchmarks, but these models remain brittle, even to mild adversarial perturbations. In this work, we demonstrate surprising gains in adversarial robustness enjoyed by Model-tuning Via Prompts (MVP), an alternative method of adapting to downstream tasks. Rather than appending an MLP head to make output prediction, MVP appends a prompt template to the input, and makes prediction via text infilling/completion. Across 5 NLP datasets, 4 adversarial attacks, and 3 different models, MVP improves performance against adversarial substitutions by an average of 8% over standard methods and even outperforms adversarial training-based state-of-art defenses by 3.5%. By combining MVP with adversarial training, we achieve further improvements in adversarial robustness while maintaining performance on unperturbed examples. Finally, we conduct ablations to investigate the mechanism underlying these gains. Notably, we find that the main causes of vulnerability of MLP-FT can be attributed to the misalignment between pre-training and fine-tuning tasks, and the randomly initialized MLP parameters.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems, widely used to improve the factual grounding of large language models (LLMs), are increasingly vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where adversaries inject manipulated content into the retriever's corpus. While prior research has predominantly focused on single-attacker settings, real-world scenarios often involve multiple, competing attackers with conflicting objectives. In this work, we introduce PoisonArena, the first benchmark to systematically study and evaluate competing poisoning attacks in RAG. We formalize the multi-attacker threat model, where attackers vie to control the answer to the same query using mutually exclusive misinformation. PoisonArena leverages the Bradley-Terry model to quantify each method's competitive effectiveness in such adversarial environments. Through extensive experiments on the Natural Questions and MS MARCO datasets, we demonstrate that many attack strategies successful in isolation fail under competitive pressure. Our findings highlight the limitations of conventional evaluation metrics like Attack Success Rate (ASR) and F1 score and underscore the need for competitive evaluation to assess real-world attack robustness. PoisonArena provides a standardized framework to benchmark and develop future attack and defense strategies under more realistic, multi-adversary conditions.

This paper introduces a novel adversarial attack method targeting text classification models, termed the Modified Word Saliency-based Adversarial At-tack (MWSAA). The technique builds upon the concept of word saliency to strategically perturb input texts, aiming to mislead classification models while preserving semantic coherence. By refining the traditional adversarial attack approach, MWSAA significantly enhances its efficacy in evading detection by classification systems. The methodology involves first identifying salient words in the input text through a saliency estimation process, which prioritizes words most influential to the model's decision-making process. Subsequently, these salient words are subjected to carefully crafted modifications, guided by semantic similarity metrics to ensure that the altered text remains coherent and retains its original meaning. Empirical evaluations conducted on diverse text classification datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method in generating adversarial examples capable of successfully deceiving state-of-the-art classification models. Comparative analyses with existing adversarial attack techniques further indicate the superiority of the proposed approach in terms of both attack success rate and preservation of text coherence.

Knowledge Graph Embedding models have become an important area of machine learning.Those models provide a latent representation of entities and relations in a knowledge graph which can then be used in downstream machine learning tasks such as link prediction. The learning process of such models can be performed by contrasting positive and negative triples. While all triples of a KG are considered positive, negative triples are usually not readily available. Therefore, the choice of the sampling method to obtain the negative triples play a crucial role in the performance and effectiveness of Knowledge Graph Embedding models. Most of the current methods fetch negative samples from a random distribution of entities in the underlying Knowledge Graph which also often includes meaningless triples. Other known methods use adversarial techniques or generative neural networks which consequently reduce the efficiency of the process. In this paper, we propose an approach for generating informative negative samples considering available complementary knowledge about entities. Particularly, Pre-trained Language Models are used to form neighborhood clusters by utilizing the distances between entities to obtain representations of symbolic entities via their textual information. Our comprehensive evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach on benchmark Knowledge Graphs with textual information for the link prediction task.

The indexing-retrieval-generation paradigm of retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) has been highly successful in solving knowledge-intensive tasks by integrating external knowledge into large language models (LLMs). However, the incorporation of external and unverified knowledge increases the vulnerability of LLMs because attackers can perform attack tasks by manipulating knowledge. In this paper, we introduce a benchmark named SafeRAG designed to evaluate the RAG security. First, we classify attack tasks into silver noise, inter-context conflict, soft ad, and white Denial-of-Service. Next, we construct RAG security evaluation dataset (i.e., SafeRAG dataset) primarily manually for each task. We then utilize the SafeRAG dataset to simulate various attack scenarios that RAG may encounter. Experiments conducted on 14 representative RAG components demonstrate that RAG exhibits significant vulnerability to all attack tasks and even the most apparent attack task can easily bypass existing retrievers, filters, or advanced LLMs, resulting in the degradation of RAG service quality. Code is available at: https://github.com/IAAR-Shanghai/SafeRAG.

We demonstrate how images and sounds can be used for indirect prompt and instruction injection in multi-modal LLMs. An attacker generates an adversarial perturbation corresponding to the prompt and blends it into an image or audio recording. When the user asks the (unmodified, benign) model about the perturbed image or audio, the perturbation steers the model to output the attacker-chosen text and/or make the subsequent dialog follow the attacker's instruction. We illustrate this attack with several proof-of-concept examples targeting LLaVa and PandaGPT.

Adversarial purification is a defense mechanism for safeguarding classifiers against adversarial attacks without knowing the type of attacks or training of the classifier. These techniques characterize and eliminate adversarial perturbations from the attacked inputs, aiming to restore purified samples that retain similarity to the initially attacked ones and are correctly classified by the classifier. Due to the inherent challenges associated with characterizing noise perturbations for discrete inputs, adversarial text purification has been relatively unexplored. In this paper, we investigate the effectiveness of adversarial purification methods in defending text classifiers. We propose a novel adversarial text purification that harnesses the generative capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) to purify adversarial text without the need to explicitly characterize the discrete noise perturbations. We utilize prompt engineering to exploit LLMs for recovering the purified examples for given adversarial examples such that they are semantically similar and correctly classified. Our proposed method demonstrates remarkable performance over various classifiers, improving their accuracy under the attack by over 65% on average.

We surface a new threat to closed-weight Large Language Models (LLMs) that enables an attacker to compute optimization-based prompt injections. Specifically, we characterize how an attacker can leverage the loss-like information returned from the remote fine-tuning interface to guide the search for adversarial prompts. The fine-tuning interface is hosted by an LLM vendor and allows developers to fine-tune LLMs for their tasks, thus providing utility, but also exposes enough information for an attacker to compute adversarial prompts. Through an experimental analysis, we characterize the loss-like values returned by the Gemini fine-tuning API and demonstrate that they provide a useful signal for discrete optimization of adversarial prompts using a greedy search algorithm. Using the PurpleLlama prompt injection benchmark, we demonstrate attack success rates between 65% and 82% on Google's Gemini family of LLMs. These attacks exploit the classic utility-security tradeoff - the fine-tuning interface provides a useful feature for developers but also exposes the LLMs to powerful attacks.

Reliable deployment of machine learning models such as neural networks continues to be challenging due to several limitations. Some of the main shortcomings are the lack of interpretability and the lack of robustness against adversarial examples or out-of-distribution inputs. In this exploratory review, we explore the possibilities and limits of adversarial attacks for explainable machine learning models. First, we extend the notion of adversarial examples to fit in explainable machine learning scenarios, in which the inputs, the output classifications and the explanations of the model's decisions are assessed by humans. Next, we propose a comprehensive framework to study whether (and how) adversarial examples can be generated for explainable models under human assessment, introducing and illustrating novel attack paradigms. In particular, our framework considers a wide range of relevant yet often ignored factors such as the type of problem, the user expertise or the objective of the explanations, in order to identify the attack strategies that should be adopted in each scenario to successfully deceive the model (and the human). The intention of these contributions is to serve as a basis for a more rigorous and realistic study of adversarial examples in the field of explainable machine learning.

Deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples. Adversarial training (AT) is an effective defense against adversarial examples. However, AT is prone to overfitting which degrades robustness substantially. Recently, data augmentation (DA) was shown to be effective in mitigating robust overfitting if appropriately designed and optimized for AT. This work proposes a new method to automatically learn online, instance-wise, DA policies to improve robust generalization for AT. A novel policy learning objective, consisting of Vulnerability, Affinity and Diversity, is proposed and shown to be sufficiently effective and efficient to be practical for automatic DA generation during AT. This allows our method to efficiently explore a large search space for a more effective DA policy and evolve the policy as training progresses. Empirically, our method is shown to outperform or match all competitive DA methods across various model architectures (CNNs and ViTs) and datasets (CIFAR10, SVHN and Imagenette). Our DA policy reinforced vanilla AT to surpass several state-of-the-art AT methods (with baseline DA) in terms of both accuracy and robustness. It can also be combined with those advanced AT methods to produce a further boost in robustness.

Recent work has shown it is possible to construct adversarial examples that cause an aligned language model to emit harmful strings or perform harmful behavior. Existing attacks work either in the white-box setting (with full access to the model weights), or through transferability: the phenomenon that adversarial examples crafted on one model often remain effective on other models. We improve on prior work with a query-based attack that leverages API access to a remote language model to construct adversarial examples that cause the model to emit harmful strings with (much) higher probability than with transfer-only attacks. We validate our attack on GPT-3.5 and OpenAI's safety classifier; we can cause GPT-3.5 to emit harmful strings that current transfer attacks fail at, and we can evade the safety classifier with nearly 100% probability.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in a variety of important applications, yet their safety and reliability remain as major concerns. Various adversarial and jailbreak attacks have been proposed to bypass the safety alignment and cause the model to produce harmful responses. We introduce Self-supervised Prompt INjection (SPIN) which can detect and reverse these various attacks on LLMs. As our self-supervised prompt defense is done at inference-time, it is also compatible with existing alignment and adds an additional layer of safety for defense. Our benchmarks demonstrate that our system can reduce the attack success rate by up to 87.9%, while maintaining the performance on benign user requests. In addition, we discuss the situation of an adaptive attacker and show that our method is still resilient against attackers who are aware of our defense.

As large language models (LLMs) continue to advance in capability and influence, ensuring their security and preventing harmful outputs has become crucial. A promising approach to address these concerns involves training models to automatically generate adversarial prompts for red teaming. However, the evolving subtlety of vulnerabilities in LLMs challenges the effectiveness of current adversarial methods, which struggle to specifically target and explore the weaknesses of these models. To tackle these challenges, we introduce the Self-Evolving Adversarial Safety (SEAS) optimization framework, which enhances security by leveraging data generated by the model itself. SEAS operates through three iterative stages: Initialization, Attack, and Adversarial Optimization, refining both the Red Team and Target models to improve robustness and safety. This framework reduces reliance on manual testing and significantly enhances the security capabilities of LLMs. Our contributions include a novel adversarial framework, a comprehensive safety dataset, and after three iterations, the Target model achieves a security level comparable to GPT-4, while the Red Team model shows a marked increase in attack success rate (ASR) against advanced models.

This paper addresses the tradeoff between standard accuracy on clean examples and robustness against adversarial examples in deep neural networks (DNNs). Although adversarial training (AT) improves robustness, it degrades the standard accuracy, thus yielding the tradeoff. To mitigate this tradeoff, we propose a novel AT method called ARREST, which comprises three components: (i) adversarial finetuning (AFT), (ii) representation-guided knowledge distillation (RGKD), and (iii) noisy replay (NR). AFT trains a DNN on adversarial examples by initializing its parameters with a DNN that is standardly pretrained on clean examples. RGKD and NR respectively entail a regularization term and an algorithm to preserve latent representations of clean examples during AFT. RGKD penalizes the distance between the representations of the standardly pretrained and AFT DNNs. NR switches input adversarial examples to nonadversarial ones when the representation changes significantly during AFT. By combining these components, ARREST achieves both high standard accuracy and robustness. Experimental results demonstrate that ARREST mitigates the tradeoff more effectively than previous AT-based methods do.

We study the problem of learning representations of entities and relations in knowledge graphs for predicting missing links. The success of such a task heavily relies on the ability of modeling and inferring the patterns of (or between) the relations. In this paper, we present a new approach for knowledge graph embedding called RotatE, which is able to model and infer various relation patterns including: symmetry/antisymmetry, inversion, and composition. Specifically, the RotatE model defines each relation as a rotation from the source entity to the target entity in the complex vector space. In addition, we propose a novel self-adversarial negative sampling technique for efficiently and effectively training the RotatE model. Experimental results on multiple benchmark knowledge graphs show that the proposed RotatE model is not only scalable, but also able to infer and model various relation patterns and significantly outperform existing state-of-the-art models for link prediction.

Adversarial attacks have emerged as a critical threat to autonomous driving systems. These attacks exploit the underlying neural network, allowing small -- nearly invisible -- perturbations to completely alter the behavior of such systems in potentially malicious ways. E.g., causing a traffic sign classification network to misclassify a stop sign as a speed limit sign. Prior working in hardening such systems to adversarial attacks have looked at robust training of the system or adding additional pre-processing steps to the input pipeline. Such solutions either have a hard time generalizing, require knowledge of the adversarial attacks during training, or are computationally undesirable. Instead, we propose to take insights for parameter efficient fine-tuning and use low-rank adaptation (LoRA) to train a lightweight security patch -- enabling us to dynamically patch a large preexisting vision system as new vulnerabilities are discovered. We demonstrate that our framework can patch a pre-trained model to improve classification accuracy by up to 78.01% in the presence of adversarial examples.

Over the last decade, deep neural networks have achieved state of the art in computer vision tasks. These models, however, are susceptible to unusual inputs, known as adversarial examples, that cause them to misclassify or otherwise fail to detect objects. Here, we provide evidence that the increasing success of adversarial attacks is primarily due to increasing their size. We then demonstrate a method for generating the largest possible adversarial patch by building a adversarial pattern out of repeatable elements. This approach achieves a new state of the art in evading detection by YOLOv2 and YOLOv3. Finally, we present an experiment that fails to replicate the prior success of several attacks published in this field, and end with some comments on testing and reproducibility.

Despite the remarkable progress in text-to-image generative models, they are prone to adversarial attacks and inadvertently generate unsafe, unethical content. Existing approaches often rely on fine-tuning models to remove specific concepts, which is computationally expensive, lack scalability, and/or compromise generation quality. In this work, we propose a novel framework leveraging k-sparse autoencoders (k-SAEs) to enable efficient and interpretable concept manipulation in diffusion models. Specifically, we first identify interpretable monosemantic concepts in the latent space of text embeddings and leverage them to precisely steer the generation away or towards a given concept (e.g., nudity) or to introduce a new concept (e.g., photographic style). Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our approach is very simple, requires no retraining of the base model nor LoRA adapters, does not compromise the generation quality, and is robust to adversarial prompt manipulations. Our method yields an improvement of 20.01% in unsafe concept removal, is effective in style manipulation, and is sim5x faster than current state-of-the-art.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have led to significant improvements in many tasks across various domains, such as code interpretation, response generation, and ambiguity handling. These LLMs, however, when upgrading, primarily prioritize enhancing user experience while neglecting security, privacy, and safety implications. Consequently, unintended vulnerabilities or biases can be introduced. Previous studies have predominantly focused on specific versions of the models and disregard the potential emergence of new attack vectors targeting the updated versions. Through the lens of adversarial examples within the in-context learning framework, this longitudinal study addresses this gap by conducting a comprehensive assessment of the robustness of successive versions of LLMs, vis-\`a-vis GPT-3.5. We conduct extensive experiments to analyze and understand the impact of the robustness in two distinct learning categories: zero-shot learning and few-shot learning. Our findings indicate that, in comparison to earlier versions of LLMs, the updated versions do not exhibit the anticipated level of robustness against adversarial attacks. In addition, our study emphasizes the increased effectiveness of synergized adversarial queries in most zero-shot learning and few-shot learning cases. We hope that our study can lead to a more refined assessment of the robustness of LLMs over time and provide valuable insights of these models for both developers and users.

Diffusion Models (DMs) have empowered great success in artificial-intelligence-generated content, especially in artwork creation, yet raising new concerns in intellectual properties and copyright. For example, infringers can make profits by imitating non-authorized human-created paintings with DMs. Recent researches suggest that various adversarial examples for diffusion models can be effective tools against these copyright infringements. However, current adversarial examples show weakness in transferability over different painting-imitating methods and robustness under straightforward adversarial defense, for example, noise purification. We surprisingly find that the transferability of adversarial examples can be significantly enhanced by exploiting a fused and modified adversarial loss term under consistent parameters. In this work, we comprehensively evaluate the cross-method transferability of adversarial examples. The experimental observation shows that our method generates more transferable adversarial examples with even stronger robustness against the simple adversarial defense.

We study the problem of adversarial language games, in which multiple agents with conflicting goals compete with each other via natural language interactions. While adversarial language games are ubiquitous in human activities, little attention has been devoted to this field in natural language processing. In this work, we propose a challenging adversarial language game called Adversarial Taboo as an example, in which an attacker and a defender compete around a target word. The attacker is tasked with inducing the defender to utter the target word invisible to the defender, while the defender is tasked with detecting the target word before being induced by the attacker. In Adversarial Taboo, a successful attacker must hide its intention and subtly induce the defender, while a competitive defender must be cautious with its utterances and infer the intention of the attacker. Such language abilities can facilitate many important downstream NLP tasks. To instantiate the game, we create a game environment and a competition platform. Comprehensive experiments and empirical studies on several baseline attack and defense strategies show promising and interesting results. Based on the analysis on the game and experiments, we discuss multiple promising directions for future research.

The pursuit of data efficiency, where quality outweighs quantity, has emerged as a cornerstone in robotic manipulation, especially given the high costs associated with real-world data collection. We propose that maximizing the informational density of individual demonstrations can dramatically reduce reliance on large-scale datasets while improving task performance. To this end, we introduce Adversarial Data Collection, a Human-in-the-Loop (HiL) framework that redefines robotic data acquisition through real-time, bidirectional human-environment interactions. Unlike conventional pipelines that passively record static demonstrations, ADC adopts a collaborative perturbation paradigm: during a single episode, an adversarial operator dynamically alters object states, environmental conditions, and linguistic commands, while the tele-operator adaptively adjusts actions to overcome these evolving challenges. This process compresses diverse failure-recovery behaviors, compositional task variations, and environmental perturbations into minimal demonstrations. Our experiments demonstrate that ADC-trained models achieve superior compositional generalization to unseen task instructions, enhanced robustness to perceptual perturbations, and emergent error recovery capabilities. Strikingly, models trained with merely 20% of the demonstration volume collected through ADC significantly outperform traditional approaches using full datasets. These advances bridge the gap between data-centric learning paradigms and practical robotic deployment, demonstrating that strategic data acquisition, not merely post-hoc processing, is critical for scalable, real-world robot learning. Additionally, we are curating a large-scale ADC-Robotics dataset comprising real-world manipulation tasks with adversarial perturbations. This benchmark will be open-sourced to facilitate advancements in robotic imitation learning.

It has become common to publish large (billion parameter) language models that have been trained on private datasets. This paper demonstrates that in such settings, an adversary can perform a training data extraction attack to recover individual training examples by querying the language model. We demonstrate our attack on GPT-2, a language model trained on scrapes of the public Internet, and are able to extract hundreds of verbatim text sequences from the model's training data. These extracted examples include (public) personally identifiable information (names, phone numbers, and email addresses), IRC conversations, code, and 128-bit UUIDs. Our attack is possible even though each of the above sequences are included in just one document in the training data. We comprehensively evaluate our extraction attack to understand the factors that contribute to its success. Worryingly, we find that larger models are more vulnerable than smaller models. We conclude by drawing lessons and discussing possible safeguards for training large language models.

We explore a class of adversarial attacks targeting the activations of language models. By manipulating a relatively small subset of model activations, a, we demonstrate the ability to control the exact prediction of a significant number (in some cases up to 1000) of subsequent tokens t. We empirically verify a scaling law where the maximum number of target tokens t_max predicted depends linearly on the number of tokens a whose activations the attacker controls as t_max = kappa a. We find that the number of bits of control in the input space needed to control a single bit in the output space (what we call attack resistance chi) is remarkably constant between approx 16 and approx 25 over 2 orders of magnitude of model sizes for different language models. Compared to attacks on tokens, attacks on activations are predictably much stronger, however, we identify a surprising regularity where one bit of input steered either via activations or via tokens is able to exert control over a similar amount of output bits. This gives support for the hypothesis that adversarial attacks are a consequence of dimensionality mismatch between the input and output spaces. A practical implication of the ease of attacking language model activations instead of tokens is for multi-modal and selected retrieval models, where additional data sources are added as activations directly, sidestepping the tokenized input. This opens up a new, broad attack surface. By using language models as a controllable test-bed to study adversarial attacks, we were able to experiment with input-output dimensions that are inaccessible in computer vision, especially where the output dimension dominates.

Counterfactual explanations and adversarial attacks have a related goal: flipping output labels with minimal perturbations regardless of their characteristics. Yet, adversarial attacks cannot be used directly in a counterfactual explanation perspective, as such perturbations are perceived as noise and not as actionable and understandable image modifications. Building on the robust learning literature, this paper proposes an elegant method to turn adversarial attacks into semantically meaningful perturbations, without modifying the classifiers to explain. The proposed approach hypothesizes that Denoising Diffusion Probabilistic Models are excellent regularizers for avoiding high-frequency and out-of-distribution perturbations when generating adversarial attacks. The paper's key idea is to build attacks through a diffusion model to polish them. This allows studying the target model regardless of its robustification level. Extensive experimentation shows the advantages of our counterfactual explanation approach over current State-of-the-Art in multiple testbeds.

The proliferation of large language models has raised growing concerns about their misuse, particularly in cases where AI-generated text is falsely attributed to human authors. Machine-generated content detectors claim to effectively identify such text under various conditions and from any language model. This paper critically evaluates these claims by assessing several popular detectors (RADAR, Wild, T5Sentinel, Fast-DetectGPT, PHD, LogRank, Binoculars) on a range of domains, datasets, and models that these detectors have not previously encountered. We employ various prompting strategies to simulate practical adversarial attacks, demonstrating that even moderate efforts can significantly evade detection. We emphasize the importance of the true positive rate at a specific false positive rate (TPR@FPR) metric and demonstrate that these detectors perform poorly in certain settings, with TPR@.01 as low as 0%. Our findings suggest that both trained and zero-shot detectors struggle to maintain high sensitivity while achieving a reasonable true positive rate.

Self-supervised learning usually uses a large amount of unlabeled data to pre-train an encoder which can be used as a general-purpose feature extractor, such that downstream users only need to perform fine-tuning operations to enjoy the benefit of "large model". Despite this promising prospect, the security of pre-trained encoder has not been thoroughly investigated yet, especially when the pre-trained encoder is publicly available for commercial use. In this paper, we propose AdvEncoder, the first framework for generating downstream-agnostic universal adversarial examples based on the pre-trained encoder. AdvEncoder aims to construct a universal adversarial perturbation or patch for a set of natural images that can fool all the downstream tasks inheriting the victim pre-trained encoder. Unlike traditional adversarial example works, the pre-trained encoder only outputs feature vectors rather than classification labels. Therefore, we first exploit the high frequency component information of the image to guide the generation of adversarial examples. Then we design a generative attack framework to construct adversarial perturbations/patches by learning the distribution of the attack surrogate dataset to improve their attack success rates and transferability. Our results show that an attacker can successfully attack downstream tasks without knowing either the pre-training dataset or the downstream dataset. We also tailor four defenses for pre-trained encoders, the results of which further prove the attack ability of AdvEncoder.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are now commonly used in many domains. However, they are vulnerable to adversarial attacks: carefully crafted perturbations on data inputs that can fool a model into making incorrect predictions. Despite significant research on developing DNN attack and defense techniques, people still lack an understanding of how such attacks penetrate a model's internals. We present Bluff, an interactive system for visualizing, characterizing, and deciphering adversarial attacks on vision-based neural networks. Bluff allows people to flexibly visualize and compare the activation pathways for benign and attacked images, revealing mechanisms that adversarial attacks employ to inflict harm on a model. Bluff is open-sourced and runs in modern web browsers.

Given a partial description like "she opened the hood of the car," humans can reason about the situation and anticipate what might come next ("then, she examined the engine"). In this paper, we introduce the task of grounded commonsense inference, unifying natural language inference and commonsense reasoning. We present SWAG, a new dataset with 113k multiple choice questions about a rich spectrum of grounded situations. To address the recurring challenges of the annotation artifacts and human biases found in many existing datasets, we propose Adversarial Filtering (AF), a novel procedure that constructs a de-biased dataset by iteratively training an ensemble of stylistic classifiers, and using them to filter the data. To account for the aggressive adversarial filtering, we use state-of-the-art language models to massively oversample a diverse set of potential counterfactuals. Empirical results demonstrate that while humans can solve the resulting inference problems with high accuracy (88%), various competitive models struggle on our task. We provide comprehensive analysis that indicates significant opportunities for future research.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) enables Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate grounded responses by leveraging external knowledge databases without altering model parameters. Although the absence of weight tuning prevents leakage via model parameters, it introduces the risk of inference adversaries exploiting retrieved documents in the model's context. Existing methods for membership inference and data extraction often rely on jailbreaking or carefully crafted unnatural queries, which can be easily detected or thwarted with query rewriting techniques common in RAG systems. In this work, we present Interrogation Attack (IA), a membership inference technique targeting documents in the RAG datastore. By crafting natural-text queries that are answerable only with the target document's presence, our approach demonstrates successful inference with just 30 queries while remaining stealthy; straightforward detectors identify adversarial prompts from existing methods up to ~76x more frequently than those generated by our attack. We observe a 2x improvement in TPR@1%FPR over prior inference attacks across diverse RAG configurations, all while costing less than $0.02 per document inference.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents can automate cybersecurity tasks and can adapt to the evolving cybersecurity landscape without re-engineering. While LLM agents have demonstrated cybersecurity capabilities on Capture-The-Flag (CTF) competitions, they have two key limitations: accessing latest cybersecurity expertise beyond training data, and integrating new knowledge into complex task planning. Knowledge-based approaches that incorporate technical understanding into the task-solving automation can tackle these limitations. We present CRAKEN, a knowledge-based LLM agent framework that improves cybersecurity capability through three core mechanisms: contextual decomposition of task-critical information, iterative self-reflected knowledge retrieval, and knowledge-hint injection that transforms insights into adaptive attack strategies. Comprehensive evaluations with different configurations show CRAKEN's effectiveness in multi-stage vulnerability detection and exploitation compared to previous approaches. Our extensible architecture establishes new methodologies for embedding new security knowledge into LLM-driven cybersecurity agentic systems. With a knowledge database of CTF writeups, CRAKEN obtained an accuracy of 22% on NYU CTF Bench, outperforming prior works by 3% and achieving state-of-the-art results. On evaluation of MITRE ATT&CK techniques, CRAKEN solves 25-30% more techniques than prior work, demonstrating improved cybersecurity capabilities via knowledge-based execution. We make our framework open source to public https://github.com/NYU-LLM-CTF/nyuctf_agents_craken.

Deep learning has transformed AI applications but faces critical security challenges, including adversarial attacks, data poisoning, model theft, and privacy leakage. This survey examines these vulnerabilities, detailing their mechanisms and impact on model integrity and confidentiality. Practical implementations, including adversarial examples, label flipping, and backdoor attacks, are explored alongside defenses such as adversarial training, differential privacy, and federated learning, highlighting their strengths and limitations. Advanced methods like contrastive and self-supervised learning are presented for enhancing robustness. The survey concludes with future directions, emphasizing automated defenses, zero-trust architectures, and the security challenges of large AI models. A balanced approach to performance and security is essential for developing reliable deep learning systems.

Language model attacks typically assume one of two extreme threat models: full white-box access to model weights, or black-box access limited to a text generation API. However, real-world APIs are often more flexible than just text generation: these APIs expose "gray-box" access leading to new threat vectors. To explore this, we red-team three new functionalities exposed in the GPT-4 APIs: fine-tuning, function calling and knowledge retrieval. We find that fine-tuning a model on as few as 15 harmful examples or 100 benign examples can remove core safeguards from GPT-4, enabling a range of harmful outputs. Furthermore, we find that GPT-4 Assistants readily divulge the function call schema and can be made to execute arbitrary function calls. Finally, we find that knowledge retrieval can be hijacked by injecting instructions into retrieval documents. These vulnerabilities highlight that any additions to the functionality exposed by an API can create new vulnerabilities.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems enhance Large Language Models (LLMs) by retrieving relevant documents from external corpora before generating responses. This approach significantly expands LLM capabilities by leveraging vast, up-to-date external knowledge. However, this reliance on external knowledge makes RAG systems vulnerable to corpus poisoning attacks that manipulate generated outputs via poisoned document injection. Existing poisoning attack strategies typically treat the retrieval and generation stages as disjointed, limiting their effectiveness. We propose Joint-GCG, the first framework to unify gradient-based attacks across both retriever and generator models through three innovations: (1) Cross-Vocabulary Projection for aligning embedding spaces, (2) Gradient Tokenization Alignment for synchronizing token-level gradient signals, and (3) Adaptive Weighted Fusion for dynamically balancing attacking objectives. Evaluations demonstrate that Joint-GCG achieves at most 25% and an average of 5% higher attack success rate than previous methods across multiple retrievers and generators. While optimized under a white-box assumption, the generated poisons show unprecedented transferability to unseen models. Joint-GCG's innovative unification of gradient-based attacks across retrieval and generation stages fundamentally reshapes our understanding of vulnerabilities within RAG systems. Our code is available at https://github.com/NicerWang/Joint-GCG.

Recently, there has been significant progress in studying neural networks to translate text descriptions into SQL queries. Despite achieving good performance on some public benchmarks, existing text-to-SQL models typically rely on the lexical matching between words in natural language (NL) questions and tokens in table schemas, which may render the models vulnerable to attacks that break the schema linking mechanism. In this work, we investigate the robustness of text-to-SQL models to synonym substitution. In particular, we introduce Spider-Syn, a human-curated dataset based on the Spider benchmark for text-to-SQL translation. NL questions in Spider-Syn are modified from Spider, by replacing their schema-related words with manually selected synonyms that reflect real-world question paraphrases. We observe that the accuracy dramatically drops by eliminating such explicit correspondence between NL questions and table schemas, even if the synonyms are not adversarially selected to conduct worst-case adversarial attacks. Finally, we present two categories of approaches to improve the model robustness. The first category of approaches utilizes additional synonym annotations for table schemas by modifying the model input, while the second category is based on adversarial training. We demonstrate that both categories of approaches significantly outperform their counterparts without the defense, and the first category of approaches are more effective.

In this paper, we propose a novel LLM-Neo framework that efficiently transfers knowledge from a large language model (LLM) teacher to a compact student. Initially, we revisit the knowledge distillation (KD) and low-rank adaption (LoRA), and argue that they share the same paradigm. Inspired by this observation, we explore the strategy that combines LoRA and KD to enhance the efficiency of knowledge transfer. We first summarize some guidelines for this design and further develop the LLM-Neo. Experimental results on compressing Llama 2 and Llama 3 show that LLM-Neo outperforms various baselines. Further analysis demonstrates the robustness of the proposed LLM-Neo on variants of LoRA. The trained models have been available at https://huggingface.co/collections/yang31210999/llm-neo-66e3c882f5579b829ff57eba{this repository}.

While state-of-the-art language models have achieved impressive results, they remain susceptible to inference-time adversarial attacks, such as adversarial prompts generated by red teams arXiv:2209.07858. One approach proposed to improve the general quality of language model generations is multi-agent debate, where language models self-evaluate through discussion and feedback arXiv:2305.14325. We implement multi-agent debate between current state-of-the-art language models and evaluate models' susceptibility to red team attacks in both single- and multi-agent settings. We find that multi-agent debate can reduce model toxicity when jailbroken or less capable models are forced to debate with non-jailbroken or more capable models. We also find marginal improvements through the general usage of multi-agent interactions. We further perform adversarial prompt content classification via embedding clustering, and analyze the susceptibility of different models to different types of attack topics.

The increasing reliance on Large Language Models (LLMs) across academia and industry necessitates a comprehensive understanding of their robustness to prompts. In response to this vital need, we introduce PromptBench, a robustness benchmark designed to measure LLMs' resilience to adversarial prompts. This study uses a plethora of adversarial textual attacks targeting prompts across multiple levels: character, word, sentence, and semantic. These prompts are then employed in diverse tasks, such as sentiment analysis, natural language inference, reading comprehension, machine translation, and math problem-solving. Our study generates 4,032 adversarial prompts, meticulously evaluated over 8 tasks and 13 datasets, with 567,084 test samples in total. Our findings demonstrate that contemporary LLMs are vulnerable to adversarial prompts. Furthermore, we present comprehensive analysis to understand the mystery behind prompt robustness and its transferability. We then offer insightful robustness analysis and pragmatic recommendations for prompt composition, beneficial to both researchers and everyday users. We make our code, prompts, and methodologies to generate adversarial prompts publicly accessible, thereby enabling and encouraging collaborative exploration in this pivotal field: https://github.com/microsoft/promptbench.

While pre-trained multimodal representations (e.g., CLIP) have shown impressive capabilities, they exhibit significant compositional vulnerabilities leading to counterintuitive judgments. We introduce Multimodal Adversarial Compositionality (MAC), a benchmark that leverages large language models (LLMs) to generate deceptive text samples to exploit these vulnerabilities across different modalities and evaluates them through both sample-wise attack success rate and group-wise entropy-based diversity. To improve zero-shot methods, we propose a self-training approach that leverages rejection-sampling fine-tuning with diversity-promoting filtering, which enhances both attack success rate and sample diversity. Using smaller language models like Llama-3.1-8B, our approach demonstrates superior performance in revealing compositional vulnerabilities across various multimodal representations, including images, videos, and audios.

The increasing capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) have raised concerns about their misuse in AI-generated plagiarism and social engineering. While various AI-generated text detectors have been proposed to mitigate these risks, many remain vulnerable to simple evasion techniques such as paraphrasing. However, recent detectors have shown greater robustness against such basic attacks. In this work, we introduce Adversarial Paraphrasing, a training-free attack framework that universally humanizes any AI-generated text to evade detection more effectively. Our approach leverages an off-the-shelf instruction-following LLM to paraphrase AI-generated content under the guidance of an AI text detector, producing adversarial examples that are specifically optimized to bypass detection. Extensive experiments show that our attack is both broadly effective and highly transferable across several detection systems. For instance, compared to simple paraphrasing attack--which, ironically, increases the true positive at 1% false positive (T@1%F) by 8.57% on RADAR and 15.03% on Fast-DetectGPT--adversarial paraphrasing, guided by OpenAI-RoBERTa-Large, reduces T@1%F by 64.49% on RADAR and a striking 98.96% on Fast-DetectGPT. Across a diverse set of detectors--including neural network-based, watermark-based, and zero-shot approaches--our attack achieves an average T@1%F reduction of 87.88% under the guidance of OpenAI-RoBERTa-Large. We also analyze the tradeoff between text quality and attack success to find that our method can significantly reduce detection rates, with mostly a slight degradation in text quality. Our adversarial setup highlights the need for more robust and resilient detection strategies in the light of increasingly sophisticated evasion techniques.

Adversarial datasets should validate AI robustness by providing samples on which humans perform well, but models do not. However, as models evolve, datasets can become obsolete. Measuring whether a dataset remains adversarial is hindered by the lack of a standardized metric for measuring adversarialness. We propose AdvScore, a human-grounded evaluation metric that assesses a dataset's adversarialness by capturing models' and humans' varying abilities while also identifying poor examples. We then use AdvScore to motivate a new dataset creation pipeline for realistic and high-quality adversarial samples, enabling us to collect an adversarial question answering (QA) dataset, AdvQA. We apply AdvScore using 9,347 human responses and ten language models' predictions to track model improvement over five years, from 2020 to 2024. AdvScore thus provides guidance for achieving robustness comparable with human capabilities. Furthermore, it helps determine to what extent adversarial datasets continue to pose challenges, ensuring that, rather than reflecting outdated or overly artificial difficulties, they effectively test model capabilities.

Transferable targeted adversarial attacks aim to mislead models into outputting adversary-specified predictions in black-box scenarios. Recent studies have introduced single-target generative attacks that train a generator for each target class to generate highly transferable perturbations, resulting in substantial computational overhead when handling multiple classes. Multi-target attacks address this by training only one class-conditional generator for multiple classes. However, the generator simply uses class labels as conditions, failing to leverage the rich semantic information of the target class. To this end, we design a CLIP-guided Generative Network with Cross-attention modules (CGNC) to enhance multi-target attacks by incorporating textual knowledge of CLIP into the generator. Extensive experiments demonstrate that CGNC yields significant improvements over previous multi-target generative attacks, e.g., a 21.46\% improvement in success rate from ResNet-152 to DenseNet-121. Moreover, we propose a masked fine-tuning mechanism to further strengthen our method in attacking a single class, which surpasses existing single-target methods.

The cultivation of expertise for large language models (LLMs) to solve tasks of specific areas often requires special-purpose tuning with calibrated behaviors on the expected stable outputs. To avoid huge cost brought by manual preparation of instruction datasets and training resources up to hundreds of hours, the exploitation of open knowledge including a wealth of low rank adaptation (LoRA) models and instruction datasets serves as a good starting point. However, existing methods on model and data selection focus on the performance of general-purpose capabilities while neglecting the knowledge gap exposed in domain-specific deployment. In the present study, we propose to bridge such gap by introducing few human-annotated samples (i.e., K-shot) for advancing task expertise of LLMs with open knowledge. Specifically, we develop an efficient and scalable pipeline to cost-efficiently produce task experts where K-shot data intervene in selecting the most promising expert candidates and the task-relevant instructions. A mixture-of-expert (MoE) system is built to make the best use of individual-yet-complementary knowledge between multiple experts. We unveil the two keys to the success of a MoE system, 1) the abidance by K-shot, and 2) the insistence on diversity. For the former, we ensure that models that truly possess problem-solving abilities on K-shot are selected rather than those blind guessers. Besides, during data selection, instructions that share task-relevant contexts with K-shot are prioritized. For the latter, we highlight the diversity of constituting experts and that of the fine-tuning instructions throughout the model and data selection process. Extensive experimental results confirm the superiority of our approach over existing methods on utilization of open knowledge across various tasks. Codes and models will be released later.

In Dynamic Adversarial Data Collection (DADC), human annotators are tasked with finding examples that models struggle to predict correctly. Models trained on DADC-collected training data have been shown to be more robust in adversarial and out-of-domain settings, and are considerably harder for humans to fool. However, DADC is more time-consuming than traditional data collection and thus more costly per annotated example. In this work, we examine whether we can maintain the advantages of DADC, without incurring the additional cost. To that end, we introduce Generative Annotation Assistants (GAAs), generator-in-the-loop models that provide real-time suggestions that annotators can either approve, modify, or reject entirely. We collect training datasets in twenty experimental settings and perform a detailed analysis of this approach for the task of extractive question answering (QA) for both standard and adversarial data collection. We demonstrate that GAAs provide significant efficiency benefits with over a 30% annotation speed-up, while leading to over a 5x improvement in model fooling rates. In addition, we find that using GAA-assisted training data leads to higher downstream model performance on a variety of question answering tasks over adversarial data collection.

The study of representation universality in AI models reveals growing convergence across domains, modalities, and architectures. However, the practical applications of representation universality remain largely unexplored. We bridge this gap by demonstrating that safety interventions can be transferred between models through learned mappings of their shared activation spaces. We demonstrate this approach on two well-established AI safety tasks: backdoor removal and refusal of harmful prompts, showing successful transfer of steering vectors that alter the models' outputs in a predictable way. Additionally, we propose a new task, corrupted capabilities, where models are fine-tuned to embed knowledge tied to a backdoor. This tests their ability to separate useful skills from backdoors, reflecting real-world challenges. Extensive experiments across Llama, Qwen and Gemma model families show that our method enables using smaller models to efficiently align larger ones. Furthermore, we demonstrate that autoencoder mappings between base and fine-tuned models can serve as reliable ``lightweight safety switches", allowing dynamic toggling between model behaviors.

Despite the success of convolutional neural networks (CNNs) in many academic benchmarks for computer vision tasks, their application in the real-world is still facing fundamental challenges. One of these open problems is the inherent lack of robustness, unveiled by the striking effectiveness of adversarial attacks. Current attack methods are able to manipulate the network's prediction by adding specific but small amounts of noise to the input. In turn, adversarial training (AT) aims to achieve robustness against such attacks and ideally a better model generalization ability by including adversarial samples in the trainingset. However, an in-depth analysis of the resulting robust models beyond adversarial robustness is still pending. In this paper, we empirically analyze a variety of adversarially trained models that achieve high robust accuracies when facing state-of-the-art attacks and we show that AT has an interesting side-effect: it leads to models that are significantly less overconfident with their decisions, even on clean data than non-robust models. Further, our analysis of robust models shows that not only AT but also the model's building blocks (like activation functions and pooling) have a strong influence on the models' prediction confidences. Data & Project website: https://github.com/GeJulia/robustness_confidences_evaluation

As industrial applications are increasingly automated by machine learning models, enforcing personal data ownership and intellectual property rights requires tracing training data back to their rightful owners. Membership inference algorithms approach this problem by using statistical techniques to discern whether a target sample was included in a model's training set. However, existing methods only utilize the unaltered target sample or simple augmentations of the target to compute statistics. Such a sparse sampling of the model's behavior carries little information, leading to poor inference capabilities. In this work, we use adversarial tools to directly optimize for queries that are discriminative and diverse. Our improvements achieve significantly more accurate membership inference than existing methods, especially in offline scenarios and in the low false-positive regime which is critical in legal settings. Code is available at https://github.com/YuxinWenRick/canary-in-a-coalmine.

Prior work in parameter-modifying knowledge editing has shown that large-scale sequential editing leads to significant model degradation. In this paper, we study the reasons behind this and scale sequential knowledge editing to 10,000 sequential edits, while maintaining the downstream performance of the original model. We first show that locate-then-edit knowledge editing methods lead to overfitting on the edited facts. We also show that continuous knowledge editing using these methods leads to disproportionate growth in the norm of the edited matrix. We then provide a crucial insight into the inner workings of locate-then-edit methods. We show that norm-growth is a hidden trick employed by these methods that gives larger importance to the output activations produced from the edited layers. With this "importance hacking", the edited layers provide a much larger contributions to the model's output. To mitigate these issues, we present ENCORE - Early stopping and Norm-Constrained Robust knowledge Editing. ENCORE controls for overfitting and the disproportionate norm-growth to enable long-term sequential editing, where we are able to perform up to 10,000 sequential edits without loss of downstream performance. ENCORE is also 61% faster than MEMIT and 64% faster than AlphaEdit on Llama3-8B.

Commonsense generation aims at generating plausible everyday scenario description based on a set of provided concepts. Digging the relationship of concepts from scratch is non-trivial, therefore, we retrieve prototypes from external knowledge to assist the understanding of the scenario for better description generation. We integrate two additional modules, namely position indicator and scaling module, into the pretrained encoder-decoder model for prototype modeling to enhance the knowledge injection procedure. We conduct experiment on CommonGen benchmark, and experimental results show that our method significantly improves the performance on all the metrics.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable success in various tasks such as natural language understanding, text summarization, and machine translation. However, their general-purpose nature often limits their effectiveness in domain-specific applications that require specialized knowledge, such as healthcare, chemistry, or legal analysis. To address this, researchers have explored diverse methods to enhance LLMs by integrating domain-specific knowledge. In this survey, we provide a comprehensive overview of these methods, which we categorize into four key approaches: dynamic knowledge injection, static knowledge embedding, modular adapters, and prompt optimization. Each approach offers unique mechanisms to equip LLMs with domain expertise, balancing trade-offs between flexibility, scalability, and efficiency. We discuss how these methods enable LLMs to tackle specialized tasks, compare their advantages and disadvantages, evaluate domain-specific LLMs against general LLMs, and highlight the challenges and opportunities in this emerging field. For those interested in delving deeper into this area, we also summarize the commonly used datasets and benchmarks. To keep researchers updated on the latest studies, we maintain an open-source at: https://github.com/abilliyb/Knowledge_Injection_Survey_Papers, dedicated to documenting research in the field of specialized LLM.

Vision Language Models (VLMs) have revolutionized the creation of generalist web agents, empowering them to autonomously complete diverse tasks on real-world websites, thereby boosting human efficiency and productivity. However, despite their remarkable capabilities, the safety and security of these agents against malicious attacks remain critically underexplored, raising significant concerns about their safe deployment. To uncover and exploit such vulnerabilities in web agents, we provide AdvWeb, a novel black-box attack framework designed against web agents. AdvWeb trains an adversarial prompter model that generates and injects adversarial prompts into web pages, misleading web agents into executing targeted adversarial actions such as inappropriate stock purchases or incorrect bank transactions, actions that could lead to severe real-world consequences. With only black-box access to the web agent, we train and optimize the adversarial prompter model using DPO, leveraging both successful and failed attack strings against the target agent. Unlike prior approaches, our adversarial string injection maintains stealth and control: (1) the appearance of the website remains unchanged before and after the attack, making it nearly impossible for users to detect tampering, and (2) attackers can modify specific substrings within the generated adversarial string to seamlessly change the attack objective (e.g., purchasing stocks from a different company), enhancing attack flexibility and efficiency. We conduct extensive evaluations, demonstrating that AdvWeb achieves high success rates in attacking SOTA GPT-4V-based VLM agent across various web tasks. Our findings expose critical vulnerabilities in current LLM/VLM-based agents, emphasizing the urgent need for developing more reliable web agents and effective defenses. Our code and data are available at https://ai-secure.github.io/AdvWeb/ .

Existing neural networks for computer vision tasks are vulnerable to adversarial attacks: adding imperceptible perturbations to the input images can fool these methods to make a false prediction on an image that was correctly predicted without the perturbation. Various defense methods have proposed image-to-image mapping methods, either including these perturbations in the training process or removing them in a preprocessing denoising step. In doing so, existing methods often ignore that the natural RGB images in today's datasets are not captured but, in fact, recovered from RAW color filter array captures that are subject to various degradations in the capture. In this work, we exploit this RAW data distribution as an empirical prior for adversarial defense. Specifically, we proposed a model-agnostic adversarial defensive method, which maps the input RGB images to Bayer RAW space and back to output RGB using a learned camera image signal processing (ISP) pipeline to eliminate potential adversarial patterns. The proposed method acts as an off-the-shelf preprocessing module and, unlike model-specific adversarial training methods, does not require adversarial images to train. As a result, the method generalizes to unseen tasks without additional retraining. Experiments on large-scale datasets (e.g., ImageNet, COCO) for different vision tasks (e.g., classification, semantic segmentation, object detection) validate that the method significantly outperforms existing methods across task domains.

LLM agents have demonstrated remarkable performance across various applications, primarily due to their advanced capabilities in reasoning, utilizing external knowledge and tools, calling APIs, and executing actions to interact with environments. Current agents typically utilize a memory module or a retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) mechanism, retrieving past knowledge and instances with similar embeddings from knowledge bases to inform task planning and execution. However, the reliance on unverified knowledge bases raises significant concerns about their safety and trustworthiness. To uncover such vulnerabilities, we propose a novel red teaming approach AgentPoison, the first backdoor attack targeting generic and RAG-based LLM agents by poisoning their long-term memory or RAG knowledge base. In particular, we form the trigger generation process as a constrained optimization to optimize backdoor triggers by mapping the triggered instances to a unique embedding space, so as to ensure that whenever a user instruction contains the optimized backdoor trigger, the malicious demonstrations are retrieved from the poisoned memory or knowledge base with high probability. In the meantime, benign instructions without the trigger will still maintain normal performance. Unlike conventional backdoor attacks, AgentPoison requires no additional model training or fine-tuning, and the optimized backdoor trigger exhibits superior transferability, in-context coherence, and stealthiness. Extensive experiments demonstrate AgentPoison's effectiveness in attacking three types of real-world LLM agents: RAG-based autonomous driving agent, knowledge-intensive QA agent, and healthcare EHRAgent. On each agent, AgentPoison achieves an average attack success rate higher than 80% with minimal impact on benign performance (less than 1%) with a poison rate less than 0.1%.

Machine learning models, especially deep neural networks (DNNs), have been shown to be vulnerable against adversarial examples which are carefully crafted samples with a small magnitude of the perturbation. Such adversarial perturbations are usually restricted by bounding their L_p norm such that they are imperceptible, and thus many current defenses can exploit this property to reduce their adversarial impact. In this paper, we instead introduce "unrestricted" perturbations that manipulate semantically meaningful image-based visual descriptors - color and texture - in order to generate effective and photorealistic adversarial examples. We show that these semantically aware perturbations are effective against JPEG compression, feature squeezing and adversarially trained model. We also show that the proposed methods can effectively be applied to both image classification and image captioning tasks on complex datasets such as ImageNet and MSCOCO. In addition, we conduct comprehensive user studies to show that our generated semantic adversarial examples are photorealistic to humans despite large magnitude perturbations when compared to other attacks.